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ABSTRACT  
Focusing on the support of non-CSDP policies for CSDP measures, both in the field of 
crisis management and defence, this study submits that CSDP cannot effectively 
contribute to EU external action by itself, but only in coherence with other EU policies 
and instruments. The study focuses on nine different issue areas of the EU which are 
of particular interest in the context of CSDP: European Neighbourhood Policy, 
development cooperation, internal policies and financing instruments in the context 
of the EU’s international crisis management, as well as innovation policies, industrial 
policies, regional policy, trade policy and space policy in the context of the EU’s 
defence policy. The study builds on existing evidence of synergising effects of CSDP 
and other non-CSDP policies and points to the potential impact which the closer 
interplay of CSDP and non-CSDP policies could have. Focusing on policy adaptation 
as well as institutional cooperation of EU actors in each of the policy relationships, the 
study provides a comprehensive overview of the linkage between CSDP and each of 
the respective policies and draws a large set of tailor-made recommendations in the 
field. 
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Executive Summary  
This study focuses on the support of non-CSDP policies for CSDP measures, both in the field of 
crisis-management as well as defence policy. To this end, the study focuses on nine different policy 
areas of the EU which are of particular interest in the context of CSDP: the European 
Neighbourhood Policy, development cooperation, and financing instruments in the context of the 
EU’s international crisis management, as well as EU internal policies such as innovation, industrial, 
regional, trade and space policies.  
The study shows that CSDP cannot effectively contribute to EU external action by itself, but only if 
in the good company of other EU policies and instruments. Given this interplay of CSDP and non-
CSDP policies, other non-CSDP instruments and CSDP need to be coherent and mutually 
supportive. The study shows that they eventually may even have synergising effects on each other 
in the context of CSDP. It builds on existing evidence of such synergising effects and points to the 
potential impact which a closer interplay of policies could have. The study further shows that a 
contextualisation of CSDP has a crucial impact on both policy adaptation and institutional 
cooperation of EU actors in the field. In each of the nine selected policy fields, such policy 
adaptation and institutional cooperation are being analysed, and recommendations are drawn 
accordingly. 
An analysis of the legal-political background of CSDP shows that on the one hand it is an integral 
part of the larger CFSP, providing external civilian and military capabilities (e.g. Art. 42(1), 43 and 44 
TEU) as well as internal defence cooperation tools (e.g. Art. 42(2), 45 and 46 TEU) that the EU 
otherwise would not have in neither its external action, nor its internal integration. However, it also 
points to the specific intergovernmental nature of CSDP and, therefore, the need for an EU external 
action that is consistent with other policies, for example in the framework of the EU’s 
comprehensive approach.  
The European Neighbourhood Policy analysis is divided into the Eastern and Mediterranean 
dimension. The analysis shows that ENP goals of political and economic stabilisation depend, on 
the one hand, directly on the success of conflict prevention measures and would benefit 
immensely from successful conflict resolution. On the other hand, conflict-related policies and 
other security policies linked to fighting transnational organised crime, terrorism and the 
proliferation of weapons benefit directly from successful reforms and state-building processes, 
which are at the core of the ENP. In this respect, the study submits that the articulation of 
CFSP/CSDP and non-CFSP/CSDP instruments is crucial for the overall success of EU policies in 
the Eastern neighbourhood. In fact, under the ENP and the Eastern Partnership in particular, the EU 
has several non-CFSP/CSDP instruments supporting its policy goals, including the promotion of 
stability and security, while financial assistance is available from the new European Neighbourhood 
Instrument. At the same time, the EU security policy towards the Mediterranean seems to have 
been affected by the disillusionment that followed the Arab uprisings. As economic and political 
instability inside Europe consume available resources, the attitude towards the Southern 
Mediterranean countries seems anchored to pre-2008 economic crisis and pre-Arab spring 
assumptions. Furthermore, the study points to the fact that the Lisbon Treaty has endowed the 
EU with a set of powerful instruments, from the creation of the EEAS to new CSDP practices and 
new responsibilities in the field of external economic relations, most of which could be put at use in 
relations with the ENP-South, if invigorated by a new vision. Being under review, the future ENP 
should deliver a political vision encompassing both economic and security aspects.  
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The findings regarding the ENP are mirrored in the study’s focus on the nexus between internal 
and external policies of the EU. In that respect, the analysis underlines that, in view of the current 
Mediterranean migration crisis, not only a stronger commitment from the neighbouring countries, 
but also a clearer coordinating structure, with a strong role for pivotal actors like EU Special 
Representatives (officially none exists for either the Eastern or the Southern ENP component) and 
consistency between ENP and other EU tools and policies as Frontex and Europol agreements are 
required. The EU’s comprehensive approach is a good way to combine the EU’s entire toolkit 
linked to internal and external dimensions of security to fight terrorism and irregular migration. 
However, the main challenge remains to translate the EU discourse into practice on the ground. 
The analysis points out that EU tools are managed by different actors according to various logics of 
action, procedures and budget lines. Therefore, the EU should strengthen its structures of 
coordination (PSC, EEAS) and the role of actors in a pivotal position, such as the HR/VP, in order to 
mitigate power struggles in EU security governance. In this respect, the study raises the hope that 
the European Security Strategy clarifies the strategic approach with specific guidelines to improve 
the overall coherence and especially to better bridge internal and external policies. 
With regard to development cooperation, the analysis of development-security relations shows 
that the Lisbon Treaty now provides a stronger framework than in the past to ensure that 
competition and tensions between CSDP and the Commission’s work are quickly resolved through 
inter-institutional talks and negotiations under the aegis of the double-hatted HR/VP. Regarding 
instruments on the ground, the study points out that current debates and positions seem to bend 
in favour of a revision of the scope of both the Africa Peace Facility and of the Instrument 
contributing to Stability and Peace to allow EU funds to support equipment provision in 
security and defence. Other options on the table (a new specific financing instrument, the Athena 
mechanism, the use of the CSDP start-up fund) may seem less likely but should not be discarded in 
the future. The analysis underlines that there is no shortage of tools to come up with joint 
analysis on risks to use development resources for security-related endeavours. Again, the study 
shows that new strategic frameworks may help Brussels Headquarters – more specifically the 
Council, the HR/VP, the EEAS, Commission DGs – to synergise policies, but it may also top up 
existing strategic document templates.  
In the field of EU defence policy cooperation, the analysis demonstrates that EU innovation 
policies provide considerable indirect and increasingly direct investment in dual-use and CSDP-
relevant technologies. Given the importance for defence technology development of spinning in 
the more advanced civilian technologies, the study submits that it may be more effective to 
continue supporting dual-use technologies next to than a specialised defence technology 
research priority. It also highlights that more needs to be done to align the instruments and 
procedures of the EDA and Commission so that they can work together more efficiently to avoid 
unnecessary duplication. Despite the interest of a number of Member States in funding defence 
research, the question of whether the EU can really add value in this area needs to be asked. At the 
same time, the December 2013 Council Conclusions on European defence point to the need for a 
stronger European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) as a prerequisite to an 
efficient and effective CSDP. Moreover, a number of Commission communications point to the link 
between defence industrial policies and the CSDP. The development of defence-industrial policies 
at the EU level not only seeks to create a functioning single European defence market, which could 
lead to cost savings and economies of scale, but is also seen as a way to increase the EU’s strategic 
autonomy, enhance its ability to act with partners and to boost jobs, innovation and growth. The 
study underlines that CSDP cannot be fully effective without defence capabilities, and that without 
a more efficient defence industry the Member States find it difficult to efficiently develop key 
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capabilities, remedy shortfalls or avoid redundancies. The study shows that a more cost effective 
and integrated defence market, which is stimulated by research and development investment, is 
a key building block for a more effective CSDP.  
In terms of regional policies, the study underlines that although according to the Treaties 
structural funds must be used for civilian purposes, the Commission and particularly the EDA have 
been proactive in their attempts to lever the funds into support for dual-use technology 
development. The use of structural funds to support CSDP is clearly limited by the Treaties. 
However, as the study points out, the Commission and the EDA could also publicise the ways in 
which communities could apply for support for conversion activities for people, land and industry 
that occur as a result of changing security priorities. 
In the context of EU trade policy, the armaments and dual-use export regimes have been subject 
to revision since the signing of the Lisbon Treaty. The EU Code of Conduct was revised in 2008 and 
the dual-use regime is currently undergoing a review. In order to ascertain the impact of FTAs on 
the European defence market and industry, little adaptation is required. The study shows that the 
Commission already has competence for the dual-use export regime and for negotiating the EU’s 
FTAs on behalf of the Member States. Many of the FTAs relate to dual-use goods and technologies 
rather than armaments. In turn, the Commission has a crucial role to play.  
Finally, the study demonstrates that the deployment of space assets for filling the CSDP 
capability gap is primarily framed by the parallel evolutions of an ever-expanding security concept 
and the recognition of the inherent dual-use nature of space infrastructure. The increased 
recognition of space applications as tools for deployment in security and defence matters 
becomes ever-more visible, despite the civilian nature of the programmes in which they were 
developed. This process is reinforced by the inherently dual-use nature of almost any type of space 
technology. The study underlines that the Union should further exploit the full potential of the 
institutional framework of the Lisbon Treaty, especially when taking into account the limitations 
arising from the specific nature of the space policy and CSDP competences of the EU, and the need 
to involve both independent EU space infrastructure and Member State defence systems to meet 
the increasing CSDP needs. 
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1 Objective and methodology of the study – Identifying 
support for CSDP through EU level measures and 
procedures   
The objective of this study is to show that the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is not 
only a policy related to different actors, procedures and instruments (Chapter 3), but also a policy 
field that needs to be seen in the context and company of other EU instruments and policies 
(remaining chapters of the study). CSDP and other (non-CSDP) instruments together form what is 
commonly known as EU external action. It is in this context that it becomes evident that CSDP 
cannot effectively contribute to EU external action by itself and that coherent action across policies 
will be necessary. This also implies that such other non-CSDP instruments and CSDP not only need 
to be coherent, but also supportive of each other. Eventually, they may even have synergising 
effects on each other in the context of CSDP in particular and EU external action at large.  
The type of missions which are launched in CSDP vary greatly and can be seen as missions using 
both military and civilian instruments that deal with security, political and social crises (human 
security, post war crisis management, failed states and support of government structures, security 
sector reform, border control, migration etc.). However, this 'CSDP' policy is hardly to be 
decoupled from other policies, such as development, Justice and Home Affairs, and European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Sometimes, these other policies are even conceptualised by the EU in 
such a way that they include CSDP (e.g. ENP).  
In other words, the link between CSDP and other policies arguably exists because of what has been 
called a 'nexus' between security and other fields on the ground. The nexus between one policy, 
like CSDP, and another, is crucial given their mutual effects on each other. This understanding 
can serve as a background of why coherence and synergies matter between CSDP and other fields. 
In this light we can look at what different policies have to offer for CSDP.  
CSDP does not only deal with international security. As its name suggests, collective defence is as 
important a component of CSDP. The evolution towards a common Union defence is an objective 
of the EU, contributing to the EU’s international presence and potential responsiveness in case of 
external aggression. Like in the case of international security, the defence policy conducted in the 
CSDP framework cannot be seen separately from other EU policies. Rather, Union policies related 
to the EU’s single market and external relations do provide a link (or have the potential to link) with 
the defence policy of CSDP.         
In this study, several experts look into the way how policies actually and potentially contribute to 
CSDP, whether it is in the context of international security or the objective of a common 
defence policy. The experts draw upon their ongoing research in the field, focusing on the 
interlinkage of security and other EU policy domains, including extensive desk research, primary 
and secondary sources, like EU official documents and academic literature, as well as publications 
from security-related think tanks. Moreover, their case studies also build on various expert 
interviews with EU officials. In total, the study builds on 24 interviews and contacts with officials in 
the EEAS, the Commission and the European Defence Agency. Furthermore, the study includes 
information from additional 44 interviews with the European Parliament, the Commission, EU 
Member State Officials and European Defence Agency which had been conducted prior to the 
study.     
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Figure 1: Linking CSDP (crisis-management) with external non CSDP-policies 
 
The cases that are being looked at have been selected carefully, providing a picture of CSDP being 
linked rather than being unrelated to other EU policy areas. This is true for CSDP in the specific case 
of crisis management: Here, the study will focus on the link between ENP and CSDP, Development 
Cooperation and CSDP, Internal Policies and CSDP as well as the EU’s financial instruments and 
CSDP (Figure 1).  
Moreover, the study lends particular attention to the link between defence policies and innovation, 
industrial, regional policies, trade policies and space policy. Overall the study provides a 
comprehensive overview of eight specific policy areas and instruments that are intertwined with 
CSDP (Figure 2).   
Figure 2: Linking CSDP (defence) with internal non CSDP-policies 
 
In each of the selected cases the attempt is to portray how CSDP and other non-CSDP policies 
relate to each other, how their objectives and instruments interlink and which institutional 
and policy adaptations are needed to improve the interplay between the respective fields. On 
this basis the study draws comparative conclusions and provides recommendation on how to 
make non-CSDP policies support CSDP so that in a coherent manner they are able to synergise and 
contribute to the improvement of the EU’s follow up of its overall policy objectives in the domain 
of external action.         
Regional  
Policies 
 Innovation and 
Industry 
Space Trade 
CSDP 
Development 
Cooperation ENP 
External Financing 
Instruments 
Internal Policies 
CSDP 
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2 The legal-political framework of CSDP and the treaty of 
Lisbon’s implications for the link between CSDP and 
‘other’ EU level policies   
The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) has become part of the Treaty on European 
Union’s (TEU) Title V in the 'General Provisions on the Union’s External Action and Specific 
Provisions on Common Foreign and Security Policy'. The CSDP is part of the overall Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Article 42 (1) TEU stipulates: 'The common security and defence 
policy shall be an integral part of the common foreign and security policy. It shall provide the 
Union with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets.' Still, CSDP 
arrangements are distinct from the CFSP ones, both in terms of actors as well as procedures and 
instruments.  
Although the Lisbon Treaty has officially abandoned the pillar structure of the Treaties, it can be 
argued that CFSP and CSDP are also distinct from other policies in the area of EU external action 
which are dealt with in the framework of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU). As a consequence, while one may make a distinction between TEU and TFEU policies in EU 
external action as well as CSDP and non-CSDP policies, synergising effects between these different 
areas can only be achieved if EU actors understand the various domains as contributing to one 
overall EU policy.    
2.1 External operative potentials in crisis management 
2.1.1 Objectives, actors, instruments and decision-making 
As mentioned, CSDP is an ‘integral’ part of the larger CFSP1, providing instrumental assets that the 
EU otherwise would not have in its external action, especially so-called civilian and military 
capabilities which the Union can add to its external policy tool-box when running international 
missions. Such missions can be used in the context of crisis management, including peace-keeping, 
conflict prevention and strengthening international security. Committed to the multilateral 
security governance framework provided by the United Nations and dependent upon its own 
Member States to contribute to the making of an EU security policy, the Union has gradually 
developed its assets in security policy – initially relying on capacities from the former Western 
European Union (WEU) to carry out the ‘Petersberg tasks’ in the Amsterdam Treaty2, then 
developing its own capacities since the Treaty of Nice in the framework of ESDP, by means of the 
creation of the EU Military Committee (EUMC) and the EU Military Staff (EUMS), and finally 
deepening its own policy in the context of CSDP,  including a mutual assistance clause3.  
 
1 Kuijper, P. J, WoutersJ., Hoffmeister, F., De Baere, G., Ramopoulos, T., The Law of EU External Realtions – Cases, Materials 
and Commentary on the EU as an International Legal Actor. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013, p; 871; Wouters, J., 
Bijlmakers, S. and Meuwissen, K., ‘The EU as a Multilateral Security Actor after the Treaty of Lisbon: Constitutional and 
Institutional Aspects’, in Lucarelli, S., Van Langenhove, L. and Wouters, J. (Eds.), The EU and Multilateral Security 
Governance, Routledge, 2012, pp. 72-103. 
2 See, for the gradual evolution under the respective Treaties, Wouters, J., Cuyckens, H., ‘Festina Lente: CFSP from 
Maastricht to Lisbon and Beyond’, in de Visser, M., van der Mei, A.P. (Eds.), The Treaty on European Union 1993-2013: 
Reflections from Maastricht Oxford: Intersentia, 2013, pp. 223-242. 
3 Keukeleire, S., Raube, K. . ‘Common Security and Defence Policy – Development, Added-Value, and Challenges’ in Bindi 
F., Angelescu I. (Eds.), The Foreign Policy of the European: Assessing Europe's Role in the World. Washington: Brookings 
Institution Press, 2012, pp. 62-84. 
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As an integral part of the larger CFSP framework, CSDP follows the wider objectives and 
principles of EU external relations as set out in Article 21 TEU. The following objectives and 
principles are especially relevant in the context of CSDP: 
 ‘The Union's action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have 
inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in 
the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and 
solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law.’ 
(Article 21 (1) TEU) 
 ‘[…] It shall promote multilateral solutions to common problems, in particular in the 
framework of the United Nations. (Article 21 (2) TEU) 
Furthermore, Article 21 (2) TEU sets out that ‘the Union shall define and pursue common policies 
and actions’ and that it ‘shall work for a high degree of cooperation in all fields of international 
relations, in order to’: 
 ‘safeguard its values, fundamental interests, security, independence and integrity’(Article 21 
(2) (a) TEU); 
 ‘consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of 
international law’ (Article 21 (2) (b) TEU); 
 ‘preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security, in accordance with 
the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, with the principles of the Helsinki 
Final Act and with the aims of the Charter of Paris, including those relating to external 
borders’ (Article 21 (2) (c) TEU). 
As indicated above, Article 42 (1) TEU sets out the context and overarching purpose of CSDP: 'The 
common security and defence policy shall be an integral part of the common foreign and 
security policy. It shall provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and 
military assets. The Union may use them on missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict 
prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the 
United Nations Charter. The performance of these tasks shall be undertaken using capabilities 
provided by the Member States.' Furthermore, Article 42 (1), para. 1, in fine points out that it is the 
Member States which shall contribute civilian and military capabilities. In addition, Member States 
can make their ‘multinational forces’ available for the EU’s common security and defence policy 
(Art. 42 (3) TEU).   
Beyond the CSDP’s focus on international security and crisis management, it is important to 
highlight that with Article 42 (7) TEU the EU now also has a mutual defence clause.4 Article 42 (7) 
TEU stipulates: ‘If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other 
Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their 
power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the 
specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States.’  Some authors, such 
as Koutrakos, have argued that the scope of the clause is debatable, as it leaves open ‘how far … 
Member States [are] required to go in order to comply with their duty and how rigorous … the 
 
4 Koutrakos, P., ‘The role of law in Common Security and Defence Policy: functions, limitations and perceptions’, in 
Koutrakos, P (ed.): European Foreign Policy – Legal and Political Perspectives, Edward Elgar, 2011, pp.235-260, p. 240.   
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enforcement of this duty [can] be’5. In other words, it does not explicitly state whether reactions to 
such armed aggression have to be, for example, military in nature. Hence, it has been suggested 
that – rather than a defence clause – Article 42 (7) TEU features a mutual assistance clause,6 which 
may or may not include military responses to an armed aggression. On the other hand, it has been 
argued that the EU’s clause ‘comes close’ to the formulation used in Washington Treaty, while 
leaving out the notion of ‘the use of armed force’.7 Still, like Art. 5 Washington Treaty, Art. 42 (7) 
TEU in fact includes the possibility of various responses to the original aggressor.  
Overall, the clause is ‘crucial in a functionalist evaluation of CFSP’s evolution because it inserts 
another area of integration in CFSP where one did not exist before.’8 Such a step is further 
complemented by the EU’s solidarity clause, which, framed in Art. 222 TFEU, further specifies joint 
action of the EU and EU Member States ‘if a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the 
victim of a natural or man-made disaster’. While enforceability of defence clauses for Member 
States, be it in the EU or NATO, are generally difficult, it should not be forgotten that for the EU the 
defence clause marks a major step towards measures of a common defence policy. However, this 
needs to be supplemented with further steps of defence integration.  
Art.42 (2) TEU, 45 and 46 also frame an internal common Union defence policy. On the one hand 
such internal policy underpins the EU’s internal collective defence efforts. On the other hand, it 
should enhance the EU’s coordination of defence markets in light of military capacities which are 
needed for international crisis-management missions. Art. 42 (2) TEU underlines that the ‘common 
security and defence policy shall include the progressive framing of a common Union defence 
policy’. Article 42(2) requires the EU to frame a common defence policy which can be established 
without further treaty changes. Through a ‘passarelle’ clause, the TEU foresees in Art. 42 (2) that 
such a ‘common defence’ will be put in place if the ‘European Council, acting unanimously, so 
decides.’ Article 42 (2) para. 2 TEU further stipulates opt-outs. For example, the EU’s policy ‘shall not 
prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States’ (a 
reference to the neutrality policies of Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden); moreover, it ‘shall 
respect the obligations of certain Member States, which see their common defence realised in the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)’.       
Other EU external policies are mostly supranational in nature, with either exclusive or shared 
Union competences, run by the ordinary legislative procedure and/or the involvement of powerful 
supranational actors like the European Commission (‘Commission’), the European Parliament and 
the European Court of Justice. In the context of CFSP/CSDP, however, the Union has competence 
(Article 2 (4) TFEU), while it is run by ‘specific’ intergovernmental procedures unless exceptions 
are provided (Article 24 (1) para. 1 TEU). Instead of the Commission, European Parliament and 
European Court of Justice, the Treaty foresees a key role for the European Council and the 
Council (‘acting unanimously’, Article 24 (1) subparagraph 1 TEU) as well as for the High 
Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) when it comes to 
the implementation of the policy. Article 24 TEU refers to the role of the Commission and the 
European Parliament as ‘specific’ and ‘defined by the Treaties’, while it underlines that ‘[t]he Court 
 
5 Ibid.  
6 Ibid., 238.  
7 Van Eekelen, W., Kurpas, S..,‘The Evolution of Flexible Integration in European Defence Policy: Is permanent structured 
cooperation a leap forward for the Common Defence and Security Policy?’ CEPS Working Document No. 296/June 2008, 
p.7. 
8 Austin, Michael J., ‘Style or Substance? An Analysis of the Major Reforms to CFSP by the Treaty of Lisbon’, European 
Union Law Working Papers, No. 1, 2011, Stanford Law School and University of Vienna Law School, p. 13.  
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of Justice of the European Union shall not have jurisdiction with respect to these provisions, with 
the exception of its jurisdiction to monitor compliance with Article 40 of this Treaty and to review 
the legality of certain decisions as provided for by the second paragraph of Article 275 of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union.’  
The intergovernmental nature of CFSP/CSDP is not only underlined by the role of the Council and 
European Council and their unanimous mode of decision-making, but also by the position of 
individual Member States in CFSP/CSDP. Article 21 (3) TEU explicitly points out that the ‘Union 
shall conduct, define and implement a common foreign and security policy, based on the 
development of mutual political solidarity among Member States, the identification of questions of 
general interest and the achievement of an ever-increasing degree of convergence of Member 
States’ actions.’ The important position of Member States is furthermore to be seen in the EU’s 
treatment of Member State capabilities and obligations in the domain of security and defence 
(see Art. 42 (1) and Art. 42 (2) TEU). 
In CFSP/CSDP, the European Council defines the ‘general guidelines’ of actions (Article 26 (1) TEU). 
The Council thereafter provides the framework and takes ‘decisions necessary for defining and 
implementing it’ (Article 26 (2) TEU). In CSDP, the Council decides upon joint action to launch 
international missions in the context of crisis management, be they civilian, military or mixed in 
nature (see below).  .  
CSDP action also qualifies for majority voting in several instances in the Treaty (see Art. 21 (1) TEU).  
However, CSDP does not know many exceptions to the rule that decisions are to be taken 
unanimously by the Council (Article 42 (4) TEU). In fact, Art. 41 (3), 45 (2) and 46 (2) remain 
exceptions to the rule. In these cases, Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) in the Council is possible 
with regards to (a) start-up funds for crisis-management missions, (b) the statute of the European 
Defence Agency and (c) provisions regarding the Permanent Structured Cooperation. Still, the use 
of QMV in CSDP is an untapped potential in the treaties, which could be used more regularly to 
overcome the potential deadlock of the Council regarding caused by the requirement of 
unanimous decision-making. In this view, the Treaty foresees that the Union can proceed efficiently 
(timely) and effectively (problem-oriented) without the agreement of all Member States.    
Another potential way towards deeper integration regarding security and defence is ‘the 
establishment of 'a permanent structured cooperation' (PeSCo) which is open to those Member 
States whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria, and which have made more binding 
commitments to one another with a view to the most demanding missions (Article 42(6))’9. In fact, 
as it has been mentioned elsewhere, ‘PSCD has the potential to bring real added value therefore. 
Now is the time to consider it, making full use of the momentum created by the implementation of 
the Lisbon Treaty’10. Art. 46 TEU points out that the criteria and commitments are further specified 
in the protocol on permanent structured cooperation. PeSCo can be established, as briefly 
mentioned before, by QMV, after those Member States, who intend to form a structured 
cooperation have send their notification to the Council and HR. Three months after the notification, 
the Council adopts by QMV the ‘decision establishing permanent structured cooperation and 
determining the list of participating Member States’ (Art. 46 (3) TEU). The structured cooperation 
 
9 Bono, R. G., ‘The organization of the external relation of the European Union in the Treaty of Lisbon’, in: Koutrakos, P. 
(ed.), The European Union ‘s external action one year after Lisbon, CLEER Working paper, 2011/3, pp. 13-38, p. 28. 
10 Biscop, S.,  Coelmont, J., ‘Permanent Structured Cooperation for Effective European Armed Forces’, Egmont Institute, 
Security Policy Brief, No. 9, 2011.  
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does indeed bare some untapped potential. Originally foreseen in the Constitutional Draft in the 
Convention on the Future of Europe, the structured cooperation was meant to serve as a tool to 
provide the EU’s CSDP with a flexible integration mechanism in the field of security and 
defence.11 As such, it went beyond assisting the otherwise unanimous decision-making, as it it’s 
the case of constructive abstentions (Art. 31 (1) TEU).12    
The Protocol on PESCO attached to Lisbon Treaty sets out the objectives of PESCO.13 Article 1 
PESCO Protocol states that PESCO is open for those states which: 
‘(a) proceed more intensively to develop its defence capacities through the development of its national 
contributions and participation, where appropriate, in multinational forces, in the main European equipment 
programmes, and in the activity of the Agency in the field of defence capabilities development, research, 
acquisition and armaments (European Defence Agency), and 
(b) have the capacity to supply by 2010 at the latest, either at national level or as a component of 
multinational force groups, targeted combat units for the missions planned, structured at a tactical level as a 
battle group, with support elements including transport and logistics, capable of carrying out the tasks 
referred to in Article 43 of the Treaty on European Union, within a period of 5 to 30 days, in particular in 
response to requests from the United Nations Organisation, and which can be sustained for an initial period 
of 30 days and be extended up to at least 120 days.’ 
The objectives of PESCO clearly point to a framework for deeper integration regarding defence 
capacities and complementarity as well as the enhanced deployment of EU Member States military 
forces.14  As will be further shown below, PESCO is hence a tool to step up EU efforts both with 
regards to the effectiveness and presence of EU missions in international crisis situations (see 2.1.2), 
by foreseeing deployable troops on the ground, as well as the making of an internal defence policy 
(see 2.1.3), by intensifying cooperation across the (fragmented) Member States defence markets. It 
is also in this view that the European Parliament has called the Member States to continue their 
debate on the use and establishment of PECSO15.   
Decisions in the framework of CSDP are nested in a complex institutional set of actors and 
bodies after Lisbon. The Foreign Affairs Council, chaired by the HR/VP, takes decisions regarding 
CSDP. In the Council machinery, the Political and Security Committee (PSC) as well as the EU 
Military Committee (EUMC) have taken on prominent roles in the preparatory process of CSDP 
decisions. The PSC is composed of representatives on the ambassadorial level from the Member 
States. The Commission is also present. The EUMC is bringing together the Member States’ chiefs of 
defence and is the EU’s highest military body16. The EUMC advises the Council on all military-related 
questions of CSDP via the PSC. Moreover, there is the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis 
Management (CIVCOM) in the Council, providing advice and input regarding civilian capacities 
and crisis management missions. The PSC, EUMC and CIVCOM are chaired by officials from the 
European External Action Service (‘EEAS’). This official is linked to the so-called ‘Security and CSDP 
Structures’ in the EEAS. These structures consist of several highly-ranked officials overseeing the 
 
11 Howorth, J., ‘The European Draft Constitutional Treaty and the Future of the European Defence Initiative,  European 
Foreign Affairs Review, Vol.9 2004, p.4.    
12 Ibid. 
13 Biscop/Coelmont, op.cit., p. 1.  
14 Ibid. 
15 See, for example, European Parliament, ‘Report on the EU’s mutual defence and solidarity clauses: political and 
operational dimensions’ (Rapporteur: Ioan M. Pascu), 30. 10; 2012, A7-0356/2012, p. 7.   
16 Giegerich, B., ‘Foreign and Security Policy: Civilian Power Europe and American Leadership’, in Helen Wallace, Mark A. 
Pollack, and Alasdair R. Young (eds.): Policy-Making in the European Union. 7th edition, 2014, p. 446. 
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coordination of EU action in the domain of security and defence, both in terms of its military and 
civilian dimension. These are the EU Military Staff (EUMS), the Civilian Planning and Conduct 
Capability (CPCC) as well as the Crisis Management and Planning Department (CMPD), which 
was created to ‘improve civil-military coordination’ of CSDP missions and operations’17.  
In addition to these decision-making structures, the European Defence Agency (EDA) deals with 
several dimensions of the development of a European defence market as well as the improvement 
of military supply and capabilities. Article 42 (3) para. 1 TEU provides that the agency works ‘in the 
field of defence capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments’ and gives input on 
which requirements are to be met. The EDA is headed by the HR. As such, the EDA is embedded in 
the overall decision-making structures of CSDP and crucial in terms of coordinating national 
defence policies. At the same time, as will be shown further below (chapter 4.2.3), the EDA also 
coordinates its action ever more closely with the Commission. The latter has become ever more 
active in contributing to European defence markets by dual-use strategies in innovation and 
industry policies.   
2.1.2 Policy developments in crisis management 
The CSDP has developed rapidly over the last years and has become a key element of the EU’ 
external action, especially with a view to its international crisis management missions. With this 
additional tool, both in terms of capabilities and actual missions on the ground, the EU has 
contributed to the making of CSDP since the late 1990s/ early 2000s.  
Triggered by the EU’s inability to react to the deadly crises of the Western Balkans at its 
doorstep in the 1990s, the security and defence policy was finally pushed by several events in 1998 
and 1999. The Saint Malo Declaration of the United Kingdom and France foresaw that the EU 
could develop autonomous security and defence structures (next to NATO) and the European 
Council Meeting in Cologne in 1999 further developed the idea to develop security structures in 
the EU.  
One major obstacle for the EU in its attempt to launch international missions is that the Union 
does not have an army or civilian officials – such as policemen, judges, etc. – of its own. As 
mentioned earlier, it draws upon the capabilities of its Member States. Several concerns arise in 
this respect. First, as scholars have pointed out, of the 1.7 Mio. soldiers in the EU Member States 
only one tenth is deployable.18 Second, Member States have commitments in other security 
organisations, such as NATO, and often face difficult choices in which security framework and for 
which reasons their troops are to be deployed. Third, in the case of civilian personnel, international 
missions of the EU need to be recognised as being attractive career opportunities for officers on 
the ground. Finally, the deployment of troops and civilian personnel requires the willingness of 
Member States to implement the task under the flag of the EU and the unanimous vote of Member 
States in the Council. 
Despite its willingness to further develop a security policy of its own, the EU had to find ways to 
build upon already existing structures which may foster its own capacities. At the same time, it 
also had to guarantee in the context of NATO that it would neither duplicate NATO nor decouple 
itself from NATO’s already existing military structures.19 The Berlin Plus arrangement of 2002 does 
 
17 Ibid., p. 447. 
18 Keukeleire, S., Delreux, T., The Foreign Policy of the European Union. 2nd edition, Palgrave, 2014, p.177. 
19 Ibid., p. 176. 
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in this respect guarantee NATO’s planning, command and capacity structures, availability  for 
concrete EU missions, while NATO at the same time also respects EU missions which are done 
outside its framework. Berlin Plus has been used a number of times. For example, it led to the 
launch of the EU military operation Concordia (see Figure 3) in the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia in 2003 (FYROM). Moreover, EUFOR Althea, which is still in operation, was the second 
CSDP operation carried out in the context of the Berlin Plus framework (Figure 4). 
Figure 3: Completed CSDP missions and operations (July 2015) 
 
Figure: European External Action Service, http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-
operations/index_en.htm (Accessed 2 September 2015) 
To operationalise the autonomous availability of troops, the EU has come up with several so-called 
military and civilian headline goals. The early military headline goals foresaw the availability of up 
to 60 000 troops in 2003. With the Headline Goal of 2010, the battle group concept was adopted, 
which foresees that rapid forces of 1 500 troops could be deployed for crisis management tasks of 
up to 120 days.20 Despite full operational capacity, none of the battlegroups have yet been used.  
In the civilian domain, the Civilian Headline Goal 2000 was agreed at the European Council. It has 
been revised in 2008 and 2010. Whereas the first Headline Goal focused on the quick deployment 
of judges and administrative officials, the complementary Headline Goals of 2008 added emphasis 
on monitoring missions, support for EU Special Representatives, Security Sector Reform (SSR) as 
well as Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration (DDR). The Headline Goal of 2010 
additionally stressed the nexus of civil-military operations and identified the need for further 
capacities in the field of transitional justice, dialogue and conflict analysis.21         
 
 
20 Ibid., p. 177. 
21 Civilian Headline Goal 2008 approved by the Brussels European Council on 17 December 2004, Doc. 15863/04; Civilian 
Headline Goal 2010 approved by the Ministerial Civilian Capabilities Improvement Conference and noted by the General 
Affairs and External Relations Council on 19 November 2007, Doc. 14823/07.  
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Figure 4: Ongoing CSDP missions and operations (July 2015) 
 
Figure: European External Action Service, http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-
operations/index_en.htm  (Accessed 2 September 2015)  
The operations so far took place in several regions of the world, including North and Sub-Saharan 
Africa, Asia, the Middle East, the Eastern Neighbourhood and the Western Balkans. Of the many 
missions which were launched the majority deployed were in Africa. One should however not 
forget that in terms of quantity (people deployed) and strategic importance the Western Balkan 
missions (EULEX, ALTHEA) are of crucial importance to the EU (see Figure 4). 
By 2013, the EU had launched eight EU military operations, 18 civilian missions and one mixed 
civilian-military mission.22 In 2015, the EU has completed 17 international missions and currently 
runs additional 18 military and civilian missions.23 These figures show the increasing activeness 
of the Union in the field. At the same time, it is important to mention that – despite some very 
prominent military missions – ‘the EU has mainly deployed civilian missions’24 and that the time-
scope and size of missions greatly varies from ‘a few months to nearly a decade, and the staff 
ranging from a scant dozen advisers to some thousand soldiers.’25  The distinction between 
civilian and military missions is not always an easy one to make: civilian missions sometimes deal 
with military issues, such as the support to military capacity building (e.g. in the case of EUCAP 
 
22 EEAS, About CSDP Headline Goals, http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/about-csdp/military_headline_goals/index_en.htm 
(accessed 4 September 2015). 
23 EEAS, Security and Defence,  http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/index_en.htm , (accessed 4 September 2015). 
24 Keukeleire/Delreux, op. cit., p. 188. 
25 Ibid., p. 185.   
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Nestor, see Figure 2).26 The argument made is that the EU – more precisely its Member States – is 
often not willing to put boots on the ground and contribute to international crisis management 
with troops in the theatre.27 Rather, the EU has tried to find ways to contribute to the stabilisation 
of crisis-shaken regions and countries by contributing by other means, for example the financial 
support of the African Union via the African Peace Facility (see chapter 3.3.3) or capacity building 
via civilian missions. Even if not putting boots on the ground, it should not be forgotten that the 
ATALANTA naval mission at the Horn of Africa (see figure 2) is the second-largest EU mission in 
terms of deployed personnel. It is generally seen as a success.               
2.1.3 Policy developments in defence capabilities 
Capabilities for international security missions and defence operations are in the hands of the 
Member States. For the EU this poses a major challenge: how can the EU ensure that the assets of 
Member States are complementary and deployable? Moreover, how can it be ensured that 
Member States’ equipment is living up to standards and fulfils the needs of the EU? As was noted 
earlier, the EDA was created to coordinate the efforts of Member States in the development of their 
military capabilities.  
Authors have pointed out that despite efforts to increase budget support as well as research and 
development in the context of defence, numbers of national defence expenditures and research 
and development have been in decline.28 This development has been seen as going hand with a 
fragmentation of the European defence markets. More specifically, authors have criticised the 
EDA from suffering from divergent Member States views on whether to concentrate on the 
effectiveness of national forces and their equipment or to focus ‘on defence procurement of 
European manufacturers.’29  
Against this backdrop, the tasks of the EDA, as laid out in Article 45 (1) TEU, seem daunting. 
However, EDA has undertaken several initiatives to coordinate national defence cooperation 
spending. Overall, it has been seen as crucial that the EDA pushes for ‘common, harmonised 
requirements’ which in turn would be helpful to ‘identify and capitalise on opportunities for 
multinational collaboration.’30 Moreover, the EDA Code of Conduct which was adopted by EU 
defence ministers in 2012 may aim to provide a framework to ‘systematically consider cooperation 
from the outset in their national defence planning for the whole life cycle of a capability, including 
R&T.’31 Furthermore, it has been suggested that Member States would focus on specific issues, so-
called ‘enablers’, that may facilitate the  capability of the EU on the ground (one example being the 
‘air-to-air’ refuelling initiative (AAR).32 
Member States in response have often not been willing to follow the route of cooperation due to a 
number of factors. As has been shown in a European Parliament briefing in 2015, ‘Member States 
 
26 Ibid., p. 188. 
27 Keukeleire, S., Raube, K., ‘The security-development nexus and securitization in the EU's policies towards developing 
countries’. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 26 (3), 556-572. 
28 De France, O.; C. Quain, ‘Defence spending in the EU’, in EUISS Yearbook of European Security 2014, European Union 
Institute for Security Studies, 2014, 95; Fiott, D., ‘Defence R&D in Europe’, in EUISS Yearbook of European Security 2014, 
European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2014,  in EUISS, 117; Barcikowska, A.: ‘Military capabilities and 
interoperabilit’, in: Gross, E.; Menon, A., ‘CSDP between internal constraints and external challenges’, EUISS Report No 17, 
October 2013, 31.  
29 Giegerich, op. cit., p. 447. 
30 Barcikowska, op. cit., p. 34. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid.  
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are not fully taking advantage of this potential for cooperation, due to various concerns: loss 
of strategic autonomy, the sensitivity of the defence sector, and reluctance to give up a strategic 
industrial base, seen as a matter of national prestige.’33 
2.2 Towards supporting and synergising effects between CSDP and 
EU level policies 
Article 21 TEU also underlines the need for ‘consistency between the different areas of [the 
Union’s] external action and between these and its other policies’ (Article 21 (3) para. 2 TEU). To this 
end, the Treaty of Lisbon assigns that the Council and the Commission, assisted by the HR/VP, ‘shall 
ensure that consistency and [shall] cooperate to that effect’ (ibid.).  
It thus becomes clear from CFSP/CSDP Treaty provisions that none of the Union’s CFSP/CSDP 
actions can be seen in isolation from the EU’s overarching external action. Rather, the consistency 
between policies (external-external, external-internal) needs to be ensured by the respective EU 
institutions and actors which are in charge of the development and implementation of EU external 
action. The obligation of consistency – or coherence – must be seen in the context of CFSP/CSDP 
and its distinct nature, especially when compared to other policies of the Union. Without the 
obligation of consistency, the intergovernmentalism of CFSP/CSDP (see above) can easily lead to 
policy outputs which may not only differ but also contradict decisions made in other EU external 
policies.    
With the High Representative overseeing the EEAS and the EDA, chairing the Foreign Affairs 
Council and being one of the Vice Presidents of the Commission, there should ideally be an 
internal coordination mechanism between the EEAS and the Council on the one hand and the 
EEAS and the Commission on the other hand. CSDP decision-making structures form part of the 
larger EU decision-making structures and CSDP should be seen in light of other policies. Moreover, 
it could benefit from their support. In this view, the current restructuring of the EEAS will need to 
tackle the internal quest for coherence as well. In the past, the communication and coordination 
between the so-called CSDP structures in the EEAS (Kortenberg) and the rest of the EEAS 
(Schuman) have been seen as difficult. The EEAS review has pointed out that ‘the present CSDP 
system raises a number of questions in terms of (I) the positioning and reporting lines of the 
relevant EEAS departments in relation to the HR/VP and relations with other parts of the EEAS and 
(II) the speed and effectiveness of decision-making, in particular in crisis situations.’34 It was 
mentioned that, for example, the expertise of the EU Military Staff (see further below) should be 
made ‘widely and directly available to other policy departments in the EEAS.’35 
There should be closer coordination in the future to bring together the civilian and military crisis-
management structures within EEAS with the other geographical and thematic units of the EEAS. 
The closer internal coordination may ideally lead to intra-institutional coherence. At the same 
time, the coordination between the EEAS and Commission DG’s and units, such as the Foreign 
Instruments Service, need to be coordinated in order to foster synergies across policies. As regards 
the latter, the new HR/VP’s decision to take office in the Commission (Berlaymont Building) and to 
foster her role as Vice President of the Commission as well as the creation of a ‘foreign policy cell’36 
 
33 Cîrlig, C.-C., ‘European Defence Cooperation – State of play and thoughts on an EU army’. EPRS | European 
Parliamentary Research Service, European Parliament Briefing, Briefing March 2015. 
34 European External Action Service, EEAS review, p. 5. 
35 Ibid. 
36 EU observer, EU commission creates new foreign policy cell, 11 September 2014.  
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in the College of Commissioner (including trade; humanitarian aid and crisis management; 
international cooperation and development; climate change and energy; neighbourhood policy 
and enlargement; migration, home affairs and citizenship) can be considered a useful step. As 
regards the former, in the new structure of the EEAS – as illustrated by the new organigramme of 
the EEAS37 - the FPI as well as EUMC Chair (and indirectly the Director General EUMS) report to the 
HR/VP and the new Secretary General. As such, the coordination between FPI and CSDP structures 
are streamlined on the top-level of the EEAS and seemingly geared towards greater intra-
institutional coherence. However, it remains to be seen if such top-level coordination efforts also 
create coordination and coherence between the FPI and CSDP structures on the level of Managing 
Directorates and Directorates of the EEAS.    
In this regard, it is important to recall that CSDP instruments are an integral part of the EU's 
foreign policy 'toolbox'. Whether civilian or military in nature, it would be far-fetched to assume 
that CSDP instruments can solve problems on the ground on their very own. In fact, what seems to 
be required is a combination of instruments from CSDP and other policy areas which, if 
effectively combined, live up to needs on the ground. Such a combination of instruments requires 
a proper co-ordination and complementarity between CSDP actors and other EU and international 
actors in crisis management. 
In the EU context, it is important to highlight what have been called the horizontal, intra- and inter-
institutional dimensions of coherence.38 These dimensions highlight the relationship between 
CSDP on the one hand and other policies on the EU level on the other hand. They furthermore 
focus on the coordination within and between EU actors and bodies, such as the EEAS, and 
other EU institutions like the Commission in their efforts to arrive at non-contradictory EU external 
action. Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the HR/VP and the EEAS carry the mandate to 
increase consistency and coherence horizontally (and vertically) in EU external action at large, and 
particularly in CSDP.  
In CSDP, intra-institutional coherence in the EEAS might be increased by creating a proper 
institutional interface to level out tensions between military and civilian cultures of crisis 
management in the EEAS. Moreover, coordination with the Commission is crucial to bring together 
other EU instruments (such as financing instruments) with the actions in CSDP. For example, in the 
field of CSDP, the coordination between crisis management tools and, for example, development 
coordination becomes necessary (so-called security-development nexus, see below chapter 3.3). 
Such efforts would not only enable the EU to avoid contradictions between policies, but even aim 
for synergising effects of the policies during their planning, decision-making and implementation.39 
Furthermore, the synergies may also be recognisable during various phases of crisis management, 
be it conflict prevention or post-conflict scenarios. Overall, such synergising effects can 
positively impact upon the EU’s effectiveness on the ground, bringing together the various 
instruments from the EU’s toolbox and effectively combining them in the attempt to solve 
problems on the ground.  
 
37 EEAS organigramme, http://eeas.europa.eu/background/docs/organisation_en.pdf, 16 September 2015, accessed on 
29 September 2015.   
38 Marangoni, A., Raube, K., ‘Virtue or Vice? The Coherence of the EU’s External Policies’. Revue d'Intégration Européenne / 
Journal of European Integration, 36 (5), 2014, pp. 473-489. 
39 Hillion, C., ‘Tous pour un, un pour tous! Coherence in the External Relations of the European Union’, in Cremona, M. 
(ed.), Developments in EU External Relations Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 10-36.  
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In addition, an often neglected dimension of the challenge of horizontal coherence is the 
coordination of CFSP and CSDP instruments. While the development of CSDP arguably gave 
added value to EU external action, including a more crisis management oriented foreign policy, 
crisis management operations themselves have not always been matched by complementary 
efforts and instruments to strengthen the EU's impact on the ground. How, for example, are CSDP 
missions paired with CFSP instruments, such as the Special Representatives (see chapter on the 
Eastern dimension on the European Neighbourhood)? More specifically, could a CSDP mission 
commander also become a EUSR at the same time?  
Another dimension of coherence is the vertical one, which includes the obligation to avoid the 
contradiction between EU level and Member State level policies. This dimension is crucial as it tries 
to prevent Member States from taking action that is not in line with their obligations on the EU 
level, be it with regard to the implementation of CFSP policies or their effort to coordinate defence 
policies. In other words, vertical coherence requires that foreign policies of the Member States 
and the EU match each other. However, contradictory and poorly coordinated Member State 
objectives can cause compromised CSDP action. While military and civilian crisis management 
implies that a set of different national actors becomes involved in the CSDP, this makes the 
preparation and management of CSDP operations much more complicated and leads to major 
challenges for consistency and coordination among actors and their capabilities and resources. 
Often, the EU cannot prevent the Member States from taking such sovereign actions. Still, it can 
remind the Member States of their solidarity in the context of CFSP, as stipulated by the TEU.       
In an effort to build on the diverse toolbox at its disposal for external action, the EU has adopted 
the so-called ‘comprehensive approach’. The joint communication by the Commission and the 
High Representative on the comprehensive approach to external conflicts and crises was published 
in December 201340. The document attempts to overcome the divide between CFSP/CSDP and 
alternatively other instruments of EU external action in order to build upon the ‘wide array of 
policies, tools and instruments at its disposal to respond to the increase of complex and 
interrelated crises’41. In this respect, the comprehensive approach further elaborates how EU action 
can contribute to ‘all stages of conflict’42. The approach has already been applied in several 
geographical and thematic strategies, such as the Sahel Strategy of 201143 and the Maritime 
Strategy of June 201444.  
However, several crucial questions arise: how are synergies to be identified between the various 
policy actors and EU instruments on a case-by-case basis? Which evidence and experience can 
there be generated from the analysis of specific non-CSDP-policies in view of their contribution to 
CSDP? How can the idea of synergies across policies in the domain of crisis management be used 
to think about comprehensive coordination between defence policies and non-EU policies in the 
wider CSDP? In other words, how can non-CSDP policies contribute to the efforts of defence 
cooperation in the EU? These questions will be tackled in the remaining chapters of this study.       
 
40 European Commission and High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Joint 
Communication to the European parliament and the Council, The EU’s comprehensive approach to external conflicts and 
crises, JOIN (2013) 30, 11 December 2013. 
41 Ibid., at p. 3. 
42 Amadio Viceré, M. G, ‘European Security and Defence Policy: The First 10 Years 1999–2009’, Conflict, Security & 
Development, 2014, pp. 2-12.  
43 EEAS, Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel, 
http://www.eeas.europa.eu/africa/docs/sahel_strategy_en.pdf. 
44 Council of the EU, European Union Maritime Security Strategy, 11205/14, 24 June 2014. 
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3 The external dimension of CSDP – Supporting CSDP 
crisis management by other EU-level instruments 
3.1 CSDP crisis management and EU policy level support  
In the following chapter, the study will look into the coordination between CSDP policies and 
various non-CSDP policies and instruments: (i) European Neighbourhood Policy; (ii) development 
cooperation; (iii) internal policies; and (iv) financial instruments. Next to the analysis of each of the 
policies and their respective instruments, crucial attention will be paid to the coordination and 
synergies between these policies and CSDP policies. Furthermore, it will be looked into how not 
only individual instruments, but also actor coordination and policy adaptation can contribute to 
synergies between the respective non-CSDP policies and CSDP in the long run.     
3.2 Neighbourhood policy support for crisis management   
3.2.1 The Eastern dimension 
The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) established a framework for relations between the EU 
and its direct neighbours to the East and the South45, aimed at developing closer political 
association and economic integration. Reflecting the principle of differentiation, bilateral Action 
Plans have been negotiated which define the reforms partner countries should implement in order 
to come closer to the Union. The ENP uses all instruments available to the EU, both from its CFSP 
(i.e. Special Representatives; sanctions) and CSDP tool-box (i.e. civilian and military missions) and 
from other sectoral policies (i.e. association and free trade agreements, financial assistance, etc.). In 
2009, the Eastern Partnership (EaP) was established, covering the six neighbours to the East, while 
looking to address the specificities of their regional context and the European aspirations of 
countries like Georgia and Ukraine. The EaP provided an upgrade in relations with the six post-
Soviet countries, partly as a response to the brief war between Russia and Georgia, in August 
2008. Tensions over the separatist conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia escalated into 
violent confrontation with Russia, threatening the Georgian regime and its western ambitions. 
Separatist conflicts remain over Transniestria in Moldova and over Nagorno-Karabakh, between 
Armenia and Azerbaijan. The violent conflict ongoing in Eastern Ukraine, since 2014, poses 
additional challenges to regional stability and security, raising issues as to the relevant EU tools to 
respond to this crisis. The Eastern neighbours have also undergone significant episodes of political 
instability and economic downturn, namely in Moldova and Armenia, requiring a mix of structural 
support and crisis management in order to prevent further destabilisation.  
Mixed instruments 
By bringing together such a mix of instruments, the ENP is well suited to support CSDP goals, 
namely by providing the instruments for regular monitoring of regional, national and local 
dynamics (under the ENP Action Plan reviews), by providing macro-economic assistance and 
mechanisms for political dialogue (in the framework of the Association Agreements), 
complemented by the timely application of  CFSP tools relevant for conflict mediation and crisis 
management (including the work of the Special Representatives), as well as CSDP missions. 
 
45 The countries covered by the ENP are Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Libya, Moldova, Morocco, Palestine, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine. 
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The ENP was designed with clear conflict prevention potential. The 2003 Commission 
communication on the Wider Europe acknowledged the need for closer EU engagement with 
neighbouring countries, in order to address the root causes of instability, including conflicts. These 
were seen by the Union as important obstacles to economic and political development, making EU 
action through the ENP relevant for preventing further instability and for mediating and managing 
existing regional conflicts.46 Reinforcing this goal, the 2003 European Security Strategy clearly 
allocated to the ENP an important role for the provision of regional security and for the 
establishment of the EU as relevant security actor.47 Subsequent revisions of the ENP and the 
establishment of the EaP have maintained the conflict-related focus, despite important limitations. 
For instance, the regional approach developed by the EU, through the multilateral platforms of the 
EaP and the Black Sea Synergy, failed to establish specific views and tools for conflict resolution.48 
Moreover, the EU has been reluctant to use the negotiations of the Association Agreements as a 
tool to apply conflict-related conditionality, largely keeping the EU policy towards these 
countries separated from international conflict mediation efforts.49 Although the lack of 
membership perspectives under the ENP undermined the use of conditionality, the new 
Association Agreements include better incentives, namely better access to EU market and visa 
facilitation, as well as deeper political relations, and could have been linked to concrete steps in 
conflict resolution. The latest revision of the ENP underlines the importance of stability as a pre-
requisite for prosperity, and the need for closer cooperation between the EU and partner countries 
in managing threats and conflicts, opening the possibility for important synergies.50 Political and 
economic stability is, thus, perceived as an important contribution to regional security, creating 
predictability and increasing living standards. Such a context would also facilitate peacebuilding 
efforts in the region, creating positive incentives to peace. The permanence of armed conflicts 
threatens these efforts, undermining economic development and political stability throughout the 
region (i.e. maintaining closed borders, facilitating militarist and nationalist rhetoric, as well as arms 
races and high defence budgets). 
The operationalisation of the EU goals of closer engagement in addressing regional instability and 
conflicts, however, has been deficient, despite important steps taken in the Eastern 
 
46 “If the EU is to work with its neighbourhood to create an area of shared prosperity and stability, proximity policy must 
go hand-in-hand with action to tackle the root causes of political instability, economic vulnerability, institutional 
deficiencies, conflict and poverty and social exclusion.” European Commission (2003) “Wider Europe — Neighbourhood: 
A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours”, Communication from the Commission to 
the Council and the European Parliament, COM(2003) 104 final, Brussels, 11.3.2003. 
47 European Council (2003) “A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy”, Brussels, 12 December. 
48 There are four EaP multilateral platforms on ‘Democracy, good governance and stability’, ‘Economic integration and 
convergence with EU policies’, ‘Energy Security’ and ‘People-to-people contacts’. Under the first platform, the EU is 
supporting security sector reforms and good governance, seen as contributing to regional stability. EaP partners can also 
take part in CSDP missions, as a means to develop technical capacity to participate in international peacekeeping 
missions. For more information on the regional dimension of EU policies in the EaP and particularly in the South Caucasus 
see Simão, L.,‘Region-building in the Eastern Neighbourhood: Assessing EU Regional Policies in the South Caucasus’, East 
European Politics, 2013, 29, 3, 273-288. 
49 Sasse, G.,‘The European Neighbourhood Policy and conflict management: a comparison of Moldova and the Caucasus’, 
in Hughes, James (ed.), EU Conflict Management. London: Routledge, 2010, p. 96. Shiriyev, Z.: ‘Challenges for the EU in the 
resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict: An Azerbaijani perspective’, EPC Policy Brief, 2013, 17 June. 
50 “There are currently a number of conflicts affecting the neighbourhood region. Stability is a prerequisite for working 
together on enhanced prosperity. The EU and its Member States need to do more together with our partners to address 
the security threats that arise from conflict situations, from organized crime, and from terrorism, and to develop our 
ability to jointly manage crisis and disasters.” European Commission and High Representative of the European Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (2015) “Towards a new European Neighbourhood Policy – Joint Consultation Paper”, 
JOIN(2015) 6 final, Brussels, 4.3.2015. 
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neighbourhood. Linking the provision of structural security, through a focus on reforms and 
development in ENP countries, to crisis management goals would benefit from a clear use of 
conflict-related conditionality by the EU.  
Short-term CFSP/CSDP tools 
Lacking the political will to make this link, both within the Commission and among some of its 
Member States, the EU has resorted to short-term CFSP/CSDP tools to reinforce its profile in conflict 
and crisis management. The appointment of EU Special Representatives (EUSRs) by the Council 
is one such tool, as defined by Article 33 TUE, and in the eastern neighbourhood it aimed at 
reinforcing the conflict related dimension. Both the EUSR for the South Caucasus and the EUSR for 
Moldova were tasked with supporting reform efforts expressed in the ENP Action Plans, while 
simultaneously contributing to conflict resolution.51 The separatist conflicts affecting both 
countries since independence remain unresolved, thus requiring simultaneous conflict 
prevention measures – aimed at avoiding the resumption of armed violence – and conflict 
resolution and post-conflict rehabilitation measures. Mediation aimed at the achievement of a 
long-term peace settlement is still required, whereas rehabilitation is needed as a form of incentive 
towards peace. The EUSRs are fundamental in assisting the EU in designing the approaches and 
identifying the tools suited to these complex contexts. In order to do so, the EUSRs have to 
institutionally link CFSP/CSDP actors, both in Brussels and in the field, namely the PSC and EU 
Mission Heads, with the Commission and the EEAS. EUSRs have the mandate to provide political 
guidance to CSDP missions on the ground, according to the overall foreign policy objectives of the 
Union.52 The experience so far suggests that the EUSRs have found many difficulties in shaping EU 
CFSP as well as in keeping pace with such broad mandates, considering the limited financial and 
human resources available to them.53 The 2013 EEAS review further sustained the need to fully 
incorporate the EUSRs in the EEAS structure in order to create more synergies in Brussels and on 
the ground.54 In 2010 it was decided to terminate the mandate of the EUSR for Moldova, while in 
2011 political and conflict-related responsibilities were transferred to the newly-established EU 
delegation in Chisinau. The understaffing of the Delegation and the personal engagement of 
the EUSR in building trust between the authorities in Chisinau and Tiraspol, namely through socio-
economic confidence building measures, has placed additional pressure on inter-institutional 
coordination between the EU delegations and the EEAS.55 Maintaining a well-coordinated 
approach and linking the Association Agreements with steps in conflict resolution will be 
fundamental, especially in the context of escalating tensions with Russia.   
 
 
 
51 Council of the European Union (2005) “Council Joint Action appointing a Special Representative of the European Union 
for Moldova”, 2005/265/CFSP, 23 March. Council of the European Union (2003) “Council Joint Action concerning the 
appointment of an EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus”, 2003/496/CFSP, 7 July. 
52 Gross, E.: ‘D.4.2. Systematic report on the value premises and human, ethical consequences of the CFSP/ESDP in the 
changing environment of border security’, Deliverable submitted June 2010 (M27) in fulfilment of requirements of the 
FP7 Project, Converging and Conflicting Ethical Values in the Internal/External Security Continuum in Europe (INEX) p. 12. 
53 For a detailed analysis of the development of the EUSR positions and the central issues affecting their standing in the 
post-Lisbon institutional setting see Wouters, J., Beke, L.,; Chané, A.-L., D’Hollander, D., Raube, K.: A Comparative Study of 
EU and US Approaches to Human Rights in External Relations, European Parliament, Directorate-General for External 
Policies of the Union, EXPO/B/DROI/2014/27, November 2014, pp. 63-73. 
54 EEAS (2013) “EEAS Review”, July.  
55 Cristescu, R. and Matveev, D., ‘Peacebuilding and conflict prevention in Moldova: the role of the EU’, paper produced 
for discussion during the EPLO/Civil Society Dialogue Network meeting, Bucharest, 28 June 2014.  
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Box 1: Need for more comprehensive and better articulated regional security policies  
 
The EU has deployed four missions in the Eastern neighbourhood. The first was EUJUST THEMIS, a 
rule of law mission to Georgia, mandated to assist in the reform of the judicial system of the 
country, deployed in 2003. A very limited and low profile mission, EUJUST THEMIS clearly sought to 
reinforce the ‘stability through reforms’ approach. In 2005, responding to the request made by the 
Ukrainian and Moldovan governments, the EU deployed the EU Border Assistance Mission to 
Moldova and Ukraine, mandated to provide technical assistance and advice to the Ukrainian and 
Moldovan customs services and border guards.56 EUBAM continued a structural security approach 
and was particularly concerned with toning down the political nature of the mission, but it 
provided the EU with an important tool to influence trans-border dynamics feeding the 
Transnistrian conflict.  
Due to the EU’s reluctance in becoming more actively engaged in conflict resolution in the 
former-Soviet Union – not least due to Russia’s role in these conflicts – the deployment of CSDP 
 
56 EUBAM is not a CSDP mission. It is funded by the ENPI budget. 
Regional approaches were perceived by the EU as a necessary step for confidence-building, 
eventually contributing to peace and stability. Two examples, however, illustrate the need for 
more comprehensive and better articulated regional security policies, in line with ENP 
objectives, and as a means to make the use of CSDP tools more efficient.   
 In 2006, the EU suspended negotiations of the ENP Action Plans with Armenia, 
Azerbaijan and Georgia, after an Azerbaijani commercial airline flew to the Turkish 
Cypriot Republic, in violation of the EU’s non-recognition policy of Northern Cyprus. 
Eventually, negotiations were resumed, as linking ENP and CFSP issues threatened to 
derail the EU’s overall approach to the South Caucasus. Rather than a poor use of 
negative conditionality and linkage, this case illustrates the problems posed by the 
limited institutionalisation of CFSP, making EU foreign policy vulnerable to pressures 
from some Member States, and short-term views of EU-South Caucasus relations. The 
creation of the EEAS and the reinforcement of the HR’s powers as the head of EU foreign 
policy, including in the neighbourhood, are important steps towards overcoming the 
deficit of institutionalisation and establishing a framework for EU Member States’ 
positioning within the Council vis-à-vis foreign policy issues.  
 The negotiation of Association Agreements under the EaP provides the EU with 
important leverage over its Eastern partners and could have been used as positive 
conditionality, linked to advances in conflict resolution. Both politically and 
operationally, the EU’s role as a security guarantor and an impartial mediator could be 
reinforced, building on the appeal of the AAs for both Moldova and Georgia, as well as 
for Azerbaijan and Armenia. The negotiation of DCFTAs with Moldova and Georgia 
affects their future economic and political relations with the separatist regions. 
Streamlining these negotiations with the EU’s policies of “engagement without 
recognition” of the separatist authorities would be a crucial point to assure the success of 
the new trade agreements and to assure the peace processes are not negatively 
affected.   
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missions resulted from the pressures of the Moldovan and Georgian executives for greater EU 
engagement in conflict management, rather than a proactive EU policy.57  
The EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) to Georgia is an unarmed civilian monitoring mission, 
deployed following the brief war between Georgia and Russia, in August 2008, with a mandate to 
monitor the implementation of the cease-fire agreement. Despite the inability to fully implement 
its mandate, namely due to the lack of access to the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia, the EUMM is a valuable international presence on the ground diffusing tensions and 
supporting conflict resolution. In 2014, responding to the crisis in Ukraine and at the invitation of 
the Ukrainian authorities, the EU agreed to deploy a civilian Advisory Mission to Ukraine (EUAM 
Ukraine). The mission contributes to strengthening and supporting the reform of the civilian 
security sector in Ukraine.  
Overall, the missions were able to respond to specific situations on the ground in politically 
sensitive contexts. By overcoming internal obstacles blocking effective usage of CSDP tools, 
namely the need for consensus among Member States, the EU has endowed the ENP with 
important tools for crisis management and with potential positive implications for long-term 
peace and security. In fact, ENP goals of political and economic stabilisation depend directly on the 
success of conflict prevention measures and would benefit immensely from successful conflict 
resolution. On the other hand, conflict-related policies and other security policies linked to fighting 
transnational organised crime, terrorism and the proliferation of weapons benefit directly from 
successful reforms and state-building processes, which are at the core of the ENP. Thus the 
articulation CFSP/CSDP and non-CFSP/CSDP instrument is crucial for the overall success of EU 
policies in the Eastern neighbourhood. 
The EaP and EU crisis management 
Reflecting the ENP’s initial de-politicised design, the Eastern Partnership has struggled to make the 
EU more visible as a crisis management actor in the Eastern neighbourhood of the Union. Despite 
several high profile security crises, mainly related to Russia’s foreign policy towards its 
neighbouring states of the former-Soviet Union, CSDP tools have been used sparingly to 
achieve EaP goals as well as a more coherent Eastern policy for the Union. This reflects the difficult 
and important relations between EU Member States and the Russian Federation, creating tensions 
within the Council of Ministers as to the use of the CSDP tools; but it reflects also the 
underdeveloped nature of the CSDP and the marginalisation of EU level security tools.  
The Lisbon Treaty has taken important steps towards overcoming these difficulties and in 
facilitating coordination of the EaP across EU institutions. The HR/VP and the EEAS are two central 
innovations in this regard. First, the HR/VP can better streamline Commission and CSDP tools, 
namely development and humanitarian assistance, financial resources and civilian and military 
tools, due to its institutional positioning as Vice-President of the Commission, Chair of the Foreign 
Affairs Council and Head of the EEAS. In regards to the EaP, the HR/VP needs to closely 
coordinate with the Commissioner responsible for the ENP. Initial collaboration between HR 
Ashton and Commissioner Füle ran smoothly, mainly due to their personal efforts, rather than a 
clear division of labour.58 Under the Juncker Commission, a policy of deputising is in place, with the 
 
57 Simão, L., ‘The EU’s Conflict Resolution Policies in the Black Sea Area’, Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, 16, 3, 
2014, pp. 300-313. 
58 Maurer, H., Simão, L.,‘From regional power to global power? The European Neighbourhood Policy after the Lisbon 
Treaty’, in Boening, A., Kremer, J.-F. and van Loon, A. (eds), Global Power Europe – Vol. 1 Theoretical and Institutional 
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HR reinforcing her coordinating role of all External Action relevant commissioners (the RELEX 
Commissioners), including the ENP, under the 'Europe in the World' group.59 Meetings have 
become more regular and the authority of the HR in the ENP area has been clearly reinforced. 
Second, the EEAS can now actively contribute to better integrating CSDP missions with overall EU 
policy, including the ENP.60 This can be improved throughout the crisis cycle in an integrated and 
comprehensive approach. Early warning and conflict prevention in the Eastern neighbourhood 
can benefit from EEAS duties in preparing ENP country reports, but also from the work of EU 
Delegations, now reinforced with political advisors and articulated with the EUSR and the Heads of 
CDSP missions.61 Conflict prevention can also be enhanced through Commission tools, including 
political dialogue, development and financial assistance (namely through the European 
Neighbourhood Instrument), and disaster relief. Although these can benefit from the EEAS 
coordination role, turf wars remain, namely with DG Trade, DG Development and Cooperation 
(DEVCO) and DG Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO).62 Crisis management can benefit 
from the use of the EEAS Crisis Response System (CRS), including the Crisis Response and 
Operational Coordination Department (CROC), the Crisis Platform, the Situation Room (SitRoom) 
and the Crisis Management Board (CMB).63 Political guidance is needed, however, in order to make 
crisis management efforts relevant for ENP goals and vice-versa. 
The Eastern neighbourhood of the EU has posed important challenges to the EU’s crisis 
management capabilities. The EU has responded to political instability in the colour revolutions in 
Georgia and Ukraine, but also in Moldova and Armenia; it has mediated the end to armed violence 
in Georgia, monitors the implementation of the cease-fire agreement and is part to the peace talks; 
is mediating the end of violence in Ukraine and supporting long-term stabilisation. EU policy is also 
committed to supporting the resolution of the protracted conflicts in the region and deepening 
security cooperation in other relevant fields.64 The enhanced profile of the EaP in framing security 
related cooperation between the EU and its Eastern neighbours suggests the improvement of 
institutional articulation with CFSP and CSDP actors is needed. 
CFSP/CSDP and non-CFSP/CSDP tools and their institutional coordination in the eastern 
neighbourhood – policy and organisational adaptation 
Under the ENP and the EaP in particular, the EU has several non-CFSP/CSDP instruments 
supporting its policy goals, including the promotion of stability and security. Financial assistance is 
available primarily through the new European Neighbourhood Instrument (former European 
 
Approaches to the EU’s External Relations. Verlag, Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Publishing, 2013, 93-108. EEAS (2013) “EEAS 
Review”, July.  
59 Drent, M.; Landman, L. and Zandee, D., The EU as a Security Provider. Clingendael report, December 2014, p. 13. 
60 European Union, ‘Fact Sheet: Common Security and Defence Policy. Civilian CSDP Missions: lessons and best practices 
(Report 2009)’, May, 2010. 
61 Freire, M. R., Simão, L., Multilevel Dynamics in the EU’s Approach to Preventive Action in Armenia, Brussels: Initiative for 
Peacebuilding, 2011. 
62 Helwig, N., Ivan, P.; Kostanyan, H., ‘The new EU foreign policy architecture: Reviewing the first two years of the EEAS’. 
Brussels: CEPS, 2013. 
63 Drent, M., Landman, L. and Zandee, D., op cit., p. 13. 
64 European Commission and High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (2011) “A 
New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood: A review of European Neighbourhood Policy”, Joint Communication by 
the High Representative of The Union For Foreign Affairs And Security Policy and the European Commission, COM(2011) 
303, Brussels, 25/05/2011.  
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Partnership and Neighbourhood Instrument). The range of areas covered by this funding is wide65, 
directly or indirectly contributing to conflict prevention, confidence building and other important 
measures aimed at reinforcing state institutions and improving democratic and human rights 
standards, as well as improving regional cooperation. Measures funded under this instrument 
need to be articulated with CSDP tools, including EU civilian missions contributing to state-
building (rule of law missions, border management missions, etc.) and EaP specific tools such as the 
‘Comprehensive Institution-Building’ (CIB) initiative, established in 2009 or EU Member States 
bilateral cooperation projects. Moreover, other thematic financing instruments such as the 
Partnership Instrument, the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace or the European 
Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights, might also be activated for the eastern 
neighbourhood. The use of these instruments is framed by the ENP Action Plans or the 
Association Agreements, when one is in place, establishing the benchmarks for EU actors and 
often for international donors. CSDP decisions need also to be in line with such goals and crisis 
management should be designed having in mind the long-term goals defined in these political 
documents. They should also make the best use of the new trade agreements being negotiated 
and visa facilitation perspectives, as these measures have important impacts on conflict-related 
dynamics.  
Institutional adaptation?  
The post-Lisbon setting remains in flux, but important steps have been taken towards reinforcing 
the role of the EEAS as an agenda-setter and policy coordinator. By taking up the ENP portfolio, the 
EEAS has become a fundamental element supporting the work of the Commissioner for the ENP 
and Enlargement. As he/she increasingly deputises for the HR in institutional relations, the EEAS 
support is fundamental for coherence and CFSP/CSDP awareness. The EaP management remains 
dispersed between the EEAS and the Commission, creating room for inefficiencies, namely on 
political leadership, financing, implementation and monitoring. The EEAS is responsible for 
managing the EaP, including conceptualisation, regulatory and financial issues. This requires 
coordination with the Commission, seeking input from its sectorial units, particularly relevant in 
areas such as trade, transportation, energy, research, etc., which have become important incentives 
under the Association Agreements. Finally, on budgetary issues, the EEAS coordinates with the 
Commission and needs Council and Parliament approval. A clarification of the roles of the EEAS 
and the Commission would benefit the EU’s overall performance in the Eastern 
neighbourhood, including in crisis and conflict situations. The establishment of an informal EaP 
Information and Coordination Group under the EaP is one example of ample donor coordination, 
bringing the EU in line with other International Organisations, which can also be enhanced for crisis 
management purposes. 
 
 
 
65 According to the EU, the ENI should advance six targets: “(1) Fostering human rights and fundamental freedoms, the 
rule of law, equality, sustainable democracy, good governance and a thriving civil society. (2) Achieving progressive 
integration into the EU internal market and enhanced co-operation including through legislative approximation and 
regulatory convergence, institution building and investments. (3) Creating conditions for well managed mobility of 
people and promotion of people-to-people contacts. (4) Encouraging development, poverty reduction, internal 
economic, social and territorial cohesion, rural development, climate action and disaster resilience. (5) Promoting 
confidence building and other measures contributing to security and the prevention and settlement of conflicts. (6) 
Enhancing sub-regional, regional and Neighbourhood wide collaboration as well as Cross-Border Cooperation.” 
Information available at http://www.enpi-info.eu/main.php?id_type=2&id=402#TheENI_ (accessed August 25th, 2015).  
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Box 2: EUBAM Moldovan and Ukraine as well as EUSR South Caucasus 
 
Relations between the EaP-relevant structures in the EEAS, and CSDP decision-making and 
implementation can also be streamlined. EEAS Managing Directors for the East and for the South 
coordinate their units with the Council Working Groups on Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
(COEST) and the Mashreq/Maghreb (MaMa), in order to rally Member State support for EaP security 
priorities. Mobilising the Commission to EEAS goals has proved to facilitate Council support.66 
Considering the crisis management tools integrated into the EEAS, the important role of the HR in 
managing crisis and Commission control over EU budget, close work with the Council in approving 
CFSP/CSDP tools for the Eastern neighbourhood should be framed by the continuous work of 
these institutions.  
Increased funding for EaP priorities under the multi-annual budget has been championed by the 
EEAS, in the Council and in the European Parliament, with the latter supporting these efforts. By 
aligning these resources with the available CFSP budget and the different thematic financing 
instruments, the EaP can further contribute to supporting EU foreign policy, including crisis 
management and the promotion of stability. The recently established Service for Foreign Policy 
Instruments should be particularly sensible to these EaP priorities.  
The Lisbon Treaty has initiated important institutional shifts in EU foreign and security policy 
management. The ENP has been repeatedly underlined as a major priority for the EU, considering 
the important and complex dynamics unfolding in the EU’s borders. Overcoming the lingering 
 
66 Helwig, N.; Ivan, P., Kostanyan, H., op cit, p. 46. 
EUBAM to Moldova and Ukraine is an important example of how CSDP tools can reinforce EaP 
objectives and vice-versa. By focusing on border management, the EUBAM exposes the added-
value of linking trade policies, with EU-integration efforts and sectoral cooperation and 
mobilising these policies towards positive conflict transformation. The mission’s hybrid nature1 - 
financed, managed and implemented by the Commission, but politically controlled by the 
Council – made this articulation between EaP and CSDP goals more likely. The Mission also 
benefited from the coordinating role of the EUSR for Moldova, bridging field officers from the 
EUBAM and EU Delegations in Kiev and Chisinau, with Brussels and politically framing the 
mission for EU Member States.1 The termination of the EUSR mandate has created new 
challenges in this regard, as addressed above. 
EUSR for the South Caucasus was appointed in 2003, with a mandate to assist the countries of 
the region in the reforms established under the ENP Action Plans as well as assist in the 
resolution of conflicts. It should further help the Council develop a comprehensive approach to 
the region. The EUSR has also taken oversight functions over the EUJUST THEMIS mission. 
Following the establishment of the EUMM, in October 2008, the EUSR is required to provide local 
guidance to the Head of the EUMM in coordination with the Head of the EU Delegation in 
Georgia. Since July 2014, Ambassador Herbert Salber is the EUSR for South Caucasus and the 
crisis in Georgia, with a clear conflict settlement mandate, including participation in the Geneva 
International Discussions on Georgia’s separatist regions, on behalf of the EU. Further 
integration of the EUSR into the EEAS structures could reinforce the role of articulating structural 
approaches to conflict prevention with crisis management and long-term conflict resolution.  
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institutional problems identified above would assist the Union in becoming a more coherent and 
better articulated security actor in its neighbourhood.  
3.2.2 The Mediterranean dimension  
CSDP missions and directly related CFSP instruments in the Southern 
Neighbourhood 
In June 2015, the European Parliament assessed the Southern neighbourhood in these terms: '[T]he 
neighbourhood […] is less stable, considerably less secure and facing a more profound economic 
crisis than when the ENP was launched'. 67 This description of the neighbourhood is particularly apt, 
as the Mediterranean has become an area of instability and economic crisis despite the hopes 
raised by the Arab spring in 2011 and the goals of the EU initiatives launched in 1995 (Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership) and 2003 (European Neighbourhood Policy).68 
The CSDP missions in the area are relatively modest. As well as the EUNAVFOR in the 
Mediterranean sea, which is examined elsewhere in this report, there are three missions in the 
Mediterranean, two of which however are largely on hold, plus a fourth one that was never 
activated: 
 EU Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support (EUPOL COPPS):69 Also involving the 
Palestinian Authority, this mission was agreed in 2005 and established in 2006, with the aim to 
assist in building the institutions of the future State of Palestine in the areas of policing and 
criminal justice. The two main contributions have been in supporting the reform and 
development of the Palestinian Civilian Police and in contributing to the development of 
criminal justice institutions, including respect for human rights and rule of law, as well as in 
training police forces (‘training the trainers’). More recently, EUCOPPS has also contributed to 
better coordination between police and prosecution services. The mission has recently been 
extended, with a budget of EUR 9 175 million for the period 1 July 2015-30 June 2016. 
 The EU Border Assistance Mission in Rafah (EUBAM Rafah):70 Established in 2005, as Israel 
withdrew from Gaza, the mission was to contribute to the monitoring of the Rafah checkpoint 
between Gaza and Egypt, under the joint control of Israel, Egypt, and the Palestinian Authority 
(Presidential Guard)71. The functioning of the mission was however hampered from the start. 
The frequent Israeli blockades of the checkpoint, accompanied by the takeover of Gaza by 
Hamas in 2007, led to the suspension of the mission in June 2007. Despite not being present at 
the Rafah checkpoint, the mission is however standing and ready to re-deploy if conditions 
allow. At the moment, it is organising training activities in Jericho for the General Authority for 
Border and Crossings of the Palestinian Authority. Its head-quarters, at Israel’s insistence, are in 
 
67 Committee on Foreign Affairs / European Parliament, Report on the review of the European Neighbourhood Policy, 19 
June 2015 (2015/2002(INI)) 
68 European Commission (2003) “Wider Europe — Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and 
Southern Neighbours”, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, COM(2003) 
104 final, Brussels, 11.3.2003 
69 Approved on 13 November 2014 with Council Joint Action 2005/797/CFSP, published in OJ L 300 of 17 November 2014, 
and modified in subsequent decisions. More info here: http://eupolcopps.eu/  
70 Established with Council Join Action 2005/889/CFSP of 1 December 2005, published in OJ L 328 of 14 December 2005, 
and modified in subsequent decisions. More info here: http://www.eubam-rafah.eu/; 
http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eubam-rafah/index_en.htm  
71 And thus close to the Fatah faction of the PLO. 
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Israel. Its mandate has been periodically extended, most recently until 30 June 2016 under the 
new Head of Mission Natalina Cea. 
 European Union military operation in support of humanitarian assistance operations in 
response to the crisis situation in Libya (EUFOR Libya):72 This operation was approved in April 
2011, when the crisis management concept was agreed, but it was never activated. As well as 
the deteriorating security conditions on the ground, reasons for this featured the resistance of 
several actors (including OCHA, but also Sweden and Finland) to blur lines between the 
military and the military sphere, as well as the cumbersome process for defining priorities and 
assessing needs for crisis management in CSDP, which in turn led to the Council decision in 
December 2011 to revisit CSDP procedures.73 
 EU Border Assistance Mission in Libya, also referred to as EU Integrated Border Management 
Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM Libya):74 Approved in 2013, this mission aims at supporting 
the Libyan authorities in improving and developing the security of the country’s borders. 
Activities were expected to tackle security of land, sea and air borders in the short term, and to 
contribute to an integrated border management strategy in the mid- to long-term, mainly by 
training Libyan forces. However, in light of the deteriorating security situation, the mission was 
downsized to 3 international staff operating from Tunis from July 2014. It remains on hold, 
ready to re-deploy if a ceasefire were to hold.  
Moreover, there have been recently discussion about a CSDP mission in Tunisia to monitor the 
border with Libya and improve the security situation (a possible ‘EUBAM Tunisia’) or to contribute 
to security sector reform, the utility of which is discussed below.75 A further number of issues are of 
direct relevance to CSDP missions in the Mediterranean. The first and more general one is that the 
EU has been putting in place a framework for gathering political intelligence in support of CSDP 
missions, but much remains to be done.  
 EU Delegations around the Mediterranean report regularly to Brussels. This is in addition to 
the traditional reports by Heads of Mission, which are signed by all heads of mission in a given 
country. With the creation of the EEAS, all EU Delegations have been endowed with a Political 
Officer, who generally coordinates meetings of political officers and contributes to political 
reporting. However, Political Sections in EU Delegations in the Mediterranean are very small, 
consisting of one or two persons, and do not include an expert in security and defence matters, 
an issue the European Parliament has raised.76 
 EU Delegations in the Mediterranean (including Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Palestine and 
Tunisia) are in the process of being assigned a ‘security expert,’ seconded from Member 
States and with a limited mandate, as envisaged by the FAC Conclusions in January 2015. Their 
 
72 Approved on 1 April 2011 with Council Decision 2011/210/CFSP, OJ L 89 of 5.4.2011, and modified with a corrigendum 
on 6 August 2011, OJ L 203. 
73 See Nicole Konig (2012) Libya: A Wakeup Call for CSDP? TEPSA Brief. 
74 Approved on 22 May 2013 with Council Decision 2013/233/CFSP, published in OJ L 138 of 24 May 2013, and modified 
in subsequent decisions. More info here: http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eubam-libya/background-
material/index_en.htm  
75 See for instance the Draft Conclusions of the Inter-Parliamentary Conference for CFSP and CSDP held in Luxembourg, 
5-6 September 2015, available at 
http://www.eu2015parl.lu/Uploads/Documents/Doc/31_2_Draft%20Conclusions%20IPC%20CFSP%20CSDP.pdf 
76 See the Resolution of the European Parliament, adopted on 12 March 2015, P8_TA(2015)0075. 
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job remit, as currently defined, will only have tasks related to counter-terrorism, most notably 
the implementation of counter-terrorism dialogues with hosting countries where initiated. 
 Council bodies have visited Mediterranean countries, but no established routine has 
emerged. The PSC visited Cairo and Beirut in September 2012, whereas the Maghreb/Mashreq 
Working Party visited Tunis in December 2011 and Beirut in November 2014. 
 There have been a number of EU Special Representatives in the Mediterranean, providing a 
focal point for the gathering of information and coordination of action. The most recent are:  
o Bernardino León, appointed EUSR for the Southern Mediterranean July 2011-June 
2014, with the aim to foster the EU objectives in the Southern neighbourhood. He gave 
an important contribution in the Libyan crisis and is now UN Special Representative 
and Head of the UN Support Mission in Libya. 
o Fernando Gentilini, appointed EUSR for the Middle East Peace Process in April 2015 
with the aim to help the resumption of Arab-Israeli negotiations.  
 The EU has helped financially and technically the setting up of a Situation Room in the Arab 
League headquarters, thus creating a ‘red phone’ between Brussels and Cairo and improving 
the potential for exchange of information.77 The networking of crisis room across the globe, 
promoted under Managing Director for Crisis Response and Operational Coordination 
Agostino Miozzo has not been continued once his mandate was not renewed. 
 The EU has signed an agreement with Israel in 2009 for the exchange of confidential 
information.78 The agreement has been marred, however, by the controversy between the 
parties about confidential information gathered in the Occupied Palestinian Territories.  
Moreover, the Mediterranean is not just at the receiving end of CSDP missions. Two Mediterranean 
countries have participated in CSDP missions in the Balkans. Morocco has contributed to mission 
Althea in Bosnia Herzegovina and has announced its intention to align with CFSP Declarations on 
an ad hoc basis.79 Turkey has participated in several operations, has been involved in stand-by 
Battlegroups (as in 2010) and has formalised its participation in EU crisis management operations 
in 2006.80  
Therefore, there are a number of entry points for cooperation involving EU institutions. In the case 
of CSDP missions, while the EEAS tends to draft the information documents and policy papers, the 
decision on and supervision of the mission is responsibility of the PSC, and the implementation is 
done directly by the EEAS structures within the crisis management structures. The EEAS relies on 
cooperation with representatives from the Commission, including personnel in Delegations, if a 
common position is to be found. This cooperation however is not always working as smoothly as 
possible. For their part, Council preparatory bodies are involved to the extent that they rely on this 
information to draft relevant decisions. This is particularly important in the case of smaller member 
states. 
 
77 EUObserver “EU builds situation room for Arab League in Cairo”, 26 June 2012. 
78 Council Decision 2009/558/CFSP, published in OJ L 192/63 of 24 July 2009. 
79 Barbé, E., Herranz-Surrallés, A., The challenge of differentiation in Euro-Mediterranean relations: flexible regional 
cooperation or fragmentation, Routledge, 2013, p.107. 
80 See Koutrakos, P.,The EU Common Security and Defence Policy. Oxford University Press, 2013, p.203. 
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This brief tour of the horizon shows that CSDP missions and related activities in the area are 
modest in size. Most importantly, they are also largely unsuited to a rapidly deteriorating security 
environment, which prevents two of the missions from becoming fully operational. 
The security environment in the Mediterranean has dramatically worsened since the early 
years of the ENP. The most glaring issues are obviously Libya and Syria. However, there is a more 
general trend across the Mediterranean: large parts of the Southern Mediterranean (and, it could 
be argued, some parts of the Northern Mediterranean too) have become failed states or areas of 
limited statehood, in which central authorities lack the monopoly on the use of force and hence 
the capacity to implement and enforce central decisions.81 As well as Syria and Libya, also the Sinai, 
the Southern and Eastern parts of Algeria, the borders of Tunisia and more generally the regions 
bordering the Sahara desert have acquired these characteristics. Lebanon’s central authorities have 
traditionally had a limited grip on local actors, whereas the situation in Palestine, Jordan and 
Morocco is ‘held together’ by long-standing and well-structured conflicts. This new political and 
institutional void is the breeding ground not only for uncontrolled and largely exploited migration, 
but also for extremism and terrorism.  
CSDP missions in the Mediterranean have largely aimed at putting a plaster on this macro-
phenomenon of areas of limited statehood. Tackling the issue of failing states is hardly feasible in 
terms of CSDP. However, the EU can use its vast repertoire of non-CSDP economic instruments and 
aim to forge a political vision shared by all Member States, with the aim to make a difference in 
terms of security of the area in the mid- to long term. This would also have the benefit to better 
coordinate and synergise non-CSDP instruments and security policy. 
Non-CSDP instruments at the disposal of the EU for its security and foreign policy 
goals 
While the CSDP missions and related actions in the Mediterranean are modest, the EU has at its 
disposal other, much more significant instruments for relations with its Southern neighbours. 
These could not only support CSDP missions, but also and most importantly contribute to the same 
goals and create an environment in which it is actually possible to carry out CSDP missions. 
The main instrument of EU foreign policy in the area is the European Neighbourhood Policy 
(ENP), which is currently considered as having an Eastern dimension (covered elsewhere in this 
report) and a Southern or Mediterranean dimension. In the case of the Mediterranean, the ENP 
took over from the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), which was also called Barcelona 
process, and it has been paralleled by the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), adopted in 2008.  
The backbone of the ENP, and of the economic and political relations between the EU and the 
Southern Mediterranean countries more generally, is represented by the bilateral Euro-
Mediterranean Association Agreements, concluded with nearly all Southern Mediterranean 
partners (see table 1). They have aimed at bolstering trade and furthering economic and 
political relations between the EU and each of the Southern Mediterranean countries. This 
‘Community’ instrument, governed by the traditional set of rules in relation to trade, gives an 
important role to the Commission, which is in charge of disbursing aid on the ENP budget line 
according to priorities defined in the Action Plans, agreed between the Commission and the EEAS, 
and approved by Member States in Council preparatory bodies (namely the Maghreb/Mashreq 
 
81 On the concepts of limited statehood, see Risse, T., Governance without a state?: policies and politics in areas of limited 
statehood, Columbia University Press, 2013. 
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Working Group). Additional initiatives, building on the AAs, and political and economic dialogues 
are conducted jointly by the Commission and the EEAS, at times with the involvement of Member 
States’ representatives. Since the Arab uprisings in 2011, the Mediterranean dimension of the ENP 
has been often at centre stage in a number of Declarations issued by the HR/VP, aimed at finessing 
the ENP approach to the changing context on the ground. The ‘new’ approach has been 
summarised as ‘more for more’ (more EU concessions for more reforms in the Arab countries). This 
approach, which has not been particularly successful,82 is currently under revision and, following a 
public consultation, the early output should be made public in November 2015. 
Other economic and political initiatives exist, some tailored just to Mediterranean countries and 
some having a Mediterranean dimension. Belonging to the first group and inspired by a functional 
logic, the UfM has aimed to stimulate cooperation between geographical neighbours around 
the Mediterranean, including on transport, energy and the environment.83 SPRING (acronym of 
Support to Partnership, Reform and Inclusive Growth) was adopted in September 2011 as a 
response to the Arab uprisings. It has expanded the financial amount devoted to Arab 
Mediterranean countries, with a particular emphasis on support to democratic transition and on 
responses to socio-economic challenges. FRONTEX, as explained elsewhere in this report (see 
chapter 3.4), is also involved in the Mediterranean. The European Instrument for Democracy and 
Human Rights (EIDHR) includes the Southern Mediterranean countries, although the focus of 
initiatives tends to be more on human rights than on democracy.84 Horizon 2020 allows Southern 
Mediterranean countries to participate to research projects, which is particularly significant in the 
case of Israel. Most importantly, the Instrument contributing to Peace and Stability and the 
Development Cooperation Instrument have also been employed, for instance in the case of Libya. 
More generally, several other EU programmes, including programmes tailored to EU Member 
States, allow for the participation of Southern Mediterranean countries.85  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
82 Bicchi, F., ‘The Politics of Foreign Aid and the European Neighbourhood Policy Post-Arab Spring: ‘More for More’ or Less 
of the Same?’’ Mediterranean Politics 19(3), 2014, pp. 318-332. 
83 For more information, see http://ufmsecretariat.org. 
84 See Bicchi, F., ‘Dilemmas of Implementation: EU Democracy Assistance in the Mediterranean’ Democratization 17(5), 
2010, pp. 976-996. 
85 For more information, see http://www.enpi-info.eu.  
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Table 1 – Date of publication in the Official Journal of the EC/EU of Euro-Mediterranean Association 
Agreements 
 OFFICIAL PUBLICATION DATE AND INDICATION OF THE EC/EU 
OFFICIAL JOURNAL  
Algeria OJ L264 (10.10.2005)
Egypt OJ L 304 (30.9.2004)
Israel OJ L147 (21.6.00)
Jordan OJ L129 (15.5.02)
Libya No negotiations (but an exploratory negotiating mandate was 
approved by the Council in 2007 and is still standing)86 
Lebanon OJ L 143 (30.5.2006)
Morocco OJ L70 (18.3.00)
Palestinian Authority OJ L187 (16.7.97)
Syria Initiated 19.10.2004 but never ratified
Tunisia OJ L97 (30.3.98)
Turkey  Candidate country
Last but not least, the EU has devoted a number of programmes to support the Middle East Peace 
Process, the Palestinian Authority and the socio-economic conditions of Palestinians in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories and elsewhere. The issue has also been the target of a significant 
number of CFSP Declarations and activities. 
This set of instruments thus suggests that the EU has a strong legal and economic basis to its 
political and security action in the Mediterranean. The funds and the dialogues institutionalised 
around the ENP are by far the main component of Euro-Mediterranean relations. The link between 
the economic context and security in the Southern Neighbourhood, however, requires a 
closer scrutiny. 
The economic context and its relevance for security in the Southern 
Neighbourhood 
The economic situation in the Mediterranean remains stagnant, especially in rural areas, and this 
contributes to the political and security instability at the borders of Europe’s neighbourhood. The 
impact of the 2008 economic crisis has been less immediate and less spectacular in the Southern 
Mediterranean than in Europe, but fundamental issues are at stake. While the GDP has continued 
to grow (see Table 2), there are indications that growth has slowed down. This is a cause for 
concern, given the persistent challenges in the labour market (high youth levels combined 
with high unemployment) and the widespread market distortions (high corruption and 
cronyism).87 As it has been shown in the literature, the ‘Arab capitalist model,’ while able to deliver 
growth on the surface, has not resolved deep-seated economic and social problems and it has on 
 
86 See the answer on 25 April 2012 to the Parliamentary question by FK Brantner and J Sargentini on 9 December 2011 (E-
011667/2011), available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference=E-2011-
011667&language=EN.  
87 Specific data is available from the World Bank Development Indicators 2014. 
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the contrary, further exacerbated social and political relations throughout the period pre- and post-
Arab spring.88 Under authoritarian regimes, both liberalisation and market protection tend to fall 
prey to local ‘networks of privilege,’89 derailing development and political liberalisation. Even 
Tunisia, previously considered as a ‘role model for development,’ has revealed fundamental 
distortions in its economic growth model, as recently and conclusively shown by the World Bank.90 
Table 2 – Real GDP growth (% change compared with previous year) 
COUNTRY 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Algeria  2.0 1.7 3.6 2.8 3.3 2.8 
Egypt 7.2 4.7 5.1 : : : 
Israel 4.1 1.1 5.0 4.2 3 3.2 
Lebanon : : 7.0 2.0 2.5 : 
Morocco 5.6 4.9 3.6 5.0 : : 
Palestine 7.1 7.4 9.8 12.4 6.3 1.9 
Tunisia 5.6 2.8 : -1.9 3.7 : 
NB: No (reliable) data available for Jordan, Libya and Syria 
Source: 2008-2010: Eurostat, Pocketbook on Euro-Mediterranean Statistics, 2013 edition; 2011-13: Eurostat, 
Basic Figures on the ENP-South Countries, 2014 edition. For specific details on national figures, see source.  
Tunisia’s economic and security situation is still under challenge. FDIs have decreased and 
indicators have not returned to pre-2011 levels in most important economic sectors (phosphate 
mining, tourism, oil and gas) due to local difficulties and weak European demand.91 Despite the end 
of the Ben Ali regime, the institutional and economic mechanisms of the country have remained 
largely the same, as confirmed by e.g. levels of corruption.92 Rather than isolated cases of 
extremism, the terrorist attack on 18 March and 26 June 2015 against foreign tourists have 
been shown to be an indication of a widespread internal security concern, further exacerbated by 
the lack of security sector reforms,93 an issue on which the EU has promised to engage in 2016.  
A particularly important case must be made in relation to agriculture and its relation to security. 
Agriculture remains a very important part not only of the economy but also of employment in 
Southern Mediterranean countries,94 and it is crucial to rural areas where state authority tends to be 
most challenged. Agriculture continues to add substantial gross value to Southern Mediterranean 
 
88 See for instance Richards, A., Waterbury, J., A political economy of the Middle East, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 
2013; Hanieh, A., Lineages of revolt: issues of contemporary capitalism in the Middle East. Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2013; 
Baffes, J., et al., The Great Plunge in Oil Prices: Causes, Consequences, and Policy Responses, Development Economics, World 
Bank Group., March 2013. 
89 Heydemann, S., Networks of privilege in the Middle East: the politics of economic reform revisited, Palgrave Macmillan, 
2004. 
90 Rijkers, B., Freund, C. Nucifora, A., ‘All in the family: state capture in Tunisia’. Policy Research Working Paper, 2014, World 
Bank. 6810. 
91 The Economist Intelligence Unit, Tunisia’s economic challenges, 14 January 2015, available at 
http://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=1342653318&Country=Tunisia&topic=Economy    
92 See reports of Transparency International, various years. 
93 See the ICG report (2015) Réforme et stratégie sécuritaire en Tunisie, Rapport Moyen Orient/Afrique du Nord, n.161, 23 
July 2015. 
94 Data and analysis available at http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/European_Neighbourhood_Policy_-_South_-_agriculture_statistics, last accessed 29/7/2015 
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countries’ economies, particularly in Morocco (ca. 15 %), Egypt (14 %), Tunisia (ca. 9%) and Algeria 
(ca.9 %),95 and it employs an even more relevant percentage of workers (Tab.3). Youth living in rural 
areas, in which opportunities and the presence of state authorities are limited, is left with radical 
choices. Rural areas in Southern Mediterranean countries are in fact the borderlands of Europe’s 
neighbourhood. 
A key challenge in Arab countries post-Arab spring is therefore to promote economic 
development in such a way as to rebalance inequality of opportunities, with the general aim of 
consolidating the social, economic and political texture of Arab societies.96 This will contribute to 
the security context of the Mediterranean in a number of ways, including the slowing down of 
internal migration and the improved sustainability of governance institutions. 
The link between migration and security in the Mediterranean 
Migration to, from and across south Mediterranean countries has long been a key issue in EU 
relations with these countries. While the issue of migration is addressed elsewhere in the report 
(see chapter 3.4), it is vital to Euro-Mediterranean relations and mention should be made here too. 
The issue’s centrality intensified with the onset post-2011 of the Mediterranean refugee crisis 
linked to conflict in Syria and the breakdown of governance in Libya. Of particular concern has 
been the displacement of around 4 million people from Syria to Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey 
as well as the loss of life in the Mediterranean (around 2 000 reported deaths in the first 6 months 
of 2015 according to the International Organization for Migration). A ‘Central Mediterranean route’ 
from Libya and primarily to Italy was identified by the EU border agency Frontex as a key route for 
entry to the EU with a reported 170 000 irregular border crossings in 2014 (compared to 45 000 in 
2013).97  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
95 Data for 2010, excluding Tunisia (2009). Source: Eurostat (2012) ENP Countries. Recent Economic Developments, Table 11. 
At the same date, Syria registered ca. 20%. 
96 See the studies commissioned by Brookings about the role of agriculture in promoting inclusivity and sustainable 
growth: Ghanem, H. (ed.), The Arab Spring Five Years Later: Case Studies, Brookings Institution Press, 2014. 
97 Frontex (2015) Annual Risk Analysis, Warsaw: Frontex. 
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Table 3 – Share of agriculture, forestry and fishing in total employment, 2003 and 2013 (%)  
 
EU responses to the Mediterranean refugee crisis occur within the framework of the ‘external’ 
dimension of EU migration policy that has been an important component of EU migration and 
asylum policy since the specification of the ‘Tampere objectives’ by EU heads of government in 
1999 and that now form part of the EU’s Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM).98  The 
GAMM specifies a range of measures that include efforts to stem migration flows (such as 
cooperation on border security and readmission agreements with sending countries) as well as 
raising the prospect of agreement with sending countries that might facilitate migration. These 
include, example, Dialogues on Migration, Mobility and Security (finalised with Morocco, Tunisia 
and Jordan)99 and the creation of ‘Mobility Partnerships’ (finalised on paper with Morocco and 
Tunisia, but not activated).  
In May 2014, the Commission published 'A European Agenda on Migration' and outlined plans to 
deal with irregular migration via border control measures and action to combat smuggling and 
trafficking as well as measures to promote the relocation of refugees and asylum seekers.100 
Subsequent debate has focused on the efficacy of measures to disrupt the ‘business model’ of 
smugglers and includes the CDSP operation EUNAVFOR Med to capture and destroy boats used 
for people smuggling, as described elsewhere in this report.  
The core dilemma is between long-term actions and short term efforts at restriction that might 
address demands for action but do little to address deeper seated root causes linked to economic, 
social and demographic changes in sending countries as well as to the effects of conflict and the 
 
98 CEC (2011) The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility, CEC(2011) 743 final. 
99 CEC (2011) A Dialogue for Migration, Mobility and Security with the Southern Mediterranean Countries, COM(2011) 
292) final.   
100 CEC (2015) A European Agenda on Migration, CEC(2015)  
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breakdown of governance systems. Efforts at control and repression may well do little to deal with 
these root causes and might have the effect of making migration more dangerous and fuelling 
growth of criminal networks of people smugglers. 
How can EU instruments better contribute to EU security goals in the 
Mediterranean? 
There are a number of suggestions the EU could consider to make its action in the Mediterranean 
more effective. A few pertain directly to CSDP measures and are more short-term, while others, 
more long-term, refer to the Association Agreements and the agenda of dialogue with Southern 
Mediterranean partners. 
In terms of CSDP, the Mediterranean experience suggests that EU Delegations should expand 
their EEAS component and notably include a defence and security expert, to liaise with CSDP 
missions and hierarchies and to facilitate interaction with local security and defence actors. The EU 
could also promote more consistently security and foreign policy dialogues, leading for instance 
to a more structured support for CFSP declarations and CSDP missions. The newly established 
‘security expert’ posts are a step in the right direction, but so far there is confusion about exactly 
what they are expected to do and the risk is that their job description remains vague for long. 
Instead, this opportunity should be used to include security and defence in the remit of EU 
Delegations, especially in relation to CSDP missions. 
Moreover, given the EU experience in bordering assistance missions and in contributing to police 
reform, the possibility of a mission to Tunisia should be examined with care. As mentioned, the EU 
is about to launch a security sector reform project in 2016 (EUR 23 million), which is to be 
praised. The integrated border management component included in the project should pay 
attention to the border between Algeria and Tunisia. Algeria has invested heavily in more 
favourable relations with Tunisia, but this positive development risks isolating the EU, traditionally 
not a particularly welcome partner by Algerian authorities. Therefore a European contribution 
would create a favourable multilateral environment. Moreover, the EU could contribute to support 
Tunisian authorities in the management of the border with Libya and of Libyan refugees, which 
currently number ca. 1 million. While Libyan refugees seem so far to have integrated relatively well 
in Tunisia, much of this is due to their relative wealth, which in the mid- to long-term, however, 
could diminish to negative effects.  
In comparison, the US is engaged in a security dialogue with Tunisia, with the aim to sponsor an 
enhanced NATO-status for Tunisia. It is also discussing security cooperation, having launched a 
Security Dialogue (which includes an economic component) with Tunisia in April 2014. 
Whether EU cooperation with Tunisia should take the form of a CSDP mission, however, is 
questionable, especially in comparison to the possibility of strengthening the existing cooperation 
run by the Commission. The Commission is already active on the ground and has substantial 
funding in place that could be used to support security sector reform and training, including of 
border management. Moreover, the Commission would be better placed to avoid potential 
duplication of efforts. There are a number of programs on the ground financed by Member States 
(including Germany and Italy) in the area of security sector reform and border management. In this 
regard, the dialogue and cooperation between the G7+3 and Tunisia plays an important role in 
coordinating the engagement of the international community. Finally, the visibility of a CSDP 
mission might not be right for Tunisia, which has the political profile of an EU partner, rather than 
of a recipient of support actions. This is testified also by the lack of invitation on the part of the 
Tunisian government to the EU to discuss a possible CSDP mission, as well as by the refusal by 
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Tunisian authorities to implement some of the proposals made by the EU and other partners. To 
put it differently, the political, context and operational conditions for a CSDP mission to Tunisia do 
not seem to be present. 
More generally, the connection between crisis management structures and the Commission should 
be strengthened to ensure that lessons learned travel across the full institutional spectrum of the 
EU. For instance, at the moment it is difficult to envisage an end-date to the EUPOL COPPS CSDP 
mission, as it would suggest that the mission objectives have been fully achieved (despite lack of 
formal recognition of the state of Palestine). However, some of the mission’s tasks could be also 
performed by or should at least be carried in conjunction with the Commission, thus giving 
more operational content to the comprehensive security approach, as well as to the 'train and 
equip' debate. Similarly, the current operational activities of EUBAM Rafah do not strictly require a 
military presence, which serves instead a political purpose. The EU Border Assistance Mission to 
Moldova and Ukraine, which is fully funded by the Commission and implemented by the 
International Organization for Migration, could be an interesting model to consider – and vice 
versa, as the experience accumulated in Mediterranean CSDP missions is certainly valuable also for 
Commission’s actions in non-EU countries. 
In a longer time frame and involving a broader range of instruments, the re-thinking of the ENP 
must address also the political and economic logic of the Euro-Mediterranean Association 
Agreements. At the moment, it remains very much that of the early post-Cold war years, in which 
economic liberalisation was expected to not only foster development, but also contribute to 
political liberalisation, as Mediterranean countries became further integrated in the Single Market. 
However, with the benefit of twenty years’ hindsight and in the context of the 2008 economic crisis 
in Europe, this assumption has proved untenable. While it is generally stressed that the entry into 
force of the Association Agreements has increased the volume of trade, it should also be noted that 
in all cases and across time it has worsened the trade balance for Southern Mediterranean 
countries and consolidated a trade balance favourable to the strongest partner, the EU. This is 
economically sound for the EU, but politically and strategically dangerous, given the local context, 
and Algeria, for instance, has started to ‘roll back’ the Association Agreement with the EU and re-
impose trade barriers. The Association Agreements seem so far unable to translate into a truly 
inclusive and equitable model of development, or to support a more balanced political and 
security context within Mediterranean countries. This includes also Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia, 
which have been granted ‘Advanced’ status (i.e. have a broader range of issues on the agenda for 
dialogue).  
Moreover, the current talks about Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas, aimed at deepening 
the AAs, continue to put the entire burden of regulatory adjustments on the fragile Southern 
Mediterranean countries, with very limited support on the part of the EU. References abound to 
‘regulatory convergence’ between the EU and Southern Mediterranean countries. However, the 
reality is that Southern Mediterranean countries would be expected to implement costly reforms 
to approximate the ‘acquis communautaire’ with limited guarantee that sustainability, equality 
and security would ensue. It should come as no surprise that negotiations have stalled with all 
Southern Mediterranean countries, despite the expected start of negotiations with Tunisia in 
October 2015.  
Given the limitations of the current Association Agreements, the issue of agriculture should be re-
opened and it should be accompanied by a focus on supporting local governance institutions that 
are able to deliver development. Agriculture is often treated as an afterthought in Euro-
Mediterranean economic relations, as the default EU position tends to be of flat refusal to engage 
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on this key aspect. The programme ENPARD (the European Neighbourhood Programme for 
Agriculture and Rural Development) is a case in point. Endowed in its Southern Mediterranean 
component with EUR 10 million for 2012-14 and renewed in September 2015,101 the programme is 
outsourced to the French Institut Agronomique Méditerranéen de Montpellier, it represents a 
modest and indirect effort, despite its stated goal (to strengthen food security and the living 
conditions of rural populations) is to be praised.  
The EU should revisit its approach and capitalise on the opportunity agriculture provides for 
increasing security at the borders. The EU should devise a strategy that allows an increase in its 
agricultural quota policy, fostering joint North-South ventures aimed at global export, as well as 
replicating the agreement concluded in January 2015 with Morocco on the protection of 
Geographical Indications, to name just a few issues. Recent (temporary) concessions made to 
Tunisia in relation to olive oil are another good example. The olive oil sector employs directly and 
indirectly ca. 1 million people in Tunisia, largely in the rural areas that the EU is targeting in its 
2014-15 programme.102 It is a paradox that in the agricultural sector, the EU exports to Tunisia are 
nearly twice as much as it imports.103 
3.2.3 Conclusions 
ENP goals of political and economic stabilisation depend directly on the success of conflict 
prevention measures and would benefit immensely from successful conflict resolution. On the 
other hand, conflict-related policies and other security policies linked to fighting transnational 
organised crime, terrorism and the proliferation of weapons benefit directly from successful 
reforms and state-building processes, which are at the core of the ENP. Thus the articulation 
CFSP/CSDP and non-CFSP/CSDP instruments is crucial for the overall success of EU policies in 
the Eastern neighbourhood. 
Under the ENP and the EaP in particular, the EU has several non-CFSP/CSDP instruments 
supporting its policy goals, including the promotion of stability and security. Financial assistance is 
available primarily through the new European Neighbourhood Instrument (former European 
Partnership and Neighbourhood Instrument). The range of areas covered by this funding is 
directly or indirectly contributing to conflict prevention, confidence building and other 
important measures aimed at reinforcing state institutions and improving democratic and human 
rights standards, as well as improving regional cooperation. Measures funded under this 
instrument need to be articulated with CSDP tools, including EU civilian missions contributing to 
state-building (rule of law missions, border management missions, etc.) and EaP specific tools such 
as the ‘Comprehensive Institution-Building’ (CIB) initiative. 
The EU security policy towards the Mediterranean seems to have been affected by the 
disillusionment that followed the Arab uprisings. As economic and political instability inside 
Europe consume available resources, the attitude towards the Southern Mediterranean countries 
seems anchored to pre-2008 economic crisis and pre-Arab spring assumptions. The Lisbon Treaty 
has endowed the EU with a set of powerful instruments, from the creation of the EEAS to new 
CSDP practices to new responsibilities in the field of external economic relations, most of which 
could be put at use in relations with the ENP-South, if invigorated by a new vision. 
 
101 No public information is available on the renewal. ENPARD website: http://www.enpard.iamm.fr/en/.  
102 European Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/newsroom/191_fr.htm, last accessed 28/7/2015. 
103 European Commission, (November 2014) “Tunisia, Bilateral relations in agriculture,”  
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Possible improvements include both CSDP and non-CSDP instruments. EU Delegations should be 
expanded to comprise more political officers as well as security and defence experts. Tunisia 
should be better supported in terms of security sector reform, border management and refugees. 
Better coordination between the Commission and the EEAS would contribute to strengthen the 
development-security nexus.  
More generally, the ENP should deliver a political vision encompassing both economic and security 
aspects. Much more attention should be devoted to agriculture, in order to exploit its potential in 
terms of security and sustainable development. The outcome of the ENP revision will hopefully 
deliver a clear political and economic vision to support the resolution of conflicts and the 
management of crises in the Mediterranean. 
3.3 Development policy support for crisis management 
3.3.1 Scope, policy stakes, definitions and legal base 
Over the last 20 years, since the adoption in 2001 of the Goteborg programme on conflict 
prevention, the EU and its Member States have worked to create synergies between its 
development policy tools and security policies, on the ground that 'security is a precondition for 
development' and that 'without development and poverty eradication there will be no sustainable 
peace'.104 
The challenge has been to enhance conflict sensitivity among development experts while 
demonstrating to security specialists that their work had implications for development. A toolbox 
now exists and is being used and enriched regularly.105 Most recently interlinkages between 
security and development have been addressed by the documents on the EU Comprehensive 
Approach to crises as well as by the 2015 Joint Communication on capacity development for 
security and development.106  
E/CSDP was developed initially as a distinct set of EU intergovernmental actions, deliberately and 
clearly separated from EU tools and instruments. Initially, many E/CSDP military operations were 
conceived by seconded national militaries (French, in the cases of Artemis, EUNAVFOR and EUFOR 
Chad/RCA) who had little understanding of the ‘development world’ and did not think in terms of 
comprehensive approach.107 Next to their original mandate, civilian missions were also an 
opportunity to enlarge the sphere of influence of the then HR/SG Solana over Commission’s 
prerogatives (in the field of Rule of Law or Security Sector Reform for instance).108 Missions 
 
104 Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on Security and Development, 2831st External Relations Council 
meeting, Brussels, 19-20 November 2007 
 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/gena/97157.pdf 
105 Operating in situation of conflict and fragility, an EU staff handbook, 2014. http://tinyurl.com/qgoyaoc.  
106 These documents are available on the webpage of the 2015 EU training on Seminar on Fragility, Security and 
Development in the context of EU external action - See more at: http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/public-
fragility/event/seminar-fragility-security-and-development-context-eu-external-action-1#sthash.EbjgPclC.dpuf 
107 Author’s interviews with E/CSDP experts referring to the various 'fathers' of a given operation, 2008-2013. EUFOR 
Chad/RCA is a particular case since the humanitarian component was added by non ESDP experts.  
108 These debates were precisely held during the 1996 intergovernmental conference. Buchet de Neuilly, Y., L’irrésistible 
ascension du haut représentant pour la PESC, Politique européenne, 2002. https://www.cairn.info/revue-politique-
europeenne-2002-4-page-13.htm EUJUST THEMIS in 2003 was a case in point. Ensuring EU coherence has also been at 
the core of the discussions on the launch of EULEX Kosovo. The coherence challenge and the quest for a comprehensive 
approach is a red thread in the history of E/CSDP, addressed by all volumes on the topic. http://www.eufp.eu/common-
security-and-defense-policy  
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mandates have been negotiated on the basis of their added value to Commission’s programmes 
and overlaps have been frequently noted.109  
This form of institutional competition is still prevalent today. Since the Lisbon treaty entered into 
force, tensions and competition remain, despite specific provisions and measures supposed to 
enhance coherence and efficiency. In parallel, as the result of the financial meltdown and the 
politically negative experience of EUFOR Chad/RCA for Germany in 2008-2009, the military part of 
CSDP has not grown as initially foreseen in Saint Malo. Instead, the civilian component of CSDP (or 
training CSDP) has developed more than peacekeeping operations. As a consequence, CSDP 
civilian missions have become longer in duration, and increasingly resemble security cooperation 
programmes: their connections with development work have thereby become even more salient.  
Scope 
There are two types of possible interactions between CSDP operations and Commission 
programmes: complementarity or overlap (see table 4). From a time perspective, the interaction 
can take the shape of simultaneous, sequenced or handed-over interventions as part of exit 
strategies. Interactions usually focus on three dimensions: financing, expertise, political clout (see 
table 4).  
Most of the debates about support to security and defence activities through existing EU 
instruments will be framed by the parameters above.  
Table 4: Dimensions, interaction and timing between development and security policies 
Dimensions Interaction Time
Financing Complementarity Simultaneous 
Expertise Overlap Sequenced 
Political clout  Hand-over 
Definitions and legal base 
EU security and defence activities are not the monopoly of CSDP, yet CSDP is the main EU 
framework to carry out the so-called Petersberg-tasks: peacekeeping and peace enforcement, 
humanitarian rescue and evacuation, peacebuilding. At the same item, the Commission has been 
involved for a long time in security-related work, especially peacebuilding and conflict 
prevention. It is also responsible for the internal defence market, which has direct connections 
with CSDP (see chapter 4). This means that legally speaking and in practice, for the sake of EU 
coherence, the Council and the Commission can and have to work in a complementary manner.  
The paradox is that Member States have decided to isolate military CSDP from EU financing to 
avoid any interference by the Commission in military operations. Article 41.2 states that the EU 
budget cannot be used to finance 'operations having military or defence implications and 
envisages the creation of a separate start-up fund for them'. The Commission is fully associated to 
 
109 According to DEVCO representatives describing the preparation work for the 2015 Joint Communication on capacity 
building for security and defence, 70 % of EU bilateral development cooperation funds go to fragile countries where 
conflict sensitivity and therefore interlinkages with security is paramount. Notes taken at the Civil Society Dialogue 
Network, Brussels, 12 March 2015.  
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CFSP but is only requested to manage the CFSP budget. The European Parliament has actually had 
a stronger say on CSDP when negotiating and reporting on the use of the CFSP budget.  
There are currently debates on the legal base to finance CSDP operations with EU budget and 
particularly on the interpretation of article 41 of the Lisbon Treaty. However, available data and an 
analysis of this article show that article 41 leaves a) the door open for the use of EU budget to 
support 'operations having military or defence implications'110 and b) is open for interpretation (the 
terms 'operations', 'military implications' and 'defence implications' can be discussed at length).  
Article 42 on CSDP similarly opens room for EU support coming from the Community budget 
because of the complementary nature of CSDP Petersberg tasks some of which have also been 
implemented by the Commission. Although CSDP tasks have to be performed 'with capabilities 
provided by Member States', the Lisbon Treaty also encourages actions 'framing a common 
defence policy', any initiative seeking coherence and progress towards this direction is legally 
justified. 
Table 5: Budget source and instrument 
Budget source and 
respective 
instruments 
EU budget
(not CFSP) 
Outside of EU 
budget 
CFSP budget
 The European 
Neighbourhood 
Instrument (ENI) 
The European 
Development Fund 
(EDF) 
The African Peace 
Facility (within EDF) 
The Common Foreign 
and Security Policy 
(CFSP) budget 
The Instrument for 
Pre-accession 
Assistance (IPA) 
Athena Mechanism CSDP missions 
budget (within CFSP 
budget) 
The Instrument 
contributing to 
Stability and Peace 
(ICsP) 
Member States’ 
bilateral budgets 
EUSR offices budget 
(within CFSP budget) 
The Instrument for 
Democracy and 
Human Rights (EIDHR) 
  
The Development 
Cooperation 
Instrument (DCI) 
  
As a matter of fact, the EU already has a myriad of instruments at its disposal to support security 
and defence endeavours abroad. A list of these instruments is provided in the table above.  
3.3.2 Policy debates and dynamics 
Current debates have focused on four main issues: legal interpretations of article 41, the use of EU 
funds for security and defence actions and in particular compliance with the criteria qualifying 
 
110 The second paragraph of article 41.2 states 'unless the Council unanimously decides otherwise'.  
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Official Development Assistance (ODA).111 These debates show there is variety of positions within 
EU institutions112 and civil society, but also the existence of reluctance and fear from the 
development community that development funds would finance weapons. The Joint 
Communication on capacity building in support of security and development addresses these fears 
by explicitly stating that EU development funds will not be used to provide or acquire weapons.113 
The current situation therefore makes some experts think that the question is not whether EU 
funds will be used for CSDP operations, but when and how this will happen.  
Several options have been sketched out by the Joint Communication on Capacity Building in 
support of security and development: an adaptation of the Africa Peace Facility, the 
establishment of a new and enlarged facility and the creation of new dedicated instrument.114 The 
European Council of June 2015 has not taken any clear decision on either of these options. Public 
statements from EU officials though seem to indicate that the creation of a new instrument is being 
discussed by EU institutions.115 The Joint Communication also envisages measures to enhance 
the security and development nexus, focused on enhanced coordination and joint frameworks in 
SSR strategy, monitoring and evaluation, expertise sharing, reporting and risk analysis and 
management.116  
Some of these frameworks or documents are being developed or in place: the PFCA (Political 
Framework for Crisis Approach)117, the Joint Framework document (JFD)118, context analysis and 
Political Economy Analysis (PEA) exercises119, and the communication on the comprehensive 
approach and its action plan. There is no shortage of tools to come up with joint analysis on 
risks to use development resources for security-related endeavours. Having new strategic 
frameworks may help Brussels HQs but it may also top up existing strategic document templates. 
Against this background the sections below look at examples of interactions between security and 
defence and development tools to identify options for further improvements.  
3.3.3 Support to the APSA 
The use of the Africa Peace Facility (APF) in support to the African Peace and Security Architecture 
is the most obvious example (more than 1.2 billion spent in support of the AU) of how the EU has 
used its development funds for security.120 The African Peace Facility has been used as a 
complement to EUNAVFOR Atalanta in Somalia, by massively supporting the AU-led military 
operation AMISOM. However, APF money has not been used to provide equipment per se.  
 
111 Tardy, T., ‘Enabling partners to manage crises – From ‘train and equip’ to capacity building’, EUISS Brief 18, 2015. 
www.iss.europa.eu.  
112 Bruxelles 2, Les defies et dilemmes de la PSDC, http://club.bruxelles2.eu/2015/06/les-defis-et-dilemmes-de-la-psdc/.  
113 “While it addresses the issue of equipment to support partner countries' security capacity building, it does not address 
the provision of lethal weapons. The EU will not provide such equipment.” Joint Communication to the Council and the 
European Parliament, Capacity building in support of security and development - Enabling partners to prevent and 
manage crises, p. 2. 
114 JOIN (2015) 17 final. 
115 Statement made by a CMPD official, EUISS conference on Sahel security, Brussels, 11 September 2015.  
116 Ibid.  
117 Joint Communication on the Comprehensive Approach, 2013.  
118 Council conclusions, 12 May 2014.  
119 See various resources on PEA on the Capacity4dev platform, http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/political-
economy/terms-5529/tags/political-economy-analysis-2.  
120 Keukeleire, S., Raube, K., ‘The security-development nexus and securitization in the EU's policies towards developing 
countries’. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 26 (3), 2013, 556-572. 
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In the case of the APF, a number of shortcomings have been identified by the Joint 
Communication: the restriction of the APF to the support to the African Union and not to 
national governments, its constraints provided by compliance with ODA criteria, its status linked to 
the European Development Fund.121  
Any reform of the APF would have to be negotiated with the parties of the Cotonou Agreement 
(in particular the group of ACP countries) the future of which is actually under discussion in 
anticipation of its legal termination in 2020. The creation of a new facility replacing the APF would 
also require an agreement with the ACP. The creation of a new facility outside the EDF would 
require identifying alternative sources of funding, which, in time of financial constraints, seems 
unlikely.  
Another option that could be used to provide equipment to APSA and national partner 
governments is the Athena mechanism, which can, since its recent reform, manage EU 
contributions and contribution from non-EU partners. Such move would imply that APF money 
(coming from the EDF) would be managed by an intergovernmental security-focused CSDP 
structure.  
A last option, not envisaged by the Joint Communication, is the use of the treaty provision to 
establish a start-up fund for CSDP operations that would be targeted to equipment provision.  
3.3.4 CSDP training missions 
The Joint Communication in particular is based on two case studies of CSDP military training 
missions, namely EUTM Somalia and EUTM Mali. The limitations of both missions in terms of 
equipment provision have already been documented in public documents.122 However, providing 
equipment to foreign partners entails risks: the equipment might be misused or used for other 
purposes than initially planned, the trained partners may change sides, become foes, just leave 
their position, or behave in such a way that is in contradiction with European objectives or values.  
Reform options currently on the table include the use of a) the Athena mechanism as a 
management body of EU funds for equipment provisions or b) a reformed African Peace Facility 
allowing support to national forces. Yet a third option is the provision of equipment by Member 
States themselves as a bilateral measure supporting both EUTM.  
One example of the necessity to ensure risk management in equipment provision was given in 
June 2014, in the wake of a failed Malian attack in Kidal during which most of the equipment used 
was provided by Europeans and EUTM Mali.123 Equipment provision by EUTM was made possible by 
the creation of a project cell in 2013, after one year of internal EU negotiations: a rather fast reform 
in comparison to past CSDP missions. Yet, stakeholders acknowledged in June 2014 that the 
security and development nexus was still very hard to implement and underlined that in the 
given context, the influential player is the Head of Cooperation section of the EU Delegation, with 
strong decision making powers on budget allocations.  
 
121 The budgetisation of the EDF is an old debate. See European Parliament Research Service’s forum on the EDF and the 
EU budget, http://epthinktank.eu/2014/11/21/forum-on-the-european-development-fund-and-the-eu-budget/. Mackie, 
J., Frederiksen, J., Rossini, C, ‘Improving ACP-EU Cooperation – Is ‘budgetising’ the EDF the answer?’, ECDPM, 2004. 
http://ecdpm.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/DP-51-Improving-ACP-EU-Cooperation-Budgetising-EDF-2004.pdf 
122 Thierry Tardy, op. cit.  
123 “They took the equipment for rapid interventions to the North but they have been unable to use it properly.” Interview 
with an EU official, Bamako, June 2014.  
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Potential complementarity between EDF funded rule of law programmes and CSDP missions in 
Mali (EUTM and EUCAP Sahel Mali) and Niger (EUCAP) 
The cases of Mali and Niger provide more foods for thought on the potential complementarity of 
CSDP missions and existing EU funds. In terms of internal EU coordination, EU working groups on 
security now convene regularly with the EU Delegations in Mali and Niger. Such practice has 
allowed stakeholders to identify potential complementarities in terms of joint analysis and 
jointly programmed initiatives.  
In Niger, field research has shown that it took time for EUCPAP Sahel Niger staff to request for and 
benefit from expertise, advice and financial support from the EU Delegation and various 
programmes staff already present in the country (and in the Northern region of Agadez in 
particular) for several years.124 EDF programmes in Niger (PAJED) substantially contributed to the 
security sector in Niger (Meharist brigade, training of judicial police, forensic lab, etc.) before the 
launch of EUCAP and some complementarity had to be found. 
Once the mission was set up initial talks on potential synergies took place. The EU Delegation also 
played an instrumental role in introducing CSDP staff to the right interlocutors in Niger. This 
political contribution is also to take note, even if it is not immediately visible. After over a year, 
some cooperation started off, with attempts to use existing EU funds at the disposal of the EU 
Delegation in support of EUCAP work.125 EUCAP experts have contributed to the identification of 
relevant communication equipment to be provided to Nigerian forces supported by the 
Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), while taking part in training modules to 
municipal police. After two years, EUCAP Sahel Niger was still 'perceived by Nigeriens as a 
cooperation agency to which they could make equipment requests'126: this situation shows how 
acute the need has been for more resources to provide equipment.  
One of the lessons learnt from the experience of EUCAP Niger is to hire CSDP mission staff who 
have some experience in development cooperation and are able to coordinate and cooperate 
immediately with EU Delegations managers of development cooperation funds.127  
3.3.5 Other CSDP missions 
As far as rule of law missions are concerned, another option could be to second Commission Staff 
to these missions, to ensure complementarity with Commission’s programmes and to bring in 
development expertise.  
Tentative (but aborted) EDF support to a pension fund in Guinea Bissau as a complement to 
EUSSR Guinea Bissau (2009) 
EUSSR Guinea Bissau was a mission aimed at providing strategic advice to the reform of the armed 
forces and the security and justice sector in 2009. The ESDP mission was launched while the 
Commission had already engaged in SSR, DDR and justice reform processes under the 8th, and 9th 
EDF. ESDP and EC initiatives were planned in synergy while most of security and defence 
equipment was provided by Member States (Portugal, Spain, UK) on a bilateral basis and to some 
 
124 Interviews with EU staff in Niger and Brussels, 2013 and 2014. 
125 Interview with EU officials, Niamey, May 2014.  
126 Interview with an EU official, Niamey, May 2014. 
127 Phone Interview with an EU official based in Niamey September 2014.  
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extent by the EC.128 Under the 10th EDF, an SSR programme (PARSS) focused on the demobilisation 
of and 'appropriate compensation package for demobilisation' to former freedom fighters (troops 
employed in the independence struggle against former colonial power). Setting up a pension 
mechanism for these aged troops was seen as a way to pave the way for a reform of the army. The 
first step consisted in carrying out, with EU funds, a census of this population. Negotiations on a 
pension fund were well under way when the army chief of staff was assassinated, bringing EU 
efforts in SSR to an end. Other EC programmes such as the PAOSED focused on the training as well 
as on the ‘building of infrastructure for the organs of sovereignty and provision of equipment'.129  
At the strategic level, the then Instrument for Stability had been mobilised to ensure an EU 
presence on SSR while the ESDP mission was deployed.  
The Bissau Guinean example illustrates very well the kind of complementarity that can be found 
between E/CSDP and other EU instruments if planned well. One lesson learnt was the need for 
Development cooperation staff to be better trained on SSR, Rule of Law reform and the security 
and development nexus.  
EUSEC DR Congo and its project cell and tensions with the EC Delegation back in the 2000s 
EUSEC DR Congo has become an almost 'permanent' crisis management operation, contradicting 
those stating that CSDP is for only short term interventions, i.e. shorter than 3 years. Very early on, 
the mission had to coordinate with and manage funds from Member States willing to provide 
equipment to Congolese armed forces. The creation of a project cell in the mission created 
tensions with the Commission which was already carrying large-scale SSR programmes in the 
country. Over time, the project cell became accepted, and reinforced in 2010. IT infrastructure was 
delivered by EUSEC.130 Its purpose was also to develop 'flanking measures' as additional incentives 
for reform as well as tangible support. It included funding for the school of military administrations 
and support to the wives of soldiers.131  
Over time, the establishment of project cells in CSDP SSR missions so as to deliver equipment 
became the norm, for instance in EUPOL COPPS, EUPOL Afghanistan (see chapter in ESDP@10) and 
EUBAM Moldova.132 In the case of DR Congo, the co-existence of such project cells has not always 
been easy. This experience called for more coordination and coherence at national level, now 
favoured by the framework of the Lisbon Treaty.  
EUFOR Chad and the practice of signing an MoU with OCHA and the humanitarian actors in 
Eastern Chad for a mutually beneficial coordination (2009) 
Examples of complementarity between military operations and Commission’s programmes 
are as old as ESDP. For instance, it is reported that the European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR) 
 
128 “Donor support to the Security Sector Reform process April 2009”, in possession of the author, and interviews in 
Bissau, 2009. 
129 “Donor support to the Security Sector Reform process April 2009”, in possession of the author and interviews in Bissau, 
2009. 
130 Clément, C., ‘EUSEC RD Congo’, in Grevi, G., Helly, D., Keohane, D. (eds.), ESDP the first ten years, EUISS, 2009, p. 245. 
131 EUSEC RD Congo soutient le renforcement des capacités des “mamans militaires”, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/081108-Genre_Maluku_Foyer_social_FIN.pdf.  
132 See references to projects in chapters on these missions in Grevi, G., Helly, D. Keohane, D., op cit.  
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funded Civil-Military (CIMIC) projects in the CONCORDIA operation.133 In Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
EUFOR Althea engineers oversaw school rehabilitation projects funded by the Commission.134  
A more systematic effort was made in the case of EUFOR Chad/RCA in 2008-2009. The Commission 
was explicitly requested to launch flanking measures to the operation: the PAS (programme 
d’accompagnement pour la stabilisation) was therefore designed to target IDPs and refugees living 
conditions in and around the operation’s intervention area.135 Other initiatives were launched by 
the Commission’s Instrument for Stability to provide funding for the equipment and training of 
the Chadian police and gendarmerie within the UN operation MINURCAT. The deployment of these 
forces actually proved very slow, which partly undermined the success of the hybrid EU/UN 
coordination format.  
The main lesson learnt from the experience of EUFOR Chad/RCA was the recognition that a joint EU 
political strategy is a pre-requisite for successful combination of peacekeeping, training and 
equipment of partner forces.   
3.3.6 Phasing out of civilian CSDP operations and take over by EU funds 
In July 2014 the EEAS issued a document on CSDP transition strategies seeking to provide a 
framework for planning hand-over from CSDP operations to other EU instruments.136  
So far, quite a few operations had to hand over their activities to other EU programmes: it has been 
the case of the EU Police Mission in BiH, to some extent EUPOL Afghanistan and EUSEC DR 
Congo.137 The phasing out of EUCAP Nestor is under discussion, with CIVCOM seeking 
Commission’s involvement to ensure a smooth exit for the CSDP operation.  
The main lesson learnt from transition and phasing-out experiences is the need for early joint 
planning, a point already recognised by the Joint Communication on capacity building in security 
and development and the document on CSDP transition strategies.138  
3.3.7 Conclusions  
The Member States and Commission’s range of activities in the security field actually represent the 
lion’s share of the EU security and development nexus. CSDP missions represent a very small 
budget in comparison to EDF and DCI envelopes that amount to billion euros. It is reported by EU 
officials that 70 % of bilateral programs in Africa go to fragile states.  
Current debates and positions seem to bend in favour of a revision of the scope of both the Africa 
Peace Facility and of the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace to allow EU funds to 
support equipment provision in security and defence. Other options on the table (Brand new 
financial instrument, Athena mechanism, use of the CSDP start-up fund) seem less likely but should 
not be discarded in the future.  
 
133 Ibid., p. 176. 
134 Ibid., p. 218.  
135 Programme d’accompagnement à la stabilization dans l’Est du Tchad – Cadrage stratégique et méthodologique, 
Mission conjointe UE-CONAFIT, Document de travail provisoire, 13 mai 2008, in possession of the author.  
136 CSDP transition strategies, EEAS document 01454/14, 15 July 2014. 
137 The handover usually implied transfer of activities from the CSDP mission to programmes managed by the EU 
Delegation (or the EUSR office in the case of EUPM). On EUPM, see Flessenkemper, T, Helly, D. (eds.), ‘Ten years after: 
lessons learned from EUPM in Bosnia and Herzegovina 2002-2012’, EUISS, 2013.  
138 Joint Communication, Capacity building in support of security and development - Enabling partners to prevent and 
manage crises, JOIN (2015) 17 final, 28 April 2015. 
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The examples presented above show that coordination and complementarity between EC 
programmes, Member States’ security initiatives and E/CSDP missions have been happening since 
the creation of ESDP. The provision of equipment to the security sector is not something 
completely new for the Commission, and the possibility for EU funds to be used in support of CSDP 
work is a reality. Doing it more often in practice is actually possible with some imagination, 
creativity and inter-institutional compromising negotiation skills. 
The Lisbon Treaty now provides a stronger framework than in the past to ensure that 
competition and tensions between CSDP and Commission’s work are quickly resolved through 
inter-institutional talks and negotiations under the aegis of the double hatted HR/VP.  
Several considerations on possible improvements made above are reminded here, including: 
clarification of the legal debate and the legal options by setting up a joint team of legal experts 
from the Council, the Commission, the EEAS and the European Parliament to sketch out the width 
of possible interpretations of relevant articles of the Lisbon Treaty (41 but also 42 and other legal 
bases to be used).   
There is no shortage of tools to come up with joint analysis on risks to use development 
resources for security-related endeavours. Having new strategic frameworks may help Brussels HQs 
but it may also top up existing strategic document templates. 
Any reform of the APF would have to be negotiated with the parties of the Cotonou Agreement (in 
particular the group of ACP countries) the future of which is under discussion in the view to its 
termination in 2020. The creation of a new facility replacing the APF would also require an 
agreement with the ACP. The creation of a new facility outside the EDF would require identifying 
other sources of funding outside the EDF, which, in time of financial constraints, seems unlikely. A 
last option, not envisaged by the Joint Communication, is the use of the treaty provision to 
establish a start-up fund for CSDP operations that would be targeted to equipment provision.  
One of the lessons learnt from the experience of EUCAP Niger is to hire CSDP mission staff who 
have some experience in development cooperation and are able to coordinate and cooperate 
immediately with EU Delegations managers of development cooperation funds. The Bissau 
Guinean example illustrates very well the kind of complementarity that can be found between 
E/CSDP and other EU instruments if planned well. One lesson learnt then was the need for 
Development cooperation staff to be better trained on SSR, Rule of Law reform and the 
security and development nexus. The main lesson learnt from the experience of EUFOR 
Chad/RCA was the recognition that a joint EU political strategy is a pre-requisite for successful 
combination of peacekeeping, training and equipment of partner forces. The main lesson learnt 
from transition and phasing-out experiences is the need for early joint planning, a point already 
recognised by the Joint Communication on capacity building in security and development and the 
document on CSDP transition strategies. 
Security coordination primarily happens at national level, involving EU Delegations and CSDP 
missions, as shown in the Sahel. Such coordination formats are the best base for joint analysis and 
assessments.  There is margin of manoeuvre for EU Delegations in the way they allocate funds, 
which also depends also on the EU policy dialogue with the partner government.  
To that end, it is recommend to beef up political sections in EU Delegations to a) coordinate the 
drafting of joint analyses and strategies on security & development nexus in a given country 
b) interact more intensively with Cooperation sections and Heads of Cooperation to assess 
potential synergies between available EU funds for development and their availability for actions 
having security and defence implications 
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3.4 Nexus between internal and external policies’ support for crisis 
management (focusing inter alia on counter-terrorism and 
migration) 
3.4.1 EU Comprehensive approach: the merging of internal and external 
aspects of security 
The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) was initially conceived to fight neither terrorism 
nor irregular migration, but to deal with civilian aspects of crisis management – police, civil 
administration and protection, rule of law, security sector reform (SSR) – and to conduct military 
operations (as defined by the 1992 Petersberg tasks). However, the terrorist attacks in New York 
and Washington (2001), followed by the Madrid (2004) and London (2005) bombings, gave new 
impetus to better acknowledge the external dimension of internal security. Recent events like the 
attack against Charlie Hebdo in Paris at the beginning of 2015, but also the dramatic increase of 
irregular immigration since 2011 with the current record numbers of refugees have pushed this 
conviction even further. Such events have stressed the need to activate all relevant tools at the 
disposal of the EU to tackle internal threats, including the external financing instruments, as well 
as to externalise EU internal security especially in its neighbourhood139.  
This is in line with the 'Comprehensive Approach' which the EU promoted notably in the 2003 
European Security Strategy and the 2005 Strategy on the External Dimension of the Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice. The rising number of deadly shipwrecks in the Mediterranean Sea 
(with a peak of 1 308 migrants who drowned in April 2015 alone140) led to a quick European 
reaction towards better border protection, including the launch of a CSDP military operation 'EU 
Naval Force Mediterranean' (EUNAVFOR Med). Since 22 June 2015, this mission, with the support of 
20 Member States, mainly aims at countering the smuggling and trafficking of migrants across the 
Mediterranean Sea, and to prevent irregular migration flows 'as part of the EU’s comprehensive 
approach to migration which includes the use of other tools and actions' as detailed below141. Since 
May 2013 already, the EU conducts the CSDP civilian mission 'EU Integrated Border Management 
Assistance Mission in Libya' (EUBAM Libya) which supports Libyan authorities 'in developing border 
management and security at the country’s land, sea and air border'142; for the EU, this is perceived 
as another way to locate and stop migrant boats before they reach EU waters143. Due to the fragile 
security and political situation in Libya, the mission has been conducted since August 2014 with 
limited capacity from Tunisia144. 
 
139 Ioannides, I., ‘Inside-out and Outside-in: EU Security in the Neighbourhood’, The International Spectator: Italian Journal 
of International Affairs, 49(1) 2014; Trauner, F., Carrapiço, H. ‘The External Dimension of EU Justice and Home Affairs after 
the Lisbon Treaty: Analysing the Dynamics of Expansion and Diversification”, European Foreign Affairs Review, 17(1/2) 
2012; Kaunert, C., Leonard, S. ‘EU Counterterrorism and the European Neighbourhood Policy: An Appraisal of the 
Southern Dimension’, Terrorism and Political Violence, 23(2) 2011. 
140 UNHCR, Mediterranean Crisis 2015 at six months: refugee and migrant numbers highest on record, Press Releases, 1 
July 2015, http://www.unhcr.org/5592b9b36.html  
141 EEAS, European Union Naval Force – Mediterranean, August 2015, http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-
operations/eunavfor-med/pdf/factsheet_eunavfor_med.pdf  
142 EEAS, EU Integrated Border Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM Libya), January 2015, 
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Regarding the fight against terrorism, it took time to convince the Council to clearly include 
counter-terrorism as a key objective of a CSDP mission. The perceived inadequacy of the CSDP 
nature, the lack of political consensus and the overall EU response being more reactive than 
proactive in that domain might explain the declaration-implementation gap145. Eventually, the 
Lisbon Treaty (Art. 43.1, TEU) updated the Petersberg tasks with the idea that 'all these tasks may 
contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating 
terrorism in their territories'. However, the first CSDP civilian mission was launched only in 2012, 
namely EUCAP SAHEL Niger, with the formal mandate to support Nigerien authorities’ efforts to 
fight terrorism146. In this regard, the Council linked EUNAVFOR Med to EUCAP SAHEL Niger to 
improve the border management in the region. The securitisation of migration has indeed led to 
an increase of the importance of border control measures in the EU’s counter-terrorism efforts, as 
confirmed in the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy 2005, but these measures have made only small 
contributions to the fight against terrorism so far147.  
The need to bring together internal and external dimensions of security is one of the key principles 
of the European Agenda on Security and the European Agenda on Migration, both presented in 
2015 and 'strongly' underlined by the Council conclusions on CSDP of 18 May 2015. However, the 
challenge for the EU is to put its rhetoric into practice. To implement effectively the EU 
Comprehensive Approach in 'real' crisis management, with some CSDP missions concretely 
involved in internal security issues, the overall consistency between policies and better 
cooperation between EU actors dealing with these issues in the European security governance is 
required, as underlined in the Lisbon Treaty (Art. 21, TEU). 
3.4.2 Bridge between non-CSDP actions and CSDP missions 
Throughout the last years, most of the CSDP missions and operations have been presented 'as part 
of the EU’s Comprehensive Approach'148, meaning that they complement other EU tools and 
actions. Consequently, non-CSDP actions shall also contribute to CSDP activities.  
It is most relevant to underline the growing contributions of the European Agency for the 
Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of 
the EU (Frontex), particularly towards the EU Eastern and Southern neighbourhood. Several 
initiatives might be useful to support the CSDP military operation EUNAVFOR Med, as they already 
offer a framework for national cooperation which fits well to the CSDP intergovernmental logic.  
 
European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) 
Since December 2013, the European Border Surveillance System offers an information exchange 
system through the National Coordination Centres which collect and process national data. 
EUROSUR results from a long preparation process where Frontex has played an important role. It is 
notably built on the experience gained by the European Border Patrols Network which has 
 
145 Argomaniz, J., ‘A Rhetorical Spillover? Exploring the Link between the European Union Common Security and Defence 
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fostered the cooperation and coordination among Member States against irregular migration and 
cross-border crime since 2007. Besides frequent risk analyses, Frontex is tasked within EUROSUR to 
assemble, analyse and enrich data from the Member States in order to create the European 
situational picture and the common pre-frontier intelligence picture (beyond EU borders). Frontex 
strengthen its powers and broaden 'its focus from operational cooperation to becoming an 
intelligence actor'149. Therefore, EUROSUR can relate on incidents occurring at the EU sea borders 
and locate suspected vessels, as the regulation was adopted under the impression of the 
Lampedusa tragedy in October 2013, when more than 350 immigrants drowned in a single 
shipwreck. It aims at preventing trafficking in human beings and loss of lives at sea in line with 
the EUNAVFOR Med mandate150, even if the latter seems to be so far only a secondary goal, 
particularly due to its limited technological capacity151. In this respect, the EU is supporting the 
development of new technologies to improve the European maritime security. 
Maritime Common Information Sharing Environment 
The Common Information Sharing Environment for the surveillance of the EU maritime 
domain (CISE) currently developed by the Commission and the Member States with Frontex 
assistance should be operational by 2020 and might contribute to a better integration of existing 
national surveillance systems. According to its supporters, CISE should 'enable interoperability of 
relevant security data in areas such as piracy, terrorism, arms and drugs smuggling, and human 
trafficking'152. The European Security Research Programme has funded several related projects on 
maritime surveillance, such as EUCISE153, SeaBILLA154, PERSEUS155 and Aeroceptor156 over the period 
2007-2013 and continues to do so for 2014-2020157. CISE involves a broad range of sectors, 
including border control, defence and maritime safety and security, and improved exchange of 
information between civil and military authorities. Since 2006, the European Defence Agency (EDA) 
has developed the Maritime Surveillance project (MARSUR) which 'is designed to become the 
potential ‘military layer’ of CISE [… and] could work in conjunction with other ‘systems of systems’ 
to ensure efficient interaction with other European maritime security stakeholders and also in 
support of CSDP missions'158. Frontex has also worked with the EDA on tactical Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicles (drones) and the identification of small targets projects159. 
Frontex joint operations 
Frontex assists Member States in the border control and surveillance of the Mediterranean. It can 
provide a rapid response capability with the European Border Guard Teams, i.e. pooled resources 
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from Member States. Though, the Rapid Border Intervention Teams (RABIT) mechanism has 
been activated only once in 2010, the Commission’s communication of 23 September 2015 
recalled its relevance as an operational measure to cope with exceptional migratory pressure for a 
limited period of time. The European Border Guard Teams may be additionally deployed in joint 
operations. Together with a host country and in close consultation with Member States that 
determine the level of their contribution, Frontex coordinates joint operations such as Triton in the 
territorial waters of Italy and Poseidon in Greek territorial waters. In light of the 2015 surge in 
Mediterranean death toll numbers, funding and equipment for these missions have been 
increased, and their geographical scope extended. Frontex can also help Member States and may 
co-fund joint return operations of third country nationals who are legally unable to stay in the EU. 
Frontex representatives coordinate their actions closely with officials from the European External 
Action Service (EEAS), notably regarding EUNAVFOR Med. 
3.4.3 The external relations of European agencies 
Frontex has increased its external role as it can negotiate agreements with third countries to 
pursue operational cooperation, joint operations and training. Such agreements have been signed 
with partners from the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). In this respect, some ENP Action 
Plans include clauses on cooperation in various justice and home affairs fields; Mobility 
Partnerships aim at the same direction. In addition, Frontex coordinates its activities with other EU 
agencies like the European Police Office (Europol) whose role is also growing in the external 
aspects of EU counter-terrorism policies160. Europol has concluded operational and strategic 
agreements with third countries in this domain, though so far only very few have been signed with 
countries where CSDP missions are deployed, namely Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldova and 
Ukraine161. 
3.4.4 External financing instruments 
Besides European agency activities, the external financing instruments for non-CSDP activities are 
also used to complement CSDP missions and operations (see also chapter 3.4.4). In contrast to 
CSDP action, these external financing instruments (humanitarian, development, economic and 
stabilisation assistance) are managed by the EU institutions with the EU budget to support actors 
such as UN agencies and local NGOs to act on the ground. To better support regions such as the 
Sahel, the Horn of Africa and North Africa where most of refugees are from, the Commission will set 
up an 'Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and 
displaced persons in Africa'. Furthermore, among the external financing instruments which 
complement CSDP activities, the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) is 
dominating. In its short-term component crisis response, IcSP is notably dealing with CSDP 
flanking measures, border security and SSR in the Middle East and North Africa162. In the framework 
of its long-term and programmable component within the 'Security and Safety Threats in a 
Transregional Context', the IcSP is funding the Counter-Terrorism (CT) Programme. In line with the 
EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy, there are presently CT projects conducted in the Sahel (covering 
Niger, Mali and Mauritania), the Horn of Africa (including Yemen), Nigeria (regarding the fight 
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against Boko Haram), and in South-East Asia as well as Pakistan (in cooperation with UNODC)163. 
The IcSP also supports the Malta-based Institute of Justice and the Rule of Law 'through a 
mapping assignment to inform their future counter terrorism related work'164. The IcSP’s short and 
long-term components are managed by the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI) of the 
Commission and the Department of Security Policy and Conflict Prevention of the EEAS, which run 
consultation processes with several actors inside the EEAS, the Council (CSDP structures), Member 
States, and EU delegations165.  
3.4.5 African Peace Facility 
Among the most relevant non-CSDP tools supporting CSDP missions, the EU-Africa cooperation on 
peace and security is implemented with the African Peace Facility (APF), funded through the 
European Development Fund (financed by contributions from Member States) within the Cotonou 
Agreement. The Roadmap 2014-2017 adopted at the 4th Africa-EU Summit in 2014 confirms as 
joint priorities the relevance of the cooperation in peace and security affairs, including in 
counter-terrorism and in human development, with all aspects of irregular migration, aiming at 
'strengthened migration management, return and readmission'166. Most notable funded activities 
with APF are the operationalisation of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and 
various African-led Peace Support Operations, such as in particular the African Union Mission in 
Somalia (AMISOM). AMISOM is a multidimensional peace support operation which tackles the 
threat posed by the jihadist terrorist group Al-Shabaab ('The Youth') which pledged allegiance to 
Al-Qaeda in 2012. The financial support for AMISOM fits into the EU Strategic Framework for the 
Horn of Africa which encourages also cooperation and coordination between CSDP operations and 
AMISOM. APF is managed by the Commission, but each intervention financed through it needs to 
be approved by the Political and Security Committee (PSC) of the Council. 
3.4.6 Institutional cooperation towards synergies?  
Though the Lisbon Treaty has further contributed to improve the synergies between actors, 
policies and instruments, notably with structures that facilitate internal-external security 
cooperation, respond to crises and manage them, such as the EEAS, the Council Working Group on 
JHA External Relations (JAIEX) or the Committee on Internal Security (COSI), the implementation of 
the Comprehensive Approach remains difficult. Important resistance results from power struggles 
as well as different institutional logics, cultures and prerogatives among the actors involved, 
which negatively affects the EU’s global action. Therefore, certain adaptations are necessary. 
Besides willpower and beyond the EU rhetoric, the reorganisation of the configuration of actors 
needs to be supported by additional clarification about the exact division of labour and how to 
make actors working better together. 
Potential links and/or potential adaptations of existing policies 
Clearly, the nexus between CSDP and other EU instruments deserves closer cooperation and better 
links. At the national level, authorities should improve their trust among each other to better share 
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information. To build this confidence, they should share good practices, increase regular informal 
contacts, staff exchange and agree on operating guidelines.  They should also ensure consistency 
between their positions and actions and EU initiatives, even if different logics of action and 
management styles apply. Here, a strengthened performance of coordinating structures is 
recommended. The Council has a crucial role to play as decision-taker in CSDP matters (mainly 
through the PSC) to ensure policy coherence among Member states and as legislator together with 
the European Parliament on Community regulation to stimulate follow-up. The hybrid position of 
the HR/VP) who is tasked to align and bring together tools from the Council and the Commission as 
head of the EEAS should strengthen the coordination and synergies between 
intergovernmental and community actors, policies and instruments in the EU’s external action. 
In this respect, the HR/VP should make better use of the EEAS which should be more than a basic 
diplomatic service and act as a coordinating structure, using in a more efficient manner the Crisis 
Response System (and its Crisis Platform) which so far has been affected by internal struggles. The 
EEAS should have the clear ability to bring all relevant EU actors (including CSDP actors) to the 
table to identify the appropriate tools in response to crises and the most efficient way to 
coordinate them on the ground. 
Moreover, the EU needs a clear strategic approach beyond its numerous strategies. The presently 
ongoing reviews of the European Neighbourhood Policy and the European Security Strategy are an 
occasion to clarify what the EU should do on the international stage and how it should translate 
this specific strategy into practice, but should also present some guidelines about the overall 
coherence with other strategies (internal, regional, thematic). For that reason, the Lisbon Treaty 
has raised many expectations and hopes that more substance would be given to the EU rhetoric, 
but until today, very few concrete guidelines regarding the best way to converting the 
Comprehensive Approach to external conflict and crisis into practice have been created. The EU 
external action deficiency resides in the weakness of its structures of coordination to overcome 
power relations between those actors in EU security governance responsible for the 
implementation of the Comprehensive Approach. Besides, in the configuration of actors, the 
prerogatives and functions of those in pivotal positions such as the HR/VP, the Commission, the EU 
agencies and the EU special representatives (EUSR) should be clarified. For instance, the EU 
counter-terrorism coordinator 'works under the authority of the HR/VP but takes instructions from 
and reports primarily to the JHA Council'167. 
How to achieve such facilitation in the case of the Southern Neighbourhood? 
In this perspective of consistency, also the current review of the ENP should be the occasion to go 
beyond the traditional rhetoric, as suggested in the consultation paper of March 2015. The main 
concern is how to improve the implementation of the ENP in the transformational environment in 
the countries East and South of the EU. Especially, the EU should build on the Euro-Mediterranean 
partnership heritage to facilitate internal-external security cooperation such as the 4th axis 
'Migration and internal security' and the Euro-Mediterranean Code of Conduct on Countering 
Terrorism to enrich the (currently paralysed) Union for the Mediterranean cooperation in those 
domains, besides relevant chapters of some ENP Action Plans on these issues168. Here, not only a 
stronger commitment from the neighbouring countries, but also a clearer coordinating 
structure, with a strong role for pivotal actors like EUSR (officially none exists for neither the 
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Eastern nor Southern ENP component) and consistency between ENP and other EU tools and 
policies as Frontex and Europol agreements are required. Finally, the EU should continue to 
strengthen partnerships with the regional organisations such as the African Union and the League 
of Arab States through concrete initiatives such as the African Peace Facility as another way to put 
into practice the nexus between internal and external policies in support of crisis management and 
to balance the long-criticised declaration-implementation gap. 
3.4.7 Conclusions 
In sum, the Comprehensive Approach is a good way to combine the EU’s entire tools linked to 
internal and external dimensions of security to fight terrorism and irregular migration. However, 
the main challenge remains to translate the EU discourse into practice on the ground. As 
mentioned in this contribution, EU tools are managed by different actors according various logics 
of action, procedures and budget lines. Therefore, the EU should strengthen its structures of 
coordination (PSC, EEAS) and the role of actors in pivotal position such as HR/VP and EUSR, to 
mitigate power struggles in EU security governance. In this respect, the ongoing review of the 
European Security Strategy hopefully clarifies the strategic approach with specific guidelines to 
improve the overall coherence and especially to better bridge internal and external policies. 
3.5 Financing instruments 
As mentioned above, the EU’s toolbox with regards to security policy does not only entail 
geographical approaches and instruments, such as the European Neighbourhood Policy or 
Development Cooperation, it also comprises of several specialised instruments. The EU, in other 
words, can make use of these instruments and contribute to the overall security policy of the EU in 
general and CSDP action in particular.169   
3.5.1 Financing instruments and CSDP  
Most of the so-called thematic instruments – also known as financing instruments – are run by the 
EU budget. Other than the Athena mechanism in CSDP, it means the Council and European 
Parliament have to decide upon their overall expenses, while the Commission manages the 
planning and implementation of the instruments. In case of some of the financing instruments, 
the Commission is assisted by the Foreign Policy Instruments Service (FPI) which ensures the 
coordination between the Commission and the EEAS. The instruments are an instrumental part of 
what has become known as the ‘comprehensive approach’ of the European Union, aiming at 
bringing together those instruments which are run by actors and procedure outside CSDP with 
those of CSDP itself.     
Among the many thematic instruments, the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) 
and European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) are of crucial importance in the attempt to 
contribute to the EU’s security policy and CSDP.170 
3.5.2 Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) 
The European Parliament and the Council adopted the regulation governing the new IcSP in 
2014171 succeeding what was formerly known as Instrument for Stability (IfS). In the words of the 
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FPI, it belongs to the ‘new generation of instruments for financing external action’.172 According 
to Regulation No 230/2014, the objectives of the instrument are to ‘contribute swiftly to stability by 
providing an effective response designed to help preserve, establish or re-establish the conditions 
essential to the proper implementation of the Union's external policies and actions in accordance 
with Article 21 TEU’, ‘to contribute to the prevention of conflicts and to ensuring capacity and 
preparedness to address pre-and post-crisis situations and build peace’, ‘to address specific global 
and trans-regional threats to peace, international security and stability’173. In addition, it also 
focuses on ‘strengthening the capacity of law enforcement and judicial and civil authorities 
involved in the fight against terrorism, organised crime, including cyber-crime, and all forms of 
illicit trafficking and in the effective control of illegal trade and transit.’174 As such, the instrument 
not only focuses on internal conflict scenarios and their prevention, but also on the increasingly 
difficult task to address transnational threats and insecurities, which reach beyond state 
borders, affect whole regions and have direct impacts upon the EU itself. For the period between 
2013 and 2020 the IcSP has been assigned with a budget of 2.3 billion Euro.175    
The IcSP’s predecessor, the IfS, reached out to the world with 140 projects, of which 19 % were 
assigned to governmental bodies and agencies, 28 % to international and sub-regional 
organisations and 53 % to civil society actors.176 Elsewhere, the scope of the Instrument has been 
described as follows: ‘Between 2007 and 2011, around 40 countries worldwide benefited from the 
EU’s action in the framework of the IfS, the vast majority of which were developing countries. In 
2010, for instance, the Commission made 213 million Euros available for post-crisis management 
or emerging crisis situations, including the financing of piracy trials in Somalia and of the 
monitoring of the peace process between the government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front 
in the Philippines (European Commission 2011).’177 As elsewhere mentioned in this report, the IfS 
had been used to ensure a complementarity to former ESDP missions, as IfS guaranteed EU 
presence on SSR while ESDP served with the deployment of troops on the ground (chapter 3.3). In 
the case of Bissau Guinea, the complementarity that can be found between CSDP and other EU 
instruments comes to the fore if planned well. Also in the case of EUFOR Tschad/RCA, the IfS 
ensured the funding for the equipment as well as the training of the Chadian police and 
gendarmerie within the UN operation MINURCAT (see chapter 3.3.4).  
The IcSP’s contribution to CSDP can be seen with regards to its long-term and short-term 
components. ICSP’s long-term component refers to Article 3 of the IcSP’s constituting regulation 
focusing on peace-building, while its short-term component is linked to crisis-management (Article 
4). So far, FPI’s contribution to CSDP has remained civilian in nature. For example, FPI has been 
active in contributing equipment to CSDP’s police-training mission in Mali (ranging from cars to 
camels). In the context of the EU’s EUFOR mission to the Central African Republic the support 
focussed on the improvement of community relations in the country. The programmes set up 
community councils which worked to the benefit of the respective communities, indirectly 
supporting the efforts of EUFOR to guarantee for a safe and secure environment. In another case, 
 
171 REGULATION (EU) No 230/2014 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 11 March 2014 establishing 
an instrument contributing to stability and peace, 15/3/2014, Official Journal L77/1 
172 http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/fpi/what-we-do/instrument_contributing_to_stability_and_peace_en.htm  
173 Regulation No 230/2014 
174 Ibid. 
175 http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/fpi/documents/euinaction-buildingpeace-infographic-p-17sept14_en.pdf  
176 Ibid. 
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the EU’s rule of law mission EULEX in Kosovo, FPI will organise support for the oversight of heritage 
sights, taking over responsibilities which were formerly taken on by NATO’s KFOR troops. Overall, 
IcSP is seen as making meaningful contribution to CSDP, also in terms of its current financial 
scope. However, its lack of a military component is currently seen as a gap amongst policy-makers. 
While the EU receives many requests to provide military support to third countries (for example, 
regarding its contribution to military personnel, infra-structure or equipment in third countries), FPI 
and more specifically IcSP are not able to respond due to legal constraints. While CSDP instruments 
often have a limited financial scope, the policy makers in the EEAS and Commission are currently 
reflecting the option of a new financing instrument, which would include the military support in 
third countries globally. Such a new instrument is seen as closing the current gap of not being able 
to supply military support and contribute even more effectively to CSDP missions around the 
world.                    
3.5.3 European Neighbourhood Instrument and other instruments 
With Regulation No. 232/2014 the ENI succeeds the ENPI. The ENI provides funding for several 
thematic fields, including the promotion of good governance, transition to democracy and human 
rights norms. In the context of security policies, it is important to mention that it also aims for 
‘promoting  confidence-building,  good  neighbourly  relations and  other  measures  contributing  
to  security  in  all  its  forms and  the  prevention  and  settlement  of  conflicts,  including 
protracted conflicts’.178 Overall, the instrument supports ‘the implementation of the political 
initiatives shaping the European Neighbourhood Policy’.179  For the period until 2020, 15.4 billion 
Euros are provided for funding in the 16 ENP countries. As mentioned elsewhere in the report 
(chapter 3.2), the EU has several non-CFSP/CSDP instruments supporting its policy goals, the ENP 
and the EaP in particular, including the promotion of stability and security. Financial assistance is 
indeed coming from the ENI. As a consequence of its objectives reaching out to the field of security 
policies, measures funded under this instrument need to be coordinated with CSDP tools. EU 
civilian missions contributing to state-building (rule of law missions, border management missions, 
etc.) and EaP specific tools such as the ‘Comprehensive Institution-Building’ (CIB) initiative are a 
case in point. One of the examples how ENI can contribute to CSDP comes in through the EUBAM 
mission to Moldova and Ukraine. Although launched with a CFSP mandate, the mission has been 
financed by the EU’s ENPI instrument.   
Other financing instruments can also contribute to structurally guarantee stability and 
security on the ground. By means of the EIDHR or the Instrument for Development Cooperation, 
structures can be enhanced to facilitate security on the ground. The implementation of human 
rights and development objectives is crucial for the eradication of insecurity and, vice-versa, the 
implementation of security needs is a crucial element for the implementation of human rights and 
development. The financing instruments which are at the Union’s disposal can live up to the needs 
which these nexuses demand. In the specific case of the EaP it has been shown (chapter 3.2.1) that 
other thematic financing instruments such as the Partnership Instrument, the Instrument 
contributing to Stability and Peace or the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights, 
might also be activated. These instruments can be framed by the ENP Action Plans or the 
Association Agreements, when one is in place, establishing the benchmarks for EU actors and often 
for international donors.  
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3.5.4 Coordination  
The coordination of actors in Brussels and on the ground is crucial for the synergy between 
financing instruments and CSDP measure. As it has been illustrated by the examples above, the 
coordination of tasks across institutions and bodies is central. The position of the FDI in the EEAS 
while being a part of the Commission is crucial for the ongoing planning and implementation 
of the IcSP in the context of CSDP missions. This is also reflected in the latest reorganisation of 
the EEAS (see 2.2).  FPI’s integration in the EEAS remains essential, but a difficult one, as it needs to 
play its role in both its institutional contexts: the Commission (which it is dislocated from) and the 
EEAS (which it does not belong to).180  Still, the IcSP’s budgetary dimensions between 2013 and 
2020 show the importance as a complementary security tool, especially in the context of the 
comprehensive approach. The added-values of each instrument should be highlighted in that 
regard during the planning phase and strive towards a synergising effect of various instruments on 
the ground. 
3.5.5 Conclusion 
The EU’s toolbox also comprises of several specialised instruments. In other words, the EU can 
make use of these instruments and contribute to the overall security policy and CSDP action in 
particular.181  The examples of the IcSP and ENI show the meaningful contribution of these tools to 
EU security policy and CSDP. The coordination between institutions and actors on both sides of the 
spectrum is crucial for the making, implementation and synergy of measures deployed by the EU.    
3.6 Towards greater support for CSDP crisis management? – 
Identifying institutional role and policy adaptation    
The preceding section has covered a variety of fields to look for the contribution of non-CSDP 
policies and instruments for EU security in general and CSDP policies in particular. The examples 
of the European Neighbourhood Policy, Development Cooperation, Internal Policies and Financing 
Instruments have revealed ample examples of how these policies do, or could, synergise with 
security policies and CSDP. To this end, the section has identified institutional and policy 
adaptations.  
Overall, regarding the institutional adaptations, the chapter pointed out that the Lisbon Treaty 
provides a stronger framework than in the past to ensure that competition and tensions between 
CSDP and the Commission’s work are quickly resolved through inter-institutional talks and 
negotiations under the aegis of the double hatted HR/VP. At the same time, it was pointed out that 
such practices must be applied to coordinate action across the whole spectrum of EU tools. Still, 
the EU should strengthen its structures of coordination (PSC, EEAS) and the role of actors in pivotal 
position such as HR/VP and EUSR, to mitigate power struggles in EU security governance. 
Moreover, it was underlined that EEAS staff dealing for example with EaP needs to be reinforced, 
namely officials responsible for liaising with EU crisis management structures, including EU Military 
Committee (EUMC) and CIVCOM. Finally, the EU should promote the articulation between the FPI 
and the horizontal EaP unit responsible for conceptual and budgetary issues.  
 
180 Wouters, J., De Baere, G., Van Vooren, B., Raube, K., Odermatt, J., Ramopoulos, T., Van den Sanden, T., Tanghe, Y., ‘The 
Organisation and Functioning of the European External Action Service: Achievements, Challenges and Opportunities’, 
Brussels: European Parliament, Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, Directorate B, Policy Department, 
2013. 
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Regarding the EU’s Neighbourhood Policy, the revision of the ENP should deliver a political and 
economic vision to support the resolution of conflicts and the management of crises in the Eastern 
Partnership and the Mediterranean. It was furthermore underlined that there is a need to establish 
Informal Coordination Groups (or similar structures) for crisis management issues, bringing 
together relevant security organisations in the Eastern neighbourhood such as NATO, the OSCE 
and the CSTO, the EEAS, EU military and civilian staff, and Commission staff from ECHO and DEVCO. 
It has been pointed out that CSDP missions in the Mediterranean are like plasters on a big wound. 
The emphasis must be on political and economic instruments, as migration and extremism require 
long-term commitments to tackle the many root causes. To take a specific example that study 
underlined that Tunisia simply cannot fail. The EU must do more, not only in security terms 
(including securing borders) but also and especially in economic terms (and a more generous 
approach to agriculture is of order).  
With regards to development cooperation, the study showed that there is no shortage of tools to 
come up with joint analysis on risks to use development resources for security-related endeavours. 
Having new strategic frameworks may help Brussels HQs but it may also top up existing strategic 
document templates. In the specific case of the APF, current debates and positions seem to bend in 
favour of a revision of the scope of both the APF and of the Instrument contributing to Stability and 
Peace to allow EU funds to support equipment provision in security and defence. Other options on 
the table, such as a new financial instrument, Athena mechanism or the use of the CSDP start-up 
funds should not be discarded in the future. One of the lessons learnt from the experience of 
EUCAP Niger is to hire CSDP mission staff who have some experience in development cooperation 
and are able to coordinate and cooperate immediately with EU Delegations managers of 
development cooperation funds. With regards to specific missions, the Bissau Guinean example 
illustrated very well the kind of complementarity that can be found between CSDP and other EU 
instruments if planned well. One lesson learnt then was the need for Development cooperation 
staff to be better trained on SSR, Rule of Law reform and the security and development nexus. 
Furthermore, the main lesson learnt from the experience of EUFOR Chad/RCA was the recognition 
that a joint EU political strategy is a pre-requisite for successful combination of peacekeeping, 
training and equipment of partner forces. Security coordination also and primarily happens at 
country level, involving EU Delegations and CSDP missions, as shown in the Sahel. Such 
coordination formats are the best base for joint analysis and assessments.  
Overall, and also in view of the analysis of internal policies, the Comprehensive Approach is a 
good way to combine the EU’s entire tools linked to internal and external dimensions of security to 
fight terrorism and irregular migration. The main challenge, however, remains to translate the EU 
discourse into practice on the ground and to bring together EU tools which are managed by 
different actors according various logics of action, procedures and budget lines. As the EU’s 
toolbox also comprises of several specialised financing instruments, the EU can make use of these 
instruments and contribute to the overall security policy and CSDP by the means of the IcSP and 
ENI. At the same time, the coordination between institutions and actors on both sides of the 
spectrum is crucial for the making, implementation and synergy of measures deployed by the EU. 
The ongoing review of the European Security Strategy should clarify the strategic approach of the 
EU, including specific guidelines to improve the overall coherence and especially to better bridge 
internal and external policies. 
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4 Supporting CSDP defence capabilities by other EU level 
instruments 
4.1 CSDP defence capabilities and EU policy level support 
In the following, the study will look into the coordination between CSDP policies and various non-
CSDP policies and instruments: (i) innovation policies; (ii) industrial policies; (iii) regional policies; 
(iv) trade policy; and (v) space policy. Next to the analysis of each of the policies and their 
respective instruments, crucial attention will be paid to the coordination and synergies between 
these policies and CSDP policies. Furthermore, it will be looked into how not only individual 
instruments, but also actor coordination and policy adaptation can contribute to synergies 
between the respective non-CSDP policies and CSDP in the long run. 
4.2 Innovation policy support for defence capabilities 
The relationship between innovation policy and defence capabilities is a complex one. Complex 
weapons systems are the product of a very particular model of innovation, which still requires a 
level of state involvement and funding that is increasingly unusual in other industrial sectors. 
During the Cold War, technological developments in the area of defence were sometimes seen 
as shaping changes in civilian technologies. More recently, advances in civilian technologies such 
as microsystems, nanotechnology, unmanned systems, communications and sensors, digital 
technology, bio- and material sciences, energy and power technologies and neuro-technologies 
have in turn been driving new defence technologies182. The challenge for defence firms has 
become one of ‘spinning in’ these more advanced civilian technologies, or as the EU institutions 
increasingly put it, finding synergies between civilian and military research183. 
Military-related research however remains a product of an unusual industrial set of conditions. 
Briani and Sartori argue that the state-defence firm relations are characterised by monopsony on 
the demand side and monopoly / oligopoly structures on the supply-side, and that the industry 
requires unusually high R&D intensity thus requiring public subsidies in the R&D phase184. The role 
of state finance both in terms of procurement and research funding remains therefore vital. While 
Britain, France and Germany are clearly the dominant players in terms of both defence 
procurement expenditure and defence industrial capacity, the EU institutions have consistently 
argued that the EU market is fragmented on both supply and demand sides and requires 
consolidation185.  However, the EU’s ability to act here is limited. In contrast to other industrial 
sectors, in the EU context, article 346 of the Lisbon Treaty still largely protects defence equipment 
procurement and research from single market legislation: notwithstanding the 2009 ‘defence 
package’ of the directives on intra-EU transfers of defence and defence and security procurement. 
 
182Stankiewicz, R. et al, ‘Knowledge Dynamics Scoping Paper’, 2009. 
https://sandera.portals.mbs.ac.uk/Portals/65/docs/KNOWLEDGE%20Dynamics%20Scoping%20Paper-D2.1.2.pdf (last 
accessed 12 August 2015) 
183 European Commission (2004), Security Research: The Next Steps, COM (2004) 590 final, Brussels, 7 September 2004; 
ESRAB (2006) Meeting the Challenge: the European Security Research Agenda, European Security Research Advisory Board 
Report, September 2006, Luxembourg, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities 
184 Briani, Valerio and Nicolo Sartori (2011) Transatlantic Industrial Policies in the Security Sector, in EU-US Security 
Strategies: Comparative Scenarios and Recommendations, Issue 3: 156-66 Available at:  
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This not only limits EU involvement, but for those EU states that choose to invest in defence-
related research, it enables them to retain more of a directorial role than in other research sectors, 
and for reasons of national security, tight controls are kept over the sector, for example controlling 
where firms may export arms and restricting the sharing of technology. 
Despite these limitations on the role of the EU, Edler and James claim that since 2003 the 
Commission has been trying to increase its role, first in security-related and now defence-related 
research, as a means to fulfil industrial policy objectives for security and defence industries, by 
acting as a supranational policy entrepreneur186. This is in line with their industrial policy objectives 
but also their role in supporting the CSDP. This section of the report will outline the existing 
initiatives, predominantly those funded under the 7th Framework Programme and Horizon 2020, 
and assess their success. It will also look at the cooperation between the Commission and 
European Defence Agency (EDA) and the EDA’s own activities. Finally, it will also consider potential 
links between the CSDP and innovation policies and make recommendations for action. 
4.2.1 Existing links between the CSDP and innovation policies 
It is important to state that the security research preparatory action and the FP7 security research 
priority are not the first examples of defence-relevant research being funded by the Community 
budget. It has long been known that dual-use research has been funded through the Framework 
Programmes187. Early programmes in the 1980s such as BRITE and EURAM saw participation by 
defence firms which had either dual-use or civilian production for example188. While exact figures 
are not available for the amount of dual-use research funded either currently or during the lifetime 
of EU research funding, it is thought to be substantial. The Commission estimated in 1996 that at 
that point as much as a third of the Community’s research budget was being invested in areas of 
potential dual-use interest189. Support for dual-use research is not confined to the mission-
oriented priorities, some of the projects funded by the European Research Council are likely to 
have potential dual-use impact. Nevertheless, Horizon 2020 and its predecessors could only legally 
fund civilian research. Since the 2003 decision to establish the EDA and the 2004 Commission 
decision however, both the EDA and the Commission have been establishing routes towards 
using the Community budget to directly fund defence research relevant to the CSDP.  
The Commission’s route has been through security research initially. In March 2003 the 
Commission called for increased coordination of security research. It said it would ask national 
administrations, the business community and research institutions their opinions on what a 
European agenda for research in this field should look like and 'to launch a preparatory action to 
coordinate such research at the EU level, focusing on a limited number of concrete technologies 
linked to the Petersberg tasks'190. DG Enterprise and Industry seemed to be planning to fund 
defence research but the 2003 establishment of the European Defence Agency with a remit in that 
 
186 Edler, J., James, A., ‘Understanding the emergence of new science and technology policies: Policy entrepreneurship, 
agenda setting and the development of the European Framework Programme.’ Research Policy, 44(6), 2015,  1252–1265 
187 Molas-Gallart, J., ‘Coping with Dual-Use: A Challenge for European Research Policy’. Journal of Common Market Studies, 
40 (1), 2002, 155–165 
188 Although Community spending on research predates the Single European Act (SEA), the Framework Programmes and 
associated initiatives like BRITE and EURAM were codified in Art. 130 f-q of the SEA. Currently articles 179-90 TFEU form 
the treaty basis for action on research and development. 
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area, as well as reluctance amongst officials in DG-Research, made it politically impossible191. 
Commission officials then set up a Group of Personalities to look at the issue, which duly reported 
in 2004, making the case that there was no real difference between military and civilian research, 
and pointing out the US investment in homeland security as a further example of how the EU was 
falling behind. Their report helped to shape the civilian security research priority in the 7th 
Framework Programme. The basis for community action on internal security policy stems from the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)192, Title V ‘Area of freedom, security and 
justice’ (AFSJ). The amendments agreed under the Lisbon Treaty bring the AFSJ into the main body 
of the treaty and hence under normal community judicial controls. Article 4 (2) of the TEU states 
specifically that 'national security remains the sole responsibility of each Member State' and that 
the TFEU refers only to internal security. This differentiation, viewed as important by some Member 
States, was clarified during the negotiations of the Lisbon Treaty.  
4.2.2 The Commission and security research  
The Commission published the first call for proposals for projects and supporting activities 
under the new ‘Preparatory Action on the enhancement of the European industrial potential in the 
field of Security Research’ (PASR) on 31 March 2004. PASR spent 65 million euros over three years 
and served as a pilot phase for the Commission’s broader agenda of establishing a separate 
security research programme to facilitate an EU security culture. While PASR was civilian in nature 
and closely linked to the EU’s internal security priorities, its documentation stressed the need to 
maximise synergies between internal and external security technological needs. PASR’s 
governance structures included many representatives of the defence industrial sector, and some of 
the Commission’s wider industrial policy motivations were about enabling the participation of 
defence firms in what they considered to be a growth area193. 
The security research priority in FP7 funded projects in four main mission areas backed up by three 
cross-cutting themes: 
Mission areas: 
1.  'Increasing the security of citizens - technology solutions for civil protection, bio-security, 
protection against crime and terrorism;  
2. Increasing the security of infrastructures and utilities - examining and securing 
infrastructures in areas such as ICT, transport, energy and services in the financial and 
administrative domain;  
3. Intelligent surveillance and border security - technologies, equipment, tools and methods for 
protecting Europe's border controls such as land and coastal borders;  
4. Restoring security and safety in case of crisis - technologies and communication, 
coordination in support of civil, humanitarian and rescue tasks';  
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Cross-cutting themes: 
5. 'Improving security systems integration, interconnectivity and interoperability - information 
gathering for civil security, protection of confidentiality and traceability of transactions;  
6. Security and society - socio-economic, political and cultural aspects of security, ethics and 
values, acceptance of security solutions, social environment and perceptions of security;  
7. Security research coordination and structuring - coordination between European and 
international security research efforts in the areas of civil, security and defence research. '194 
The research funded was mission-orientated and frequently development-orientated, rather 
than the type of 'blue skies' research funded under the priorities managed by DG-Research. This 
matched the Commission’s industrial policy goals for the priority of shaping the emerging 
homeland security market. The Commission hoped to influence national procurement and so 
funded demonstrators (a late stage in the development of technology) as well as earlier stage 
research195. It had an overall budget of EUR1.4 billion for the period 2007-13. Again defence firms 
and military users were represented in its governance structures. The priority was over-subscribed, 
but interviews carried out with industry representatives in 2012 and 2013 suggested that there 
were problems: 
 The lack of subsequent demand from users in Member States was a major problem, as it made 
little sense to share technologies (or useful contacts to act as the user representative on the 
project) with project partners in the security research programme, if there was no contract at 
the end.  
 For firms from states with little procurement interest or research funding this led to wastage. 
The Commission, not being a customer, is limited in its ability to respond to this.  
 The need to put together bids that had geographical balance and SME representation, meant 
that suboptimal partners were being chosen196. 
The Commission’s communique on security industrial policy implicitly acknowledges the 
limitations on its ability to influence member state procurement policies by stressing the 
importance of exports into the non-EU market197. 
The successor to FP7 is Horizon 2020, which covers the time frame 2014-2020 and has a budget 
of EUR 1.695 billion for security research. It has four main priorities: 
 Disaster-resilience: safeguarding and securing society, including adapting to climate change 
 Fight against crime and terrorism 
 Border Security and External Security 
 Digital Security: Cybersecurity, Privacy and Trust 
Horizon 2020 maintains the mission-oriented focus of the FP7 security research programme and 
promises to strengthen the role of end users.  
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4.2.3 Cooperation between the EDA and the Commission 
The security research programme also paved the way to inter-institutional cooperation between 
the Commission and the EDA. Two projects were viewed as early success stories by the EDA and 
the Commission. 
 Software Defined Radio which has applications both for military use and use by first 
responders (police, fire service etc.).  
 • A project on the insertion of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles into civil airspace.  
On 18 May 2009 European Defence Ministers, meeting as the EDA Steering Board, decided to task 
the EDA with establishing a European Framework Cooperation (EFC) together with the Commission 
with the aim of 'maximising complementarity and synergy between defence and civil security-
related research activities'. The EDA has identified situational awareness (sensor technologies, 
command and control of networked assets) as an area for cooperation, but the first formal EFC 
project was research on protection against the dangers of CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, 
Nuclear)198. 
The cooperation though has been dogged by incompatibilities between the two actors. Issues like 
the handling of diverging Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) rules199, the classification of dual-
use R&T, and incompatible financing instruments and regulations limit what can be 
achieved200. While Horizon 2020 has institutionalised the participation of the EDA in setting 
research priorities, continuing incompatibilities in terms of financing instruments means that joint 
contracts for research remain impossible. 
EDA Defence research programmes 
The EDA has a research and technology strategy in which it has tried to foster cooperation 
between Member States. It has established a number of carefully-designed instruments to enable 
projects which can operate on an opt-in or opt-out basis. The Joint Investment Programme (JIP) 
allows states to work together on needed technologies while Capability Technology Areas 
(CapTechs) can enable the exchange of expertise between states, industrial actors and academia. 
However, Dahlmann et al judge the results to be minimal at best201.  They point to the fact that 
national investments in defence research have continued to fall, and that since 2008, as states have 
embarked on austerity policies to meet EU economic policy targets, that collaborative research 
spending has been particularly badly hit. The EDA’s most recent defence data for 2013, shows that 
14 Member States invested less than a million euros each in defence research and development in 
that year, and that of these, six invested nothing at all202. Dahlmann et al also point out that EDA 
outputs have thus far been unimpressive, although a lack of transparency makes this hard to judge. 
Furthermore, it has been suggested that the reluctance of the three states, the UK, France and 
 
198 Drent, Margriet, Lennart Landman and Dick Zandee (2014) The EU as a Security Provider, Clingendael Report, available 
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Germany, who do invest significantly in defence research and development, to engage more with 
the EDA, beyond rhetorical commitments (France), will continue203.  
4.2.4 Potential Links between the CSDP and Innovation Policies 
It is easy to think of EU innovation policies as being solely about the research funding made 
available through the multiannual Framework Programmes, currently called Horizon 2020, but in 
fact, the Europe 2020 initiative ‘Innovation Union’204 covers more than this. Some aims of the 
Innovation Union are wholly unrelated to the development of defence capabilities e.g. the 
establishment of a new university ranking system, and others such as increasing access to venture 
capital and other private investment in R&D might seem inappropriate for defence. Other broader 
aims such as the agenda to improve business-academia knowledge transfers are though likely 
to be beneficial for defence firms as well. As has already been argued, EU funding for dual-use 
research (both applied and blue skies) is considerable and such measures are likely to increase the 
efficiency of knowledge transfer. As a major challenge for defence firms is spinning in more 
advanced civilian technologies, the assistance measures taken under the wider Innovation Union 
umbrella might offer, should not be neglected. 
Following the December 2013 European Council ‘defence summit’ the Commission was tasked 
with setting up a preparatory action for the funding of defence research. It is likely to be launched 
in 2017 with a budget of 15 million euros, with a full programme in the next framework 
programme. The EDA suggests that the following aspects still need clarification: 
 Decision mechanism on the work programme  
 Evaluation of the proposals  
 Rules for participation  
 Funding scheme  
 IPR scheme205 
Such a programme runs the risk of wastage on several fronts, so will need careful design. The 
sustainability of any investment needs consideration. The defence market has high entry costs, 
particularly in terms of governmental relations, so it may be unwise to encourage SMEs and firms 
from states that invest little in defence research or procurement to enter an EU market, which has 
existing defence industrial over-capacities, particularly at a time when EU economic policies are 
pushing Member States to cut state expenditure, which of course includes defence. Moreover, the 
same problem that the Commission has faced with security research, namely its inability to 
control Member States’ defence procurement policies, will exist here too. Non-EU export 
markets are likely to become more difficult to grow in the foreseeable future, given EU 
commitments to responsible export policies under the 2008 Common Position and the recent 
Arms Trade Treaty and the worsening security situation in some key markets, competition from 
non-signatories like Russia, and the increasing arms production capacities in states like India, Brazil 
and South Korea, so this does not really offer a sustainable alternative to a home market206. It will 
 
203 Dahlmann, A., Dickow, M., Tisserant, L., op cit. 
204 The thirty four action points for the Innovation Union, published in 2010, can be found here: 
http://ec.europa.eu/research/innovation-union/index_en.cfm?pg=action-points&view=all (last accessed 6 August 2015). 
205 http://www.eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/activities/activities-search/preparatory-action-for-csdp-related-research (last 
accessed 12 August 2015) 
206 Grebe, J., ‘Harmonized EU Arms Exports Policies in Times of Austerity? Adherence to the Criteria of the EU Common 
Position on Arms Exports’, BICC Study commissioned by the Greens/ European Free Alliance in the European Parliament, 
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be necessary to carefully consider whether the limited sum of money that could be spent on 
defence research adds value or not, given that as Molas-Gallart argues for some time now the 
economic case has been stronger for investment in other forms of technology207. The European 
Parliament may wish to consider the reputational costs of any diversion of research funding 
from other areas, given that some of the possible projects proposed by the industry lobby group 
ASD are controversial e.g. autonomous systems208. 
How might such a programme contribute to the CSDP? Direct impacts are likely to be long-term 
rather than short-term given the longevity of defence procurement programmes and so are 
difficult to judge. If carefully tied to the capability shortfalls identified by the EDA, assuming that 
Member States were financially able and willing to procure the resulting products, it could 
contribute on that level. However, lack of political will seems the major hindering factor for the 
CSDP so it may apply here too.  If however, it is designed with industrial policy goals in mind, direct 
CSDP benefits would be harder to identify. 
There is a definite need to align financing instruments and administrative and legal procedures to 
allow the EDA and Commission to work more closely together on the preparatory action. There is 
no real need to duplicate the existing expertise in the EDA in the Commission. It may be worth 
considering whether the EDA should run the preparatory action as this would be a way round the 
participation problem. The main defence industry lobby group, the ASD’s, 2015 position paper on 
the preparatory action points out that for security reasons, it needs to be limited to Member States 
only209. This would mean excluding non-Member States who are associated with Horizon 2020, 
which may be organisationally and legally difficult, but also needs to be done to ensure the 
scheme is compliant with the Common Position on arms exports, given the security situation in 
some associated states.  
4.2.5 Conclusions 
EU innovation policies provide considerable indirect and increasingly direct investment in dual-use 
and CSDP-relevant technologies. Given the importance for defence technology development of 
spinning in the more advanced civilian technologies, it may be more effective to continue 
supporting dual-use technologies rather than a specialised defence technology research priority. 
More needs to be done to align the instruments and procedures of the EDA and Commission so 
that they can work together more efficiently to avoid unnecessary duplication and wastage. Given 
the lack of interest in funding defence research in many EU states, the question of whether the EU 
can really add value in this area needs to be asked, as unless Member States are on board, results 
are likely to be unsatisfactory. It might be that the most useful action the Commission can take is to 
provide a supportive regulatory environment for multi / binational intergovernmental research 
cooperation. 
 
 
 
2013, available at: https://www.bicc.de/uploads/tx_bicctools/EU_arms_exports_policies.pdf (last accessed 12 August 
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208 Available at: http://www.asd-
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4.3 Industrial policy support for defence capabilities 
As stipulated under Article 173 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) and various 
Commission communications, European Union (EU)-level industrial policies seek to ensure 
international competitiveness, the sustainability of the European economy and employment. EU 
industrial policy should be considered as a horizontal policy domain that is integrated into the 
single market and trade, environment, public health and research and innovation policies. While 
EU Industrial Policy addresses factors that may impede Europe’s competitiveness and industrial 
efficiency, it is a policy area that takes into consideration the specific characteristics of the EU 
Member States and of firms operating in the EU’s internal market. Industrial Policy is largely framed 
by Article 173 TFEU and a number of Commission communications refer to EU industrial policy, 
and, more specifically, to defence-industrial policy. In search of effective military and civilian 
capabilities for the EU as a way to provide the EU with its own operational capacity, both the EU 
Treaties and various Commission communications serve as the basis for the policy link between 
defence and industry and defence industrial policies play an important role in the CSDP.  
In 2005 the Commission published ‘Towards a More Integrated Approach for Industrial Policy’ 
(COM(2005) 474), which sought the establishment of a High-Level group on the defence industry 
to examine issues such as defence-related goods transfers, procurement and standardisation.210 A 
mid-term review (COM(2007) 374) followed the communication that acknowledged that the lack 
of a large and ‘unified defence market in Europe prevents the sector from reaching its full 
innovation and economic potential’.211 It is under COM(2007) 374 that one sees a clear statement of 
intent on the part of the Commission to develop two defence-related Directives, eventually 
adopted in 2009, on defence and security procurement (2009/81/EC) and intra-EU defence 
equipment transfers (2009/43/EC). The two Directives are collectively known as the 'defence 
package' and are seen as the cornerstone of EU defence-industrial integration and a crucial 
element of the CSDP. 
Indeed, in 2007 the Commission released a defence-specific communication entitled ‘Strategy for a 
Stronger and More Competitive European Defence Industry’ (COM (2007)764) to prepare the 
ground for the 'defence package'. COM(2007) 764 stressed the importance of the defence industry 
to Europe’s broader economy and the effectiveness of the CSDP, noted the financial constraints 
affecting defence and called for a de-fragmentation of defence markets in the EU. Apart from 
the introduction of the 'defence package', the Commission used COM(2007) 764 to call for more 
pooling of demand and R&D investment; to challenge Member States’ recourse to Article 346 of 
the TFEU for economic reasons212; to coordinate legislation on the control of strategic defence 
assets; to open up international markets; to manage defence globalisation for jobs and skills; and to 
strengthen the position of SMEs.213 
 
 
 
210 European Commission (2005) ‘Implementing the Community Lisbon Programme’, COM(2005) 474 final, p. 12. 
211 European Commission (2007) ‘Mid-term Review of Industrial Policy’, COM(2007) 374 final, p. 4. 
212 Article 346 affords Member States an exemption from the rules of the internal market where information and the 
production of or trade in arms, munitions and war material is in the “essential interests of its security”. The Article does 
not, however, apply to economic reasons such as job protection. 
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4.3.1 Industrial policy after the Lisbon treaty 
As laid down by Article 174 TFEU, the underlying principle for EU industrial policy in the post-
Lisbon Treaty era is that the EU maintains open and competitive markets; policy should assist 
industry adjust to structural changes in the global economy; it should stimulate entrepreneurship 
and SMEs; and it should encourage better use of innovation, research and technological 
development policies.214 In this vein, in 2008 the Commission released its ‘Raw Materials Initiative’ 
(RMI) (COM(2008) 699) which advocated a three-pronged strategy of ensuring market access to 
materials, developing the right policy framework to foster European sources of raw materials 
and to reduce the EU’s consumption of primary raw materials.215 Although the RMI did not 
specifically refer to defence, it is clear that the sector is reliant on raw material supplies. 
Furthermore, in its 2009 communication ‘Developing a Common Strategy for Key Enabling 
Technologies in the EU’ (COM(2009) 512), the Commission drew attention to key enabling 
technologies (KETs) such as nanotechnologies, micro- and nanoelectronics and semiconductors, 
photonics, advanced materials and biotechnology and their ability to help deal with a number of 
societal challenges such as ‘[the] internal and external security’ of European citizens.216 
Additionally, one must look at the various strategies adopted under the ‘Europe 2020 Strategy’ 
(COM(2010) 2020) including the publication of communications on innovation (COM(2010) 0546), 
the digital agenda (COM(2010) 245), globalisation (COM(2010) 614) and labour skills (COM(2008) 
868). COM(2010) 614 specifically made reference to the security industry, with a plea for more 
harmonisation, standardisation, coordinated public procurement and research on security and 
dual-use technologies. This same communication also recognised the importance of space, 
aerospace and maritime industries for European jobs, competitiveness and security and the 
CSDP.217 These communications were later supported by ‘Industrial Policy: Reinforcing 
Competitiveness’ (COM(2011) 642) in 2011, ‘A Stronger European Industry for Growth and 
Economic Recovery’ (COM(2012) 582) in 2012, and ‘For a European Industrial Renaissance’ 
(COM(2014) 14) in 2014. COM(2012) 582 underlined the Commission’s intention to develop a 
specific communication on Europe’s defence industry.218  
This communication arrived in 2013 with ‘Towards a More Competitive and Efficient Defence and 
Security Sector’ (COM(2013 542), which called for the ‘rapid phasing out of offsets’ or economic 
compensation for procurement219; the development of an EU security of supply system for 
defence goods, materials and services; working with the European Defence Agency (EDA) to 
promote greater standardisation and certification; tackling supply risks for sensitive defence-
relevant raw materials; supporting SMEs; encouraging the use of the European Social Fund for 
worker re-training and re-skilling; exploiting dual-use R&D; protecting space infrastructures; 
modernising satellite communications (SATCOM); building an EU satellite high resolution 
capability; and applying EU energy policies to the defence sector. Both the EDA and the 
Commission hold that each of these factors are critical to civil-military capability development and 
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interoperability under the CSDP. All of these initiatives were further elaborated through ‘A New 
Deal for European Defence – Implementation Roadmap’ (COM(2013) 542), and in May 2015 the 
Commission released a progress report on the work emanating from the communication220.  
4.3.2 Instruments, measures and procedures 
Key defence-relevant industrial policy instruments include investment in dual-use research and 
innovation under 'Horizon 2020' (see also chapter 4.2), especially as they relate to KETs. 
Furthermore, the European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF) are used to help fund dual-
use projects undertaken by SMEs, to support re-skilling initiatives and to encourage regional 
defence specialisation clusters. Indeed, in 2014, the Commission produced a guide for dual-use 
funding aimed at regions and SMEs that alerts companies and regional authorities to the potential 
of the ESIF, Horizon 2020 and the EU programme for the Competitiveness of Enterprises and SMEs 
(COSME).221 The EDA has also produced a complementary guide for SMEs seeking to access 
European structural funds for dual-use technology projects.222 Furthermore, the Commission’s Joint 
Research Centre is currently analysing which defence-relevant raw materials to screen as part of 
the Raw Materials Initiative.223 However, beyond the use of the ESIF and numerous specific policy 
initiatives, there are at least two other potential avenues that could support EU defence industrial 
policy and that have not as yet been exploited to their fullest potential.  
4.3.3 European Investment Bank 
The 18 May 2015 Council Conclusions on the Common Security and Defence Policy make clear 
mention of the possible role of the European Investment Bank (EIB) in the defence sector. As the 
conclusions state: the Council takes note of the work on ‘incentives for and innovative approaches 
to cooperation, including pooled procurement, and on potential European Investment Bank 
support’.224  
This is an interesting development because presently the EIB does not invest in ‘the production of 
and trade in weapons and ammunition and inter alia, to related research, development or technical 
applications’.225 Nevertheless, one analyst has argued that such support could focus on promoting 
dual-use knowledge, skills and innovation and also loans could be used to finance dual-use 
demonstrator technology and capability projects.226 This is especially the case for SMEs where 
defence-related activities are but a small part of their overall commercial operations. Other ideas 
involving the EIB centre on providing a bank account into which Member States can make down-
payments for a defence-specific project.227 Even though any potential future role for the EIB would 
 
220 European Commission, ‘Report on the Implementation of the European Commission’s Communication on Defence’. 
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likely be restricted to dual-use projects, the EIB could be seen as a complementary – if separate – 
investor alongside the EU. EIB funds might complement EU funds made available under a future 
Preparatory Action (to be launched in 2017) on CSDP-related research. It is vital, as the EDA have 
stated, that the rules for participation in the Preparatory Action are worked out if bodies such as 
the EIB are to play any role in dual-use investments that are of benefit for the CSDP.228 
Box 3: European Investment Bank 
The EIB is owned by the EU Member States and it works closely with the Commission to 
implement EU industrial policy. The Bank lent close to €80.3 billion in 2014 but it has over €242 
billion of available capital, and, in-line with EU industrial policy, it can make loans to SMEs. The 
EIB can offer intermediated loans – i.e. loans to enterprises made through public bodies –, 
guarantees and securitisation to firms and projects and structured finance for high-risk projects 
(this includes a €3.75 billion Structure Finance Facility and a €10 billion Risk Sharing Finance 
Facility jointly run by the EIB and the Commission). The Bank can either directly invest in a 
project or support firms and projects to attract additional investors, and it typically invests in 
projects related to innovation, access to finance for SMEs, climate action and strategic 
infrastructure.229      
The European Investment Fund (EIF) could also play a role in dual-use projects. As of 6 July 2015, 
the EIB is a 63.6 % shareholder in the Fund, the EU – represented by the Commission – holds 24.3 % 
and financial institutions from EU Member States and Turkey hold 12.1 %.230 The EIF has an 
authorised capital amount of EUR 4.5 billion and it can fund a range of technology transfer 
schemes, venture capital, co-investment schemes, etc. The Fund has also been used for a number 
of regional development and sector-specific initiatives in the Baltics, Cyprus, Poland, The 
Netherlands, Turkey, Western Balkans and the United Kingdom.231 Of course, the EIF cannot be 
utilised for the production, research, development of and trade in weapons and ammunition, but it 
could – on a case-by-case basis – invest in specific dual-use projects under vehicles such as the 
Equity Facility for Growth (EFG). While there exist important restrictions on the role of the EIB and 
EIF in Europe’s defence sector, there is also scope to study further the role each institution could 
play.232 This is especially the case in light of the ongoing pilot project on CSDP research and the 
planned Preparatory Action. 
4.3.4 Societas Unius Personae  
The idea to establish a 'European defence company' is not new233; yet defining such a company is 
fraught with difficulties and sensitivities. The specific characteristics of defence firms in a globalised 
market are not easy to pin-down. 
 
228 European Defence Agency, ‘Preparatory Action for CSDP-related Research’, 18 June 2014, See: 
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Box 4: The idea of a 'European company' 
The idea behind a 'European company' lies in Commission efforts to realise the 2008 ‘Small 
Business Act’ for Europe. The Act recognises that SMEs are crucial for the competitiveness of the 
European economy, and the main objectives are to promote entrepreneurship, lower 
regulatory burdens, provide access to finance and to encourage access to markets and 
internationalisation. The Act is currently under review and a public consultation process began 
in 2014. The review aims to ensure that the Act is fully geared to meeting the EU’s ‘Europe 2020 
Strategy’. The proposal for a Directive on single-member private liability companies (Societas 
Unius Personae) was tabled in 2014, and the main objectives of the Directive are to reduce 
cross-border transaction costs associated with establishing subsidiary firms in other Member 
States.234 
Defence-related business may only be a small part of a company’s overall operations, and, with a 
number of subsidiary firms located outside of the EU, it is not easy to define what one precisely 
means by 'European'. Nevertheless, definitional problems should not dissuade further examination 
of the role existing EU law and initiatives can play to assist defence-related SMEs. Indeed, given that 
EU secondary law (specifically under the 'defence package') seeks to facilitate cross-border 
defence equipment transfers and to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market235, an 
interesting avenue to explore could be how a defence-relevant 'company statute' could facilitate 
even greater cross-border flows in the European defence market.  
In this regard, the Commission’s proposal for a Directive on a single-member private limited 
liability company (which would be known across the EU as a Societas Unius Personae (SUP)) is 
interesting.236 While the proposed Directive (COM(2014) 212) does not specifically refer to the 
defence sector, many of the aims of the proposed Directive have a direct impact on defence-
related competitiveness issues including a reduction in the costs and difficulties associated with 
cross-border trade for SMEs, and the promotion of clusters and the internationalisation of SMEs. 
Facilitating cross-border business for SMEs is crucial in the defence sector, especially as more than 
1 350 SMEs are involved in the European defence supply chain. As the proposed Directive seeks to 
harmonise rules across the EU for companies, and bearing in mind the extant security 
concerns associated with cross-border defence trade, a 'defence-relevant SUP' could be studied 
as a way to feed into the EU’s desire to see the 'defence package' further de-fragment the European 
defence market.  
Procedural adaptation 
The major difficulty facing investment in the European defence sector through vehicles such as the 
ESIF is that there are important restrictions on the use of EU budget funds for defence 
investment. While the proposed Preparatory Action on defence R&D might see the financing of 
defence-relevant projects out of the EU budget, until this time the EU’s ESIF can only be used for 
dual-use projects and to support SMEs, and, therefore, such financing vehicles cannot be used for 
'purely' military projects. While Article 309 of the EU treaty states that ‘[t]he Bank shall, operating on 
a non-profit- making basis, grant loans and give guarantees which facilitate the financing of [...] 
 
234 European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Directive on Single-Member Private Limited Liability Companies’, COM(2014) 
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projects in all sectors of the economy’ there are still tight restrictions on EIB and EIF support for 
defence-specific initiatives.237 In this sense, procedural adaptation may require a change in the 
operating rules of the EIB and EIF. Likewise for the idea of a 'company statute', it does not appear 
that the proposed SUP Directive automatically excludes defence firms – in part because it is 
difficult to define such a firm –, so there does not appear to be a need for major procedural 
adaptation save for the fact that greater analysis is required to understand the potential spill-over 
effects of the proposed Directive for the defence sector as a whole. 
4.3.5 Conclusions 
A number of Commission communications point to the link between defence industrial policies 
and the CSDP. Indeed, even the December 2013 Council Conclusions on European defence238 point 
to the need for a stronger European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) as 
prerequisite to an efficient and effective CSDP. The development of defence-industrial policies at 
the EU level not only seek to create a functioning single European defence market, which could 
lead to cost savings and economies of scale, but such policies are seen as a way to increase the EU’s 
strategic autonomy, enhance its ability to act with partners and to boost jobs, innovation and 
growth in the EU. The logic runs that the CSDP cannot be fully effective without defence 
capabilities, and that without a more efficient defence industry the EU Member States find it 
difficult to efficiently develop key capabilities, remedy shortfalls or avoid redundancies.239 A more 
cost effective and integrated defence market, which is stimulated by research and development 
investment, is seen as a key building block for a more effective CSDP.  
4.4 Regional policy support for defence capabilities  
EU economic and social cohesion policies, often called regional policies, may not be used to 
finance investments in military equipment or activities240. As such, the Structural Funds and the 
other instruments of regional policy cannot be used in direct support of the CSDP. However, if 
investments are dual-use in nature, the Structural Funds can provide financial assistance, so long as 
such assistance is provided only with a view to assisting the attainment of the civilian objectives241. 
The earliest form of EU regional policy support for activities related to defence policy were the 
community initiatives Perifra and KONVER between 1991 and 1999. These initiatives helped 
defence-dependent communities come to terms with the economic losses they faced due to the 
post-Cold War fall in defence spending and downsizing of military bases due to relocation of 
forces. They specifically supported conversion activity i.e. shifting land, industry and people 
from military to civilian purposes, although the overall funding was not particularly high 
(between 1994 and 1999 slightly over 0.5 % of total EU structural funds spending). Eligibility 
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depended on defence sector decline and high rates of unemployment in the affected regions, 
which meant that the then worst-affected member state Germany received about 44 % of all 
KONVER funding242. 
4.4.1 Existing links between the CSDP and regional policies 
Since 2013, the EDA has been working on trying to use the European Structural Funds to support 
dual-use technology development. Their route in has been a new EU innovation policy concept 
called the Research and Innovation Smart Specialisation Strategy (RIS3), which has been developed 
to promote the more effective use of public investment in research at a regional EU level.  In 2013 
the EDA issued a call for proposals and received 72 proposals from 12 Member States and 
decided to support seven as initial pilot cases. One, a Portuguese consortium of SMEs, research 
institutes and universities, was selected for funding. 
Box 5: The ‘Turtle’ Pilot Project (2013) 
 
Since then the EDA has been running seminars to raise awareness and has produced a guide to the 
process,243 as has the Commission244. It should be noted that if a technology can be used for civilian 
and military purposes, only the civilian part is eligible for funding from the ERDF. A second call for 
project proposals was made by the EDA in February 2015. National Ministries of Defence were to 
select projects by the end of May 2015 and the EDA would choose which to support with 
technical assistance for their ERDF applications by the end of July 2015. The EDA will look at other 
projects in the second half of 2015 with a view to assisting them to apply for other sources of EU 
funding such as Horizon 2020 and the Programme for the Competitiveness of SMEs (COSME) and 
 
242 Taylor, T., ‘Arms Procurement’, in Howorth, Jolyon and Anand Menon (Eds.), The European Union and National Defence 
Policy, London, Routledge, 1997, pp. 121-40 
243 https://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/brochures/esf-brochure (last accessed 17 August 2015) 
244 http://ec.europa.eu/growth/tools-
databases/newsroom/cf/itemdetail.cfm?item_id=8133&lang=en&title=Guide%2Don%2Ddual%2Duse%2Dfor%2DRegio
ns%2Dand%2DSMEs%3A%2DHelping%2DSMEs%2Dtap%2Dinto%2DEU%2Dfunding%2Dfor%2Ddual%2Duse%2Dprojec
ts (last accessed 22 August 2015). 
Firms: Silva Matos Metalomecanica S.A, INESC PORTO, ISEP, CINAV  
Funding: €770,000 
Objectives: 
 To develop Key Enabling Technologies (KETs) for a sustainable and long term presence 
in the ocean 
 To develop new robotic ascend and descent energy efficient technologies to be 
incorporated in robotic vehicles 
Duality: 
 Defence: advanced underwater marine systems and robotics extending the range, 
endurance and depth of operations possible to be performed in Deep Sea 
 Civil: allowing the development of new and more capable automated robotic 
solutions for underwater use namely on exploration, scientific data gathering, fisheries 
etc. 
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for cross-border projects INTERREG V245. There is of course no guarantee that the managing 
authorities in the regions will accept the projects sponsored by the EDA for funding, but the 
technical assistance offered by the EDA could be viewed as giving such applications a (possibly 
unfair) advantage over other project applications. It is also important that the projects lead to 
sustainable development i.e. that the ERDF is not used to prop up failing defence firms temporarily. 
4.4.2 Potential links between the CSDP and regional policies 
Conversion activities remain a genuine regional development need. Both Kádár writing about 
Hungary and Licata on Italy point out that many unused Cold War military facilities remain derelict 
and unrestored to civilian use246. Licata also points out that in Italy, as elsewhere, recent military 
spending cuts caused by austerity economic policies, coupled with changing security threats, 
have meant that the armed forces are keen to sell land and properties that are no longer needed247. 
Changing security demands since the end of the Cold War has meant that rather than 
predominantly defence armed forces, European states have had to adapt to the demands of crisis 
intervention, peace-keeping and other humanitarian interventions, which require different types of 
armed forces. Indeed the demands of the CSDP (and NATO) for more deployable forces has led 
many EU states to abandon conscription in favour of smaller, professional armed forces, which 
inevitably means base closures, which mean not just direct job losses but the indirect impact on 
local economies. France began a major base closure and conversion programme in 2008248. 
Similarly, cuts in defence spending and defence industrial over-capacity are meaning 
continued jobs losses in the defence industrial sector249. Often earlier national regional policy 
decisions have meant that military industry and infrastructure was situated in otherwise 
structurally weak regions, so resources to convert buildings and land, and alternative high-skilled 
employment are often absent. The Commission noted in its 2013 communique on defence and 
security industry that there was a need to use regional funds to support communities effected by 
defence industrial restructuring250.  
Some regions have been very astute about accessing structural funds money to help with 
conversion, and projects to redevelop military land have continued to be financed through 
European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) funds aimed at rehabilitating contaminated or 
industrial land251. This needs to be more widely publicised, as it may make decision-making about 
disposing of unneeded land easier for MoDs, thus freeing resources for other defence priorities.  
 
245 EDA presentation at ERRIN workshop on EU funding for Dual-Use : Regional Opportunities, Brussels, April 2015: 
http://www.errin.eu/sites/default/files/publication/media/EDA_EUfunding_x_dualuse%20-
%20ERRIN%2014042015_DEF.pdf (last accessed 17 August 2015) 
246 Kádár, K., ‘The rehabilitation of former Soviet military sites in Hungary’, Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 63 (4), 2014, 
437–456; Licata, A., ‘Conversion in Italy in the context of the economic crisis and the new conflicts in the Mediterranean 
region’, BICC Policy Brief, Bonn, 2015, Bonn International Center for Conversion 
247 Ibid. 
248 See for example, Gaymard, C., ‘Le patrimoine militaire sur la scène urbaine : les processus de reconversion des sites 
militaires à Metz’, Revue Géographique de l'Est [online], 2014, 54(3-4) http://rge.revues.org/5330 (last accessed 15 August 
2015) 
249 Independent military expenditure figures are compiled by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) 
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251 Answer by Ms Creţu on behalf of the Commission to parliamentary question E-010144/2014 asked by Werner Langen 
MEP, January 2015. 
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Perhaps because of the sheer scale of the problem in Germany, German regions have been 
particularly resourceful. Brandenburg combined ERDF and Interreg III funding to lead the 
Conver-net project in the 2000s, which aimed to share best practice on military conversion in the 
Baltic Sea Area, while Hessen expressly set the conversion of ex-military sites as an aim of their 
2007-2013 structural funds allocation. Other regions have found things more difficult. Kádár 
suggests however that the specific nature of the sites needing conversion means they are not 
always eligible for EU regional spending allocated to the region – she suggests that the size of the 
brownfield sites of former Soviet military bases in Hungary meant that communities were unable to 
access EU funding to assist them252.  
As defence spending cuts and changes to armed forces structures take place, there is also a need 
for retraining and reintegration in the civilian workplace for former soldiers. Here some use is 
already being made of the European Social Fund (ESF). One ESF-funded project in Somerset, UK, 
‘Active Plus’ gets injured military veterans to help give unemployed or isolated people a fresh start 
in life through delivering support and training. It also improves the skills and confidence of the 
veterans and aids their reintegration into the civilian workplace253. Another UK ESF project is the 
Veterans Contact Point, which supports former soldiers, who have come into contact with the 
criminal justice system, to access help and to improve their employability254. 
The EDA and Commission have made great efforts to publicise how structural funds can be used to 
fund dual-use technology projects. It would be helpful if similar efforts are made to publicise 
examples where communities have used EU regional and social cohesion funding to help 
launch conversion projects for land, industry and people and to share best practice. The ex-post 
evaluation for KONVER does not appear to be available on the EU website, but a summary of what 
worked well in earlier waves of conversion activity might be useful. 
4.4.3 Conclusions 
Although the Structural Funds must be used for civilian purposes according to the Treaties, the 
Commission and particularly the EDA have been proactive in their attempts to lever the funds into 
support for dual-use technology development. The use of Funds to support the CSDP is clearly 
limited by the Treaties, but the Commission and EDA could also publicise the ways in which 
communities could apply for support for conversion activities for people, land and industry that 
occur as a result of changing security priorities. 
4.5 Trade policy support for defence capabilities 
Trade in armaments and dual-use technologies are an extremely sensitive area of national and 
European-level policy. While the exportation of armaments raises serious questions about 
international peace and stability and human rights, states also view arms exports as a way ‘to 
exert influence in other regions of the world, generate external revenues, sustain internal capacity, 
maintain employment and keep production lines open to maintain capability for integrating 
weapons systems’.255 For a number of European countries boosting arms exports to non-EU states 
is a way to offset falling national orders for armaments and defence technologies, especially within 
the context of the ongoing Eurozone crisis and chronic short falls in national demand since the end 
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of the Cold War.256 Despite numerous calls for stricter arms export mechanisms on human rights, 
non-proliferation and international peace and stability considerations, there are also a number of 
economic and strategic reasons to be mindful about armaments exports. Indeed, a state may even 
erode its defence-industrial competitiveness through exports because international sales tend to 
involve transfers of technology, intellectual property rights and production to third-countries.257 
Given such issues, there are disparities between the EU Member States with some pre-disposed to 
relatively relaxed export controls and others opting for a tight national control regime. Not only 
can such disparities give rise to competition between EU Member States for international exports, 
but also such competition may stymie efforts for armaments collaboration in Europe; this 
competition can have a detrimental effect on capability development for the CSDP258. Additionally, 
such disparities are particularly important given that a number of EU Member States are signatories 
to non-binding international export regimes such as the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Nuclear 
Supplier’s Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Australia Group – not every EU 
member state is a signatory to each regime. Furthermore, the EU has been a vocal advocate of the 
Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), and it even invested EUR 2.5 million between 2009-12 (under Council 
decisions 2009/42/CFSP, 2010/336/CFSP and 2013/43/CFSP) in the ATT process. Furthermore, in 
December 2013 the EU adopted an additional support programme (2013/768/CFSP) that provides 
funding support to the EU ATT 'Outreach Project', which is designed to assist non-EU Member 
States strengthen their arms transfer control systems in line with ATT provisions.259 Despite such 
initiatives, there are two distinct export regimes in the EU: control of armaments exports and 
control of dual-use exports. There have been some noticeable changes to each regime since the 
Lisbon Treaty was signed in 2007. 
Both before and after the Lisbon Treaty armaments export controls have remained largely national 
in nature. Armaments exports are not part of the EU’s Common Commercial Policy (CCP). The EU 
Member States did nevertheless agree to an EU Code of Conduct on arms exports in 1998, 
however, the Code is non-binding in nature and it operates on the basis that Member States 
annually report instances when they opt not to export to third-countries. The Code of Conduct 
outlines eight criteria to guide national export regimes. The criteria state that before exporting 
arms the EU Member States should: 1) respect international obligations such as UN Security 
Council/EU sanctions and non-proliferation commitments; 2) consider the human rights situation 
in the recipient country; 3) not export if doing so may provoke or prolong conflict or aggravate 
tensions in the recipient country; 4) seek to preserve international and regional peace; 5) ensure 
the territorial security of EU Member States; 6) consider the nature of the recipient country and its 
alliances in terms of compliance with international law and involvement in terrorism; 7) halt 
exports if there is a suspicion that arms may be diverted or transferred to another country with 
undesirable conditions; and 8) only export to countries with the technical and economic capacity 
to handle the arms. 
Unlike armaments exports, the EU has more control over the exportation of dual-use goods 
and technologies. Traditionally, dual-use goods and technologies fell under the EC Treaty (TEC) 
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and this was reinforced when the European Court of Justice ruled in Commission v Spain (c-328/92 
1995) that the armaments exemption under Article 346 TFEU (ex Article 296 TEC) did not apply to 
dual-use goods.260 The first attempt by the EU to establish a regime for dual-use exports can be 
found under Regulation 3381/94/EC (1994) and Council Decision 94/942/CFSP (1994). In the pre-
Lisbon Treaty era, 3381/94/EC was regulated under the Community pillar, which gave the 
Community exclusive competence, but Decision 94/942/CFSP was managed from the second pillar 
of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and therefore under intergovernmental 
guidance. However, in 2000 the EU established a community regime for the control of exports of 
dual-use items and technology (1334/2000/EC).261 This Regulation overcame the previous inter-
pillar framework and ensured that trade and CFSP considerations were treated as one and the 
same policy as far as dual-use goods were concerned. The Regulation is applicable to all goods and 
technologies on the EU’s 'dual-use list'. In 2004 the EU undertook a peer-review of Regulation 
1334/2000/EC, which, among other things, identified the need for a database of denial notices for 
dual-use exports.262 
4.5.1 Trade policy after the Lisbon treaty 
The Lisbon Treaty had a particularly important impact on both the armaments and dual-use export 
control regimes. Indeed, the Lisbon Treaty enshrined the division and competencies of each 
regime by, firstly, renewing the single market exemption for the production of and trade in 
armaments under Article 346 TFEU (ex-Article 296 TEC), and, secondly, affirming the place of dual-
use goods and technologies export controls under the EU’s CCP.263 Despite the non-binding nature 
of the EU’s control regime on armaments, a revision of the Code of Conduct was adopted in 
2008 under Common Position 2008/944/CFSP. The revision retained the non-binding nature of the 
Code but extended controls to arms brokering, transit and intangible transfers of technology – 
thus building on the Council Position on arms brokering adopted in 2003 (2003/468/CFSP). The 
review also agreed to the publication of an annual EU report on exports, and reporting occurs on 
the basis of armaments listed in the EU Common Military List (last updated 9 February 2015). 
Finally, the EU has also engaged in a number of arms control activities with third-countries and 
near neighbourhoods (see Joint Action 2008/230/CFSP and Council Decision 2009/1012/CFSP). 
Where dual-use exports are concerned, the peer review started in 2004 led, in 2009, to an update of 
the Dual-Use Regulation (428/2009), which, under Article 9 and Annex III, obliged all exporting 
companies to acquire a license for all non-EU transfers of the listed dual-use items. In 2011 the 
Commission published a Green Paper entitled ‘Strategic Export Controls: Ensuring Security and 
Competitiveness in a Changing World’, which called for a common risk assessment approach; 
greater exchange of information; the gradual phasing out of national export authorisations in 
favour of an EU general license; a solution to the problem of intra-EU transfer controls; and 
coordinated enforcement across the EU. This Green Paper led to a public consultation period 
beginning in January 2013 and in 2014 the Commission adopted a communication on the review 
of the export control policy (COM(2014) 244). However, as of 2 December 2014 the Commission 
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could not ‘identify new actions it could put forward at this stage’264, although in a May 2015 
progress report the Commission stated that it will conduct an impact assessment – to be ready 
end of 2015 – on the various revision options. In 2016 the Commission expects to identify the ‘most 
suitable regulatory and non-regulatory actions’ for the revision of the dual-use regime.265 
4.5.2 Instruments, measures and procedures 
The armaments and dual-use export control regimes are undergoing constant evolution to meet 
the challenges of defence market globalisation. There have been a number of revisions to both the 
EU Code of Conduct and the Dual-Use Regulation, and in the case of the latter there is an ongoing 
public consultation. Any revision to the export control regimes will balance ethical (human 
rights, non-proliferation and international peace and stability), commercial (competiveness, skills 
retention, etc.) and strategic (technology transfers, alliances and partnerships, etc.) 
considerations. Yet the revision process for each export control regime does not occur in a 
vacuum and each regime is directly or indirectly affected by global developments. Such 
developments can include the potential impact of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP) and other free trade agreements (FTAs) such as the extension of the World Trade 
Organisation’s (WTO) Information Technology Agreement (ITA) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(TPP) on European defence markets. Streamlining European defence considerations into all FTAs 
could become standard practice at the EU level, as FTAs can represent both important 
opportunities and costs for European defence as a whole. 
4.5.3 Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
The TTIP is currently being negotiated between the EU and the US. Following a mandate by EU 
member state governments to the Commission to begin negotiations in 2013, the ultimate aim 
of TTIP is to abolish tariffs, enhance the compatibility of the EU and US regulatory environment 
and ensure a greater flow of goods, services and investments in the transatlantic space. The 
assumption is that the removal of trade barriers may help generate jobs and growth, to help 
cut prices and boost consumer choice, to influence world trade rules and to project EU and US 
values globally.266 The TTIP negotiations are not without resistance as concerns about health 
and safety and environmental standards have fed into the negotiations. The Commission has to 
relate to business, trade unions, public interest groups, the public and the European Parliament 
during the negotiation phase. 
The TTIP is being touted as a game-changer in transatlantic relations, although the terms of any 
agreement must be acceptable to both the US and the EU. The defence sector could be potentially, 
albeit indirectly, affected by the TTIP. In 2013 one scholar267 hypothesised that while the TTIP would 
raise serious questions about the longer-term nature of the European Defence Technological and 
Industrial Base (EDTIB), the Partnership could eventually lead to more interoperability, capability 
development and closer strategic relations between European states and the US. The initial 
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inclusion of defence-related matters in the negotiating mandate given to the Commission by 
the EU Member States raised serious questions including: how willing would the US be to remove 
barriers to defence-related trade? In a free trade area with the EU, would the US be prepared to 
amend restrictive measures such as the 'Buy American Act', the 'Berry Amendment', the 
International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR) and augment the purview of the Committee on 
Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS)? 
A year later in 2014, when it became clear that the public procurement of defence and security 
goods would be removed from the negotiating mandate, the same scholar268 argued that a TTIP 
might still indirectly impact Europe’s defence industry. This could happen, it was argued, because a 
number of dual-use goods and technologies could presumably fall under the eventual 
provisions of the TTIP. Yet such goods and technologies might still be used for defence-related 
products and services. Should defence-relevant dual-use goods and technologies be traded freely 
under the TTIP, but without any particular requirement to remove trade barriers such as ITAR and 
CFIUS, then European markets may be inadvertently affected. The potential impact of the TTIP on 
the EDTIB and the CSDP is unknown, but should the TTIP lead to closer transatlantic defence 
market integration questions related to European interoperability, equipment standardisation and 
strategic autonomy – crucial objectives for and prerequisites to the CSDP – could be raised.  
4.5.4 The Information Technology Agreement 
In July 2015, fifty-four members of the WTO including the EU and its Member States, the US, 
China and Japan agreed to extend the 1996 Information Technology Agreement (ITA). The ITA 
is designed to cut import tariffs on 201 defence-relevant high-tech products such as GPS, IT 
goods and semiconductors, optical equipment, lasers, touch screens, measuring and weighing 
instruments, electromagnets, electronic chips and circuits, machine tools, instruments for 
aeronautical and space navigation, etc.269 
The expansion of the ITA is significant because agreement between the fifty-four members are 
enough for a quorum at the WTO, which means that this level of support is enough to bring the ITA 
into force in all 161 WTO Member States. Given the ongoing revision of the EU’s dual-use export 
regime, it might be worth studying what implications the ITA could have for Europe’s defence 
markets. The reduction of tariffs on high-goods covered under ITA might well encourage further 
dual-use exports, and the EU could do more to inform industry and the community of SMEs about 
the implications of ITA; particularly in the context of the ATT, the EU’s dual-use regime and 
international regimes. 
4.5.5 The Trans-Pacific Partnership 
The Trans-Pacific Partnership includes Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Japan, 
Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, United States and Vietnam. Together, these 
states represent approximately 40 % of global GDP. Much like the TTIP, the partners involved in 
the TPP hope to collectively promote job creation and retention, innovation, economic growth 
and development. The broad framework of the TPP rests on comprehensive market access, 
development of regional production and supply chains, regulatory coherence, 
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competitiveness, the internationalisation of SMEs and market liberalisation.270 As it stands, the 
TPP may cover all goods and services sectors and it seeks to also negotiate a comprehensive 
government procurement package. Defence-relevant elements of the TPP may include the 
legal texts on government procurement, intellectual property, investment, market access for 
goods and technical barriers to trade.  
Even though it is not directly involved, the Commission could start thinking about how the Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP) might impact the EDTIB and the CSDP. Free trade between the US and 
its Asia-Pacific allies could adversely affect European defence markets. This is especially so as 
the TPP would be part of the US’ overall 'pivot' to the Asia-Pacific and along with trade comes 
defence partnerships and alliances. Indeed, the US maintains a number of defence partnerships 
and alliances with fellow participants of the TPP. For example, it signed a defence partnership with 
Australia in 2007 and renewed a long-standing alliance with Japan in 2015. Despite the fact that a 
number of US defence firms are supportive of TPP271, and considering that there is still a long way 
to go in negotiations before – and if – the TPP is signed, the combined effect of closer trade ties 
under the TPP and existing strategic partnerships in the Asia-Pacific needs to be analysed in terms 
of European interests. 
4.5.6 Procedural adaptation 
The armaments and dual-use export regimes have been subject to revision since the Lisbon Treaty 
was signed. The EU Code of Conduct was revised in 2008 and the dual-use regime is currently 
undergoing a review. In order to ascertain the impact of FTAs on the European defence market and 
industry, little procedural adaptation is required. Indeed, the Commission already has competence 
for the dual-use export regime and for negotiating the EU’s FTAs on behalf of the EU Member 
States. Many of the FTAs listed above overwhelmingly relate to dual-use goods and technologies 
rather than armaments, so the Commission has a crucial role to play. The implications of these FTAs 
could figure in the Commission’s own stocktaking of the dual-use regime and its work developing 
an EU-wide security of supply regime. 
4.6 Space policy support for defence capabilities  
4.6.1 The space-security nexus 
Long before the adoption and elaboration of a European Space Policy (ESP), the institutions of the 
EU have recognised the strategic value of space assets and their intrinsic link with security and 
defence.272 Over the years, this connection between space and security has only been 
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strengthened in the policy documents of the EU institutions273, finding its most explicit expression 
in the Commission’s maxim that '[s]pace has a security dimension and security has a space 
dimension'274. Likewise, the enormous potential of space applications for meeting EU defence 
capability demands has also long been recognised, though it has so far remained largely 
untapped.275 In 2008, anticipating the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the Report on the 
Implementation of the European Security Strategy reiterated the call for a more robust defence 
effort to develop key space assets as defence capabilities.276  
The 2007 European Space Policy echoes the need for improved coordination between Europe’s 
defence and its civilian space programmes'.277 The deployment of space assets for filling the CSDP 
capability gap is primarily framed by the parallel evolutions of an ever-expanding security 
concept and the recognition of the inherent dual-use nature of space infrastructure. As to the 
former evolution, it is noteworthy that initial references to defence applications of space assets in 
EU policy documents were explicitly civilian in nature.278 However, the formulation of the European 
Security Strategy saw the beginning of an evolution that increasingly blurred the line between 
internal and external security.279 This broad take on security cleared the path for the increased 
recognition of space applications as tools for deployment in security and defence matters, despite 
the civilian nature of the programmes in which they were developed.280 This process was reinforced 
by the inherently dual-use nature of almost any type of space technology. As to the second 
evolution, the dual-use possibilities of space assets has consistently been highlighted in EU policy 
documents as the defining feature of their potential for bridging the defence capability gap.281  
 
European Union and Space: Fostering Applications, Markets and Industrial Competitiveness”, 4 December 1996, 
COM(1996) 617, 2; N. Paradiso, “The EU Dual Approach to Security and Space. Twenty Years of European Policy Making”, 
ESPI Report 45, August 2013, p. 25. 
273 See, for example, Council Resolution of 2 December 1999 Developing a Coherent European Space Strategy, OJ C 375 of 
24 December 1999, 1, preamble; Commission, “Europe and Space: Turning to a New Chapter”, 27 September 2000, 
COM(2000) 597, 2; Council Resolution of 16 November 2000 on a European Space Strategy, OJ C 371 of 23 December 
2000, 2, point 11. 
274 Commission, “Space: a New European Frontier for an Expanding Union. An Action Plan for Implementing the European 
Space Policy”, 11 November 2003, COM(2003) 673, p. 17. 
275 See the critique in European Parliament Resolution of 10 July 2008 on Space and Security, OJ C 294 of 3 December 
2009, E/69; European Capabilities Action Plan report, 1 November 2002, ref. 13809/1/02. 
276 Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy - Providing Security in a Changing World, 11 
December 2008, Doc. S407/08, P. 10. 
277 Commission, “European Space Policy”, 26 April 2007, COM(2007) 212, 7. See also the calls for space support for CSDP 
capabilities in Commission, “European Space Policy”, 21 January 2003, COM(2003) 17, 24; European Advisory Group on 
Aerospace, “STAR 21: Strategic Aerospace Review for the 21st Century: Creating a Coherent Market and Policy Framework 
for a Vital European Industry”, European Commission and Enterprise Publications, July 2002; Council, “ESDP Presidency 
Report”, 9 December 2003, Doc. 15814/03, 10; Council, “European Space Policy: ‘ESDP and Space’”, 16 November 2004, 
Doc. 11616/3/04, § 24. 
278 See, for example, Council Resolution supra note273, point 7 and EC-ESA Joint Task Force, “Towards a European Space 
Policy”, Report Presented by Commission Communication, 7 December 2001, COM(2001) 718, p. 6. 
279 European Council, “A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy”, 12 December 2003, 7, noting that 
no threat is purely military in nature. See further European Council, “Internal Security Strategy for the European Union. 
Towards a European Security Model”, March 2010, 12. See further Commission, “The EU Internal Security Strategy in 
Action”, 22 November 2010, COM(2010) 673, 2-3. 
280 See the security and defence implications and applications of Galileo and Copernicus, infra. 
281 See, for example, Commission, “Europe and Space: Turning to a New Chapter”, 27 September 2000, COM(2000) 597, 2; 
Commission, supra note, 17; Commission, “European Security Policy”, 26 April 2007, COM(2007) 212, 7; Space Council 
Resolution on the European Space Policy of 22 May 2007, § 8; PSC, “Promoting Synergies between the EU Civil and 
Military Capability Development”, 9 November 2009, Doc. 15475/09, 4-5. See further Gebhard, C. ‘The Crisis Management 
and Planning Directorate: Recalibrating ESDP Planning and Conduct Capacities’, CFSP Forum, Vol. 7, No. 4, 2009, 8; Darnis, 
J.-P, Veclani A.C., ‘Space and Security: the Use of Space in the Context of CSDP’, November 2011, 
EXPO/B/SEDE/FWC/2009-01/Lot6/15, 21. 
Supporting European security and defence with existing EU measures and procedures 
 
85 
In 2004, the Council already outlined four ways in which the EU could activate space assets for 
security and defence purposes. These ranged from the use of existing assets and multiple use 
capabilities of civilian programmes from its Member States and space assets offered by commercial 
companies and third States, to making use of multiple-use capabilities of existing EU civilian 
programmes.282 Developments since then have shown the EU to have opted for the fourth option, 
by strengthening its independent access to space assets through Galileo and Copernicus (see 
further infra).  
4.6.2 Space policy and CSDP after the Lisbon treaty 
Competences and actors 
The increased nexus between the security and space policies of the EU has been codified in the 
Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) after the entry 
into force of the Lisbon Treaty. In tandem with the reinforced security and defence framework in 
the TEU, the Union has been granted an express competence in the area of space (Article 4 (3) 
TFEU). Further, Article 189 (1) TFEU explicitly recognises the close connection between civilian 
space programmes and military applications of dual-use technologies. The provision requires the 
EU to draw up a European space policy that, among other things, should promote industrial 
competitiveness and the implementation of the Union’s policies. As recognised by the Council, this 
may include the application of civilian space programmes for implementing CSDP objectives.283 
Article 189 (2) TFEU expands the ordinary legislative procedure to issues concerning space, thereby 
solidifying the position of the Commission and EP in those areas that touch upon defence matters. 
Both institutions have indeed exercised their respective powers to develop policies and enact 
legislation instrumentalising space for Europe’s CSDP.284 At the same time, recent legislative 
initiatives also point to a reticence to use space for CSDP.285  
At Council level, the most important body for the application of space capabilities for security and 
defence purposes is the European Defence Agency (EDA). The Agency’s objectives include 
contributing to 'identifying the Member States' military capability objectives and evaluating 
observance of the capability commitments given by the Member States' (Art. 45 (1) TEU)). To realise 
this objective, the EDA signed an administrative agreement with the European Space Agency (ESA), 
transforming the EDA into the linchpin of CSDP support of EU space capabilities post-Lisbon.286 The 
EP has called for a ‘permanent link’ between EU bodies and agencies in the areas of internal and 
external security, referring to the European Defence Agency and EEAS.287  
 
282 Council, “ESPD and Space”, supra note, §§ 13-16. 
283 Space Council Resolution on Global challenges: Taking Full Benefit of European Space Systems of 25 November 2010, 
§ 20. 
284 See e.g. the SST Decision supra note; Commission, “An integrated Industrial Policy for the Globalisation Era Putting 
Competitiveness and Sustainability at Centre Stage”, 28 October 2010, COM(2010)614; Commission, “EU Space industrial 
Policy”, 28 February 2013, COM(2013) 108, p. 8;  
285 The Commission proposal for a Directive on the Dissemination of Earth Observation Satellite Data for Commercial 
Purposes (COM(2014) 344) notes that it “shall not apply to the dissemination of satellite data […] carried out by or on 
behalf of and supervised by the Union or one or more Member States and is for the purposes of security and defence”; 
Art. 1 (3). 
286 http://www.esa.int/For_Media/Press_Releases/Signing_of_EDA_ESA_Administrative_Arrangement [accessed on 24 
August 2015]. See also Council Decision 2011/411/CFSP of 12 July 2011 Defining the Statute, Seat and Operational Rules 
of the European Defence Agency and repealing Joint Action 2004/551/CFSP, OJ L 183 of 13 July 2011, 16, § 8 (preamble). 
287 European Parliament Report on the Implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy, 19 March 2015, § 47. 
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The EU Satellite Centre (SatCen) assists in implementing the space assets developed in 
cooperation with ESA for support of particular CSDP missions.288 At the request of the Council or 
the High Representative, the Centre provides products and services resulting from the 'exploitation 
of relevant space assets and collateral data, including satellite and aerial imagery, and related 
services'.289 SatCen services are delivered to all EU Member States at the same time, facilitating 
decision-making in CSDP operations290, and making it a crucial player for developing CSDP 
capabilities.291  
Programmes, projects and missions 
Though conceived as civilian space programmes and operated under civilian control, the defence 
and security potential of EU’s Galileo and Copernicus projects is increasingly recognised.292 
Originally developed as Global Monitoring for Environment and Security (GMES), Copernicus’ 
security relevance was apparent from the start, though its potential for CSDP support in particular 
has only really emerged with the expansion and merging of the EU’s internal and external security 
concepts since the 2003 ESS. Security services such as border control, maritime surveillance and 
support to Union external actions, are recognised as important components of the Copernicus 
initiative.293 Copernicus is therefore considered vital for ensuring the strategic autonomy of the EU 
in general, and for its CSDP missions in particular.294 Still, it has been noted that the security 
component of Copernicus is in need of further enhancement.295 Conceived as a European 
counterpart to the American military GPS system, Galileo, too, has obvious CSDP relevance. Though 
not driven by military needs, the dual-use capacity of the civilian programme has led the Council to 
recognise its aptitude for support in all types of crisis management operations.296 Ultimately, 
however, CSDP requirements of Copernicus and Galileo capabilities must be compatible with the 
latter’s civil framework.297 
Security services that can be provided by or with the aid of space assets are numerous, and include 
autonomous threat assessment, earth observation and reconnaissance, navigation, positioning and 
timing, telecommunications, space situational awareness, surveillance and early warning against 
ballistic missiles.298 The most important CSDP services provided by Galileo are the Public Regulated 
Service (PRS) and the Search and Rescue (SAR) service, both of which will be offered from 2016 at 
 
288 Joint Action 2001/555/CFSP of 20 June 2001 Establishing a European Union Satellite Centre (SATCEN), OJ L 200 of 25 
July 2001, p. 5. 
289 Council Decision 2014/401/CFSP of 26 June 2014 on the European Union Satellite Centre and Repealing Joint Action 
2001/555/CFSP on the Establishment of a European Union Satellite Centre, OJ L 188 of 27 June 2014, 73, Art. 2 (1). 
290 SatCen, “Annual Report 2014”, 2015, p. 11. 
291 Space Council Resolution op cit., § 21. See also N. Paradiso, op cit., p. 50. 
292 See Regulation No 683/2008 of 9 July 2008 on the further implementation of the European satellite navigation 
programmes (EGNOS and Galileo), OJ L 196 of 24 July 2008, 1; Regulation No 377/2014 of 3 April 2014 establishing the 
Copernicus Programme and Repealing Regulation No 911/2010, OJ L 122 of 24 April 2014, 44. 
293 Regulation No 911/2010 of 22 September 2010 on the European Earth Monitoring Programme (GMES) and its Initial 
Operations (2011 to 2013), OJ L 276 of 20 October 2010, 1, § 23 (preamble). 
294 European Parliament Resolution op cit. , § 11. 
295 Commission, “Towards a Space Strategy …”, op. cit. , pp. 5-6. 
296 Council, “ESDP and Space”, op cit., p. 9. 
297 EU-EDA-CSG-ESA Joint Task Force, “Civil-Military synergies in the field of Earth Observation”, Final Report, 26 
November 2010, pp. 13-14. 
298 See the overview in Council, “ESDP and Space”, supra note; European Parliament Resolution supra note; Darnis, J.-D., 
Veclani, A., op cit. ; Veclani, A.C. et al., “Space, Sovereignty and European Security. Building European Capabiltiies in an 
Advanced Institutional Framework”, January 2014, EXPO/B/SEDE/2012/21. 
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the latest.299 If specific applications appear mostly geared toward internal security rather than 
external action300, the robustness of the Galileo signal has immediate value for defence missions in 
terms of resistance to jamming and involuntary interference. The range of services in support of 
CSDP is a lot broader for Copernicus. The S-prong of the former GMES programme includes a 
wide array of services with relevance for EU external missions, such as field support for crisis 
management operations, monitoring of post-conflict recovery, reconstruction and rehabilitation, 
treaty monitoring and non-proliferation.301 Specific projects are carried out in the framework of the 
Galileo and Copernicus programmes, and implemented by the EU SatCen, including G-NEXT and 
BRIDGES.302 
Space assets have been deployed by the EU in a number of CSDP missions over the past five years 
since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. Most notably, the EU SatCen provided security 
services to EUMM Georgia in the form of imagery analysis of infrastructures and activities in the 
region, including strategic facilities such as dams, and assessment of potential consequences of 
terrorist attacks303; EUTM Mali by creating city maps and other products analysing paramilitary 
activities304; EU NAVFOR Atalanta by providing imagery-derived geospatial products, including 
mapping a geo-database, monitoring know pirate bases and searching for militia, to the mission’s 
Operational Headquarters305; EUFOR Althea for the production of reference maps of the mission’s 
area of responsibility306; and EUTM Somalia by identifying suitable location for landing strips307. 
Support was also provided for other missions, including EUBAM Rafah and EUFOR Chad.308 Outside 
of the context of these CSDP missions, the EU has also provided space-based support for United 
Nations operations, in particular Supervision Mission (UNSMIS), the Organisation for the Prohibition 
of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) - UN Joint Mission and UNDOF (UN Disengagement Observer 
Force).309 Finally, the EU also assists in monitoring the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
and the development of possible nuclear facilities across a number of countries.310 
Copernicus’ security services are not only provided by the EU and its SatCen. A number of missions 
have seen individual EU Member States relying on EU space capabilities to meet their own 
operational needs, even in those cases where the Union is not involved as a separate player.311 
Conversely, in those cases where the EU is involved, it has become apparent from a number of 
experiences that the budding space infrastructure of the Union can still not meet its 
operational requirements to the extent that it also has to rely rather heavily on space assets of its 
 
299 See the Commission’s Galileo website http://ec.europa.eu/growth/sectors/space/galileo/; the EU Global Navigation 
Satellite Systems Agency page on PRS http://www.gsa.europa.eu/news/public-regulated-service-prs-equals-public-
security and SAR, accessed on 24 August 2015. 
300 See the reference to retrieving stolen goods, lost pets or individuals as the main applications of Galileo’s security 
services on http://www.gsa.europa.eu/galileo/applications, accessed on 24 august 2015.  
301 See http://www.copernicus.eu/main/security, accessed on 24 August 2015. 
302 See http://externalaction.security-copernicus.eu/projects-overview/g-next/g-next-nutshell, accessed on 24 August 
2015. 
303 See the mission’s website: http://www.eumm.eu, accessed on 26 August 2015. 
304 See the mission’s website: http://www.eutmmali.eu, accessed on 26 August 2015. 
305 See the mission’s website: http://eunavfor.eu, accessed on 26 August 2015]. 
306 See the mission’s website: http://www.euforbih.org accessed on 26 August 2015. 
307 See the EEAS website regarding the mission: http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eutm-
somalia/index_en.htm, accessed on 26 August 2015. 
308 See the mission’s websites at http://www.eubam-rafah.eu and http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-
operations/eufor-tchad-rca/index_en.htm, accessed on 26 August 2015. 
309SatCen, “Annual Report 2013”, 2014, 13; ibid., op cit. p. 290, 16. 
310 SatCen, op cit., p. 290,  15. 
311 See the examples of Egypt and Libya in J.-P. Darnis and A.C. Veclani, supra note 281, p. 9. 
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Member States.312 Indeed, the implication of the parallel space competence and the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality are that space assets to be used in support of CSDP capabilities 
may come from both Union and Member State infrastructure. As such, Italy, France, Germany  and 
Spain all have military systems (COSMOS/SkyMed, Helios II, Pleiades, SAR-LUPE, PAZ) as well as 
civilian programmes with security and defence applications (MeteoSat, SPOT, CSO, INGENIO) that 
can provide support for EU CSDP missions. 
Considering the importance of national space infrastructure for meeting the ever-increasing 
CSDP needs of the EU, it is crucial that coordination between Member State assets and their 
activation in EU missions and operations is further enhanced, pending the development of 
independent Union space assets. Various suggestions to this end have already been suggested.313 
The potential of the Lisbon Treaty provisions on permanent structured cooperation and enhanced 
cooperation in this respect should be noted.314 Both frameworks can and should be applied to 
complement the developing Union space infrastructure for CSDP operational support. Importantly, 
one of the tasks of the EDA in this respect is to promote broader participation in programmes set 
up by Member States and aiding their implementation in Union context.315  
Past experience has shown, however, that this potential of additional space capability support 
for CSDP remains largely untapped.316 In particular, the example of MUSIS (Multinational Space-
based Imaging System) shows that, if anything, cooperation between Member States in terms of 
space assets for security purposes is actively regressing. Having started off as a military cooperation 
programme among six EU Member States to secure continuity and coordination of national 
satellite defence systems in the framework of EDA-ESA cooperation by 2015, difficulties related to 
the sensitivity of security information have restricted its scope to a bilateral cooperation framework 
between France and Italy for the benefit of their national space industries.317 
4.7 Towards greater support for CSDP defence capabilities?  
Identifying institutional role and policy adaptation     
The preceding section has covered a variety of fields to look for the contribution of non-CSDP 
policies and defence cooperation. The examples of innovation policy, industrial policy, regional 
policy, trade policy and space policy have revealed ample examples of how these policies do or 
could support defence cooperation. To this end, the section has identified institutional and policy 
adaptations.  
Regarding innovation policies and following the analysis it needs to be considered where the 
wider aims and objectives of the innovation union can be used to assist with the spinning-in of 
more advanced civilian and dual-use technologies to defence firms. In fact, it needs to be 
investigated how best to align financing instruments as well as legal and administrative procedures 
maximise cooperation between the EDA and Commission and to prevent duplication or wastage. 
Moreover, it needs to be seen the extent to which the EU can realistically add value in defence 
 
312 The Libya experience demonstrated the difficulties due to a lack of EU-centralized independent capabilities of 
Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR). 
313 Commission, “Towards a Space Strategy …”, supra note, 6. 
314 See Art. 42 (6) TEU; Protocol No. 10 to the TEU, Art. 1 (a); Art. 20 (1) TEU. See further A.C. Veclani et al., supra note, 48. 
315 Art.  45 (1)(c) TEU. See also Art. 5 of Council Decision, op cit., p. 286. 
316 Darnis, J.-P., Veclani, A.C., op cit., 22. 
317 See the MUSIS – Federating Activities webpage at http://www.occar.int/174, accessed on 25 August 2015. 
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research, and whether its investment will result in a sustainable defence, technological and 
industrial base and procurement of the results.  
With a view to industrial policies, the success of the EDA in assisting dual-use applicants to access 
ERDF funding and the sustainability of the investment should be monitored. A better 
understanding of where such support works and where it does not is needed.  Building on the 
Council Conclusions on CSDP (18 May 2015), the European Defence Agency, the Commission, 
Member States and the European Investment Bank should work together to study the various 
avenues that could be explored with the EIB and the European Investment Fund for defence-
relevant R&T and R&D funding. In addition, an in-depth study needs to be commissioned that will 
look at the potential defence-related role of the EIB/EIF and their added value. The Commission 
could assess the possible effects of the SUP Directive on the defence sector. This could include 
consultation with industry and the Commission could play a lead role by analysing the benefits of 
such a company statute for the defence sector while it conducts its review of the implementation 
of the 'defence package' (due by August 2016).  
The analysis of regional policies has further showed that the changes made to the armed forces to 
support the CSDP and changing EU security priorities have wider social consequences. The 
Commission should in fact inform regions about how the Structural Funds can support conversion 
activities and act as a locus for sharing best practice. In trade policy, a stocktaking exercise of the 
direct and in-direct impact that TTIP and other FTAs (e.g. TPP and ITA) could have on Europe’s 
defence markets. More specifically, this analysis could assess how remaining trade barriers that 
might exist alongside TTIP would affect European defence. It could also focus on the opportunities 
that may exist for the EU under each of the planned FTAs and under the ITA extension. For all 
future FTAs negotiated by the EU with third-countries, the Commission – with the support of the 
European Defence Agency – could study each FTA proposal on the basis of its impact for European 
defence. Such studies will need to ensure that FTAs sit in compliance with the ATT and other 
armaments and dual-use control regimes, but they could also integrate commercial and strategic 
elements of these FTAs into the studies too. Such considerations may already be included in the 
Commission’s revision of the dual-use regime.  
Finally, regarding space policy, the full potential of the institutional framework put in place by the 
Lisbon Treaty in terms of space-CSDP cooperation must be exploited, inter alia by creating a 
permanent link between the EU bodies and agencies. Such links could relate internal and external 
security, on the one hand, and space, on the other hand, building in particular on the cooperation 
between the European Defence and Space Agencies, so as to maximise the independent space 
capabilities of the EU for CSDP missions as implemented by the SatCen. Furthermore, the study 
showed that efficient use should be made of the permanent structured and enhanced cooperation 
mechanisms in the Treaty on European Union to coordinate the deployment of EU Member State 
space systems in support of CSDP capabilities, in particular by building on the MUSIS initiative to 
increase participation by other EU Member States 
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5 Conclusion and recommendations 
This study focused on the support of non-CSDP policies for CSDP measures, both in the field of 
crisis-management and defence. To this end, the study focused on nine different issue areas of 
the EU which are of particular interest in the context of CSDP: European Neighbourhood Policy, 
development cooperation, internal policies and financing instruments in the context of the EU’s 
international crisis management, as well as innovation policies, industrial policies, regional policy, 
trade policy and spacy policy in the context of the EU’s defence policy.  
Given the interplay of CSDP and non-CSDP policies, other non-CSDP instruments and CSDP not 
only need to be coherent, but also supportive of each other:  
While the analysis of the legal-political background of CSDP showed on the one hand that it is an 
integral part of the larger CFSP, providing civilian and military capabilities as well as defence 
cooperation tools that the EU otherwise would not have in its external action. On the other hand, 
the study showed the specific intergovernmental nature of CSDP and, therefore, the need for an EU 
external action that is consistent with other policies. 
In each of the following policies, the study came to the following results: 
First, the European Neighbourhood Policy goals of political and economic stabilisation depend 
on the one hand directly on the success of conflict prevention measures and would benefit 
immensely from successful conflict resolution. Conflict-related policies and other security were 
seen as benefitting directly from successful reforms and state-building processes, which are at the 
core of the ENP. The articulation of CFSP/CSDP and non-CFSP/CSDP instruments was seen as crucial 
for the overall success of EU policies in the Eastern neighbourhood. The study pointed to the fact 
that the Lisbon Treaty has endowed the EU with a set of powerful instruments. Being under 
review, the future ENP should deliver a political vision encompassing both economic and security 
aspects.  
The nexus between internal and external policies revealed that a clearer coordinating structure 
and consistency between ENP and other EU tools and policies as Frontex and Europol agreements 
are required. Indeed, the study highlighted that the EU’s comprehensive approach can bring the 
EU’s entire toolkit together, be it in the fight against terrorism or in the context of irregular 
migration. Still, the analysis pointed out that EU tools are managed by different actors according to 
various logics of action, procedures and budget lines. The study showed that the EU should 
strengthen its structures of coordination and the role of actors in a pivotal position. In this 
respect, the study raised the hopes that the European Security Strategy clarifies the strategic 
approach with specific guidelines to improve the overall coherence and especially to better bridge 
internal and external policies. 
Furthermore, the analysis focused on development-security relations which showed that the 
Lisbon Treaty now provides a stronger framework than in the past to ensure that competition and 
tensions between CSDP and the Commission’s work are quickly resolved through inter-institutional 
talks and negotiations under the aegis of the double-hatted HR/VP. Regarding instruments on the 
ground, the analysis underlined that there is no shortage of tools to come up with joint analysis 
on risks to use development resources for security-related endeavours. However, new tools – also 
regarding the making of a new financing instrument – should be carefully considered.   
The analysis demonstrated in the field of defence cooperation that EU innovation policies provide 
considerable indirect and increasingly direct investment in dual-use and CSDP-relevant 
technologies. It also highlighted that more needs to be done to align the instruments and 
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procedures of the EDA and Commission so that they can work together more efficiently to avoid 
unnecessary duplication. The development of defence-industrial policies at the EU level were seen 
as not only seeking to create a functioning single European defence market,  but also as a way to 
increase the EU’s strategic autonomy, enhance its ability to act with partners and to boost jobs, 
innovation and growth. The study underlines that CSDP cannot be fully effective without defence 
capabilities, and that without a more efficient defence industry the Member States find it difficult 
to efficiently develop key capabilities, remedy shortfalls or avoid redundancies.  
In terms of regional policies, the study showed that although according to the Treaties structural 
funds must be used for civilian purposes, the Commission and particularly the EDA have been 
proactive in their attempts to lever the funds into support for dual-use technology 
development. However, as the study shows, the Commission and the EDA could also publicise the 
ways in which communities could apply for support for conversion activities for people, land and 
industry that occur as a result of changing security priorities. 
In the context of EU trade policy, the study underlined that the EU Code of Conduct was revised in 
2008 and the dual-use regime is currently undergoing a review. In view of ongoing FTA 
negotiations the study shows that the Commission already has competence for the dual-use export 
regime and for negotiating the EU’s FTAs on behalf of the Member States. In turn, the Commission 
has a crucial role to play. Many of the FTAs relate to dual-use goods and technologies rather than 
armaments.  
Finally, the study demonstrated that the deployment of space assets for filling the CSDP 
capability gap is primarily framed by the parallel evolutions of an ever-expanding security concept 
and the recognition of the inherent dual-use nature of space infrastructure. The increased 
recognition of space applications as tools for deployment in security and defence matters 
becomes ever-more visible, despite the civilian nature of the programmes in which they were 
developed. This process is reinforced by the inherently dual-use nature of almost any type of space 
technology.  
Based on these findings, the study makes the following recommendations: 
5.1 General recommendations  
1. Action across the whole spectrum of EU tools must be coordinated. Actors should be reminded 
of the fact that the Lisbon Treaty ensures that competition and tensions between CSDP and 
the Commission’s work can be resolved through inter-institutional talks and negotiations 
under the aegis of the double-hatted HR/VP.  
2. The EU should strengthen its structures of coordination (in particular PSC, EEAS) and the 
role of actors in a pivotal position such as the HR/VP, to mitigate power struggles in EU security 
governance.  
3. The EU's objective of coherence in general and the comprehensive approach more 
specifically should be ‘guiding themes’ in external conflicts in order to bring together more 
closely the different actors and instruments in all phases of the conflict cycles. 
4. The ongoing review of the European Security Strategy should clarify the strategic approach 
of the EU, including specific guidelines to improve the overall coherence and especially to 
better bridge internal and external policies.  
5. EU actors should grant the EDA resources and political backing so that it could become 
more influential, especially in view of improving the military capabilities of the Member States 
in view of Art. 42(3) TEU.   
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6. The connection between EEAS crisis management structures and the Commission should be 
strengthened to ensure that lessons learned travel across the full institutional spectrum of the 
EU and there is no duplication of learning processes. 
7. The current restructuring of the EEAS should be used to strengthen the intra-institutional 
coherence amongst different units in the EEAS (for example, CSDP departments) and the inter-
institutional coherence with other EU institutions outside the EEAS (for example, the 
Commission).  
8. EU institutions should be reminded that the Common Security and Defence Policy includes the 
progressive framing of a common Union defence policy, which can lead to a common 
defence, when the European Council decides so unanimously.        
9. EU institutions should clarify the legal options offered by the Lisbon Treaty, especially with 
regard to CSDP, by setting up a joint team of legal experts from the Council, the Commission, 
the EEAS and the European Parliament to sketch out the width of possible interpretations of 
relevant articles of the Lisbon Treaty (Art. 41 but also 42 TEU, and other legal bases to be used).   
10. The Council should be reminded of the added value of Permanent Structured Cooperation 
(PeSCO) for the deeper integration of the EU’s security and defence policy. It should be 
considered that an activation of such a policy can be done by a QMV decision in the Council.   
5.2 Specific policy recommendations for CSDP support in crisis 
management 
To HR/VP, EEAS, Commission, Member States and the Council 
11. Beef up political sections in EU Delegations to a) coordinate the drafting of joint analyses 
and strategies on the security and development nexus in a given country, and b) interact more 
intensively with Cooperation sections and Heads of Cooperation to assess potential synergies 
between available EU funds for development and their availability for actions having security 
and defence implications. 
To Council and HR/VP 
12. Establish Informal Coordination Groups for crisis management issues, bringing together 
relevant security organisations in the Eastern Neighbourhood such as NATO, the OSCE and 
the CSTO, the EEAS, EU military and civilian staff, and Commission staff from ECHO and 
DEVCO. 
13. Expand the mandate and the number of security experts in EU Delegations, to liaise with 
CSDP missions and hierarchies and to facilitate interaction with local security and defence 
actors. 
To HR/VP, EEAS, the Commission and the European Parliament 
14. Next to a revision of the scope of both the Africa Peace Facility (APF) and of the Instrument 
contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), other options, such as a new financial instrument, 
Athena mechanism or the use of the CSDP start-up fund, must also be considered.  
15. The ongoing review of the ENP should deliver a political and economic vision to support the 
resolution of conflicts and the management of crises in the Mediterranean, including by means 
of non-CSDP instruments. 
16. The revised ENP should address the political and economic logic of the Euro-Mediterranean 
Association Agreements, by applying a more generous approach to agriculture, which will be 
beneficial for the stabilisation of the region. 
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15. CSDP missions in the Mediterranean should, if adopted, be accompanied with political and 
economic instruments, as migration and extremism require long-term commitments to tackle 
their many root causes. 
To HR/VP, EEAS, the Council and the Commission 
17. Reinforce EEAS staff dealing with EaP, in particular officials responsible for liaising with EU 
crisis management structures, including EU Military Committee and CIVCOM. 
18. The Commission and the EEAS should promote the articulation between the FPI and the 
horizontal EaP unit responsible for conceptual and budgetary issues.  
16. Hire CSDP mission staff that have experience in development cooperation and are able to 
coordinate and cooperate immediately with EU Delegations managers of development 
cooperation funds in EU delegations. 
17. EEAS and European Commission should ensure sufficient training of development 
cooperation staff on SSR, Rule of Law reform and the security and development nexus with a  
view to ensure smooth joint early planning with EEAS and Member States. 
18. Establish joint transition, phasing-out and hand-over procedures between CSDP and 
Commission instruments, through early joint planning, as recognised by the Joint 
Communication on capacity building in security and development and the document on CSDP 
transition strategies. 
19. Establish more systematically security and development and cooperation coordination 
bodies at country level involving EU Delegations and CSDP missions with a view to ensure 
joint analysis and assessments to inform funds allocation by EU Delegations.  
To the HR/VP, EEAS and the Member States 
20. Establish rules and practices so that a joint EU political strategy (PFCA or another strategic 
approach) is a pre-requisite for the successful combination of peacekeeping, training and 
equipment of partner forces.   
5.3 Specific recommendations for the CSDP support in defence 
policy 
To Council and Member States 
21. The Council, in particular through its work in the Space Council, should build on the 
cooperation between the European Defence Agency and the European Space Agency 
to maximise the use of the independent space capabilities of the EU for CSDP missions, 
including implementation by the Satellite Centre. This objective should be taken into 
account during a possible renegotiation of the EU-ESA Framework Agreement and the 
implementation of the Administrative Agreement between the EDA and ESA.  
22. Those Member States whose military capabilities meet the required criteria should make 
more efficient use of the permanent structured and enhanced cooperation 
mechanisms in the Treaty on European Union to coordinate the deployment of their 
national space systems in support of CSDP capabilities, in particular by building on the 
MUSIS initiative to increase participation by other EU Member States. The Council and HR/VP, 
in addition to the EDA, should encourage such use. 
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To Commission and European Parliament 
23. Consider where the wider aims and objectives of the innovation union can be used to 
assist with the spinning-in of more advanced civilian and dual-use technologies to defence 
firms. 
24. The changes made to the armed forces to support the CSDP and changing EU security 
priorities have wider social consequences. The Commission should inform regions about 
how the Structural Funds can support conversion activities and act as a locus for sharing 
best practice. The European Parliament should ask the Commission to organise and 
implement such information initiatives.   
25. The Commission should conduct a stocktaking of the direct and indirect impact which 
TTIP and other FTAs (e.g. TPP and ITA) could have on Europe’s defence markets. More 
specifically, this analysis could assess how remaining trade barriers that might exist 
alongside TTIP would affect European defence. Such a study could also focus on the 
opportunities that may exist for the EU under each of the planned FTAs and under the ITA 
extension. The European Parliament should be informed about the outcomes of such an 
analysis.   
26. For all future FTAs negotiated by the EU with third countries, the Commission – with the 
support of the EDA – could study each FTA proposal on the basis of its impact for 
European defence. Such a study will need to ensure that FTAs are in conformity with the 
ATT and other armaments and dual-use control regimes. Such considerations should already 
be included in the Commission’s revision of the dual-use regime. The European Parliament 
should be informed about the outcomes of such a study. 
To the Commission     
27. The Commission should assess the possible effects of the SUP Directive on the defence 
sector. This should include consultation with industry and the Commission should play a 
lead role by analysing the benefits of such a company statute for the defence sector while it 
conducts its review of the implementation of the 'defence package' (due by August 2016). 
To Commission, Member States and European Investment Bank 
28. Building on the Council Conclusions on CSDP (18 May 2015), the EDA, the Commission, 
Member States and the EIB should work together to study the various avenues that could 
be explored with the EIB and the European Investment Fund for defence-relevant R&T 
and R&D funding. Assess whether an in-depth study needs to be commissioned by the 
Commission and EDA that will look at the potential defence-related role of the EIB/EIF and 
their added value.   
To Commission and EDA  
29. Consider the extent to which the EU can realistically add value in defence research, and 
whether its investment will result in a sustainable defence, technological and industrial base 
and procurement of the results. 
30. Investigate how best to align financing instruments and legal and administrative 
procedures in order to maximise cooperation between the EDA and Commission and to 
prevent duplication or wastage. 
To EDA 
31. Monitor the success or otherwise of the EDA in assisting dual-use applicants to access 
ERDF funding and the sustainability of investments made. A better understanding of where 
such support works, and where it does not, is needed.  
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